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Despite the global spread of the latest form of capitalism called neoliberalism, 
literary scholars widely privilege American and British texts when studying this 
economic ideology. This project, however, takes a transnational approach to a literary 
understanding of neoliberalism by turning primarily to the work of contemporary non-
Western novelists to complicate certain assumptions about neoliberalism. Chief among 
those assumptions is the recent argument by political and literary theorists that 
neoliberalism forms a global economic totality that is impervious critique, but the 
novelists considered in this project explore and demonstrate precisely how that work of 
critique is possible. These novelists write stories that narrate the limits of the totalizing 
vision of neoliberal ideology and examine how its contradictions play out in different 
geographic and cultural locations. Different aspects of artistic work form the basis for 
these critiques—production, performance, and reception. Novelists considered here 
interrogate how literary production itself is a space to critique the violent of work of 
capitalism even as the artistic labor that goes into writing a novel is simultaneously 
supported by capitalist market economies. Other writers examine how neoliberal values 
produce unique performative pressures that affect the articulation and display of 
narrative arts. Finally, some authors focus on the moment of a narrative’s reception to 
consider what it means to receive and interpret neoliberalism itself, which these authors 
consider to be an act of writing in its own right. Taken together, these novelists envision 
what it means to tell stories and produce effective critiques that neoliberal ideology 
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 INTRODUCTION  
 
This project began in response to a perplexing tendency within literary studies. 
Research on the latest intensification of capitalism, called neoliberalism, continues to 
widely privilege American and British texts, even as scholars simultaneously 
acknowledge that neoliberalism has a global reach. This continued Eurocentric method 
of critical inquiry is curious, especially when transnational theoretical approaches to 
literature are increasingly becoming standard practice. The following chapters grew out 
of a fairly straightforward initial question: What does a transnational literary approach to 
neoliberalism tell us about global capitalism’s continued effect on literature and vice 
versa? Implicit within that question is the expectation that transnational literatures make 
significant contributions to our understanding of how neoliberalism operates across the 
globe. Further, since cynical and even fatalistic arguments within Western literature and 
academic scholarship about the supposed indomitability of neoliberalism are easy to 
come by, I wanted to see whether a similar hopelessness appears throughout non-
Western literatures or if a slightly different narrative thread is discernible. 
Any answer to these questions first requires a preliminary definition. 
Neoliberalism is a hegemonic ideology that situates the capitalist construction of a 
naturally self-correcting “free” market as the organizing principle of political, social, and 
cultural life. Neoliberal ideology was first formulated in the 1930s, refined as a theory in 
the midcentury, and more forcefully put into practice in the US and abroad in the 1970s 




economic inequalities due to such practices as granting unethical loans to developing 
countries, financial deregulation, increased privatization, and massive tax cuts for those 
with the most wealth. Because of the global spread of neoliberalism, I approach it in this 
study primarily as a transnational economic ideology. While neoliberalism has different 
effects and outcomes depending on the local and/or national contextual sampling under 
consideration, the extent to which neoliberal policies have privileged private 
corporations adds a transnational dimension to its global work. While it is true that most 
transnational corporations remain linked to a specific national location (Keohane and 
Nye xv-xvi), the resource extraction and environmental degradation they initiate scatters 
and displaces indigenous communities, a key hallmark of the creation of transnational 
cultures (Vertovec 3). Further, the transnational movement of capital is “at once 
subnational and supranational,” a both/and construction that is visible in the uneven 
development of any “uniform proletariat” across the globe (Lowe and Lloyd 2). To 
understand neoliberalism as operating in a transnational manner would be to approach it 
as “theories and practices that cross national boundaries that need not be mediated by the 
state, the form in which the West is instantiated” (Lowe and Lloyd 6). 
Some standard neoliberal practices are greater privatization; a significant 
emphasis on individual responsibility, to the extent that individual freedom means the 
self-determination to participate in the market and increase one’s wealth; the protection 
of the market from state interference by deregulating financial systems; and the rapid 
accumulation of capital through risky investment in and trade of financialized 
instruments, such as derivatives and securities. As may be evident, neoliberalism has 




self-determination, a free market, and a general distrust of state interventions into 
economic affairs. But the two economic ideologies are also distinct in key ways, to the 
point that many critics refer to neoliberalism as liberalism in overdrive, so much so that 
it becomes a form of “market fundamentalism” (Prechel and Harms 4). Within liberal 
thinking, markets were constructed and viewed as “efficient means for producing and 
distributing goods”; however, neoliberal theories tout markets as “morally good in 
themselves, and thus should be applied to all aspects of life” (Prechel and Harms 4). This 
application results in two key shifts, one political and the other social or cultural. The 
political shift is visible within the tendency today to regard individuals primarily as 
economic subjects, and the socio-cultural shift is marked by the neoliberal drive to 
economize nearly all aspects of life by commodifying them for the purpose of extracting 
greater amounts of capital. 
First, the most notable political shift is that economic concerns take precedence 
over political matters in neoliberal societies, or, to put a finer point on it, the political 
becomes understood through the economic. Wendy Brown contends that this shift is 
what chiefly distinguishes neoliberalism from liberalism. The former is marked by the 
“neoliberal triumph of homo oeconomicus”—that is, the economic subject—“as the 
exhaustive figure of the human” which replaces the liberal subject that “governs itself 
through moral autonomy and governs others through popular sovereignty”; Brown terms 
this liberal subject homo politicus (79). Both conceptualizations of the individual have 
existed side by side for much of modernity, and it has long been the case that a subject’s 
economic participation never “extinguish[ed] his political features” (Brown 94, 




centuries, “quests for political emancipation, enfranchisement, equality, and … 
substantive popular sovereignty … are not formulated in economic language” (Brown 
94). Within political thought, the individual subject was not regarded first and foremost 
as economic; rather, from Adam Smith and John Locke to Jean-Jacques Rousseau and 
John Stuart Mill, the individual is a free sovereign dependent on others in a web of social 
and democratic relations with others (Brown 95). However, the shift to regarding the 
individual as an instantiation of capital occurs when the liberal model of the “political 
economy” was replaced by simply “the economy,” a change that emphasized the 
necessity of “macroeconomic growth” above the collective interests of the public good 
that former Keynesian models held as most important (Brown 82-83). 
This shift is further explained in Michel Foucault’s lectures on the biopolitical 
aspects of neoliberalism. He notes that from neoliberalism’s inception, political and 
economic strategists have faced down the key question of how to make sure that 
governmental practices are fully modeled on the work of the economy (131). The liberal 
goal of growing and protecting market spheres of exchange gave way to an emphasis on 
facilitating market competition, and this shift is visible in how people are encouraged to 
think of themselves. Homo oeconomicus is no longer the “partner of exchange” 
conceptualized in liberalism; now, this subject is an “entrepreneur of himself” (Foucault 
226), for labor is no longer regarded or treated as something abstract (or abstracted) from 
a worker. Instead, the worker “comprises a capital” with his/her specific set of skills and 
abilities and becomes capital, possessing “capital-ability” (Foucault 224, 225). Foucault 
contends that when neoliberal economists make this new analytical distinction, they are 




individuals are encapsulations of potential capital, any area of life can be experimented 
with to maximize profitability. This telos of neoliberal capitalism is perhaps most 
recognizable within the near-constant move to subject anything and everything to an 
economic rationale. This impulse is evident in (to name only a few social and cultural 
examples) the turn to sports analytics, the popular Freakonomics books, and the heavy 
emphasis placed in school on standardized testing. All of these are driven or explained 
by an economic rationale that assesses something’s value and necessity. Many scholars 
and critics note how this recourse to economic rationalization has over time enabled 
neoliberalism to take on the semblance of a social and cultural common sense, whose 
application to any quotidian matter is deemed an appropriate course of action. One 
outcome of this privileging of economic rationalization, is that there is little within 
neoliberal societies that cannot be understood as either a commodity or commodifiable, 
including the arts. 
Second, cultural and social forms frequently become economized because of 
neoliberalism’s hegemonic structure and global spread that places a premium on 
considerations of value, worth, exchangeability, and profitability. Accordingly, this 
study specifically considers how this latest iteration of capitalism affects literature: Is 
literature just another commodity? Are readers nothing more than consumers whose 
books merely possess exchange value? Do the hegemonic aspects of neoliberalism create 
social performative pressures that are impossible for the arts and individuals to reject, or 
is there space for resistance and critique, new modes of being and belonging? What 
formalist changes has neoliberalism generated within literature, if any? What limitations 




literature able to carve out a social or critical space that is not immediately subsumed by 
the work of neoliberalism? To the attuned reader, these questions may bring to mind 
echoes of Theodor Adorno’s mid-twentieth-century concerns about capitalism’s affect 
on aesthetics, and while I am indebted to the groundwork his arguments lay, this project 
seeks to expand on his theories by moving specifically into the terrain of literary 
accounts of neoliberalism. And not only that, but I also, as noted earlier, consider how 
the broader transnational network of novelists help us to more compellingly and richly 
answer the above questions. 
Therefore, I start in chapter two by establishing a theoretical understanding of 
what it means to approach neoliberalism from a transnational perspective. A key part of 
that discourse is the thorny issue of how precisely to categorize and conceptualize 
neoliberalism—namely, is it national, international, transnational, some combination of 
those, or something else entirely? And how does the way we answer that question affect 
our study of literature? I address these issues by tracing the contours of neoliberalism’s 
growth across the twentieth century through an examination of the differences between 
colonial capitalism and neoliberal globalization. Relying on the work of theorists from 
Rosa Luxemborg, Vladimir Lenin, and Frantz Fanon to Foucault, David Harvey, and 
Quinn Slobodian, I argue that neoliberalism is a global ideology with imperialist means 
and ends, the likes of which significantly alter prior understandings of labor, value, and 
production. I then locate these ideas in a specific literary example by turning to Hergé’s 
graphic series The Adventures of Tintin. I look specifically at one of the series’ earlier 
stories from the 1930s, The Broken Ear, because it questions what the value of art is 




the cultural and economic value of different forms of art are in the midst of the twilight 
of colonialism, rise of mechanical reproduction, and tendency to produce one’s art with 
the market in mind. 
Hergé’s question leads us to more pointedly consider literary modes of 
production, and chapter three covers how neoliberal values influence literary labor. 
Adorno’s arguments on the commodification of art within late capitalism are well 
known, but I return to a recent debate by Stewart Martin and Nicholas Brown about the 
contemporary significance of Adorno’s theories. They question whether art and literature 
can ever be anything but commodities or if their capacity for critique is neutralized by 
their commodified status. I locate answers to this debate within Ruth L. Ozeki’s My Year 
of Meats and Mohsin Hamid’s How to Get Filthy Rich in Rising Asia. Both novelists use 
their work to explore what it means to produce literary work within an age of 
neoliberalism, playing with the extent to which their (and any) novels can produce 
substantive political effects in the world around them. Both novelists acknowledge how 
their work is complicit in the very economic systems it seeks to critique, but they also 
envision how an artwork’s call for political resistance cannot be fully subsumed and 
neutralized by a market economy, either. Ozeki specifically uses her novel to show how 
art can spotlight neoliberalism’s contradictions in ways that create meaningful change in 
people’s lives. While she suggests that large-scale, macroeconomic concerns like 
corporate abuses and the violence of the industrialized food industry remain intact, she 
does note that significant reparations and social progress can occur through communal 
efforts of care and selflessness that are rooted in artistic work. Hamid writes his novel in 




forms and can turn the act of writing into simply another capitalist enterprise. Yet, at the 
same time, he also shows how the interaction between reader and writer is itself a 
significant communal effort of artistic production, where new forms of meaning and 
knowledge can be generated in ways that directly challenge neoliberal ideology. 
Since most areas of life are now subjected to economic rationalizations, chapter 
four examines how neoliberal values produce unique performative pressures that affect 
the articulation and display of narrative arts. I approach this issue in light of the growing 
tendency within economic theory over the past two decades to conceptualize the work of 
the economy as performative in the linguistic sense most often attached to J. L. Austin—
that is, that the act of naming something creates that which is being named. I trace these 
ideas from Austin to the present and connect them with Michel Callon’s theories of 
performative economics before considering how these ideas play out (and are 
complicated) within Gillian Flynn’s Gone Girl and Arundhati Roy’s The God of Small 
Things. The former contains literal performances—Amy Dunne’s staged murder—and 
performative utterances—the fake diary she constructs to frame her husband, Nick, for 
her murder. Flynn shows, though, that the performative pressures motivating Amy’s 
actions cannot be understood outside of the conflicts created by the 2008 financial 
collapse; further, Amy’s ability to effectively execute her different narrative modes of 
performativity crucially depend on her utilization of different privatized structures of 
capital accumulation that are transnational and/or international in scope—
plasmapheresis, derivatives trading, and mortgage-backed securities. Roy, on the other 
hand, explores how narrative art itself becomes a performance in deference to Western 




Kathakali dancers’ ancient practice of retelling Hindu history as a framing device, Roy 
shows how the influx of Western investment through entities such as the World Bank 
both alters and limits the performative possibilities of narrative modes. Storytelling in 
The God of Small Things becomes a practice tainted and appropriated by the hegemonic 
influence of Western neoliberal practices, so much so that indigenous cultural forms 
become nothing more than avenues for the continual selling-off of resources in a former 
colony such as India. 
But whether produced or performed, narrative arts require an audience, and 
chapter five focuses on the moment of reception, when a text is consumed or read, to 
consider how the interpretive work of reception does or does not afford agency to 
individuals. Moving beyond merely considering how the act of reading and literature 
itself constitute forms of cultural capital, I turn to two recent Latin American novels that 
question what it means to receive and interpret neoliberalism itself, as if the latest form 
of capitalism is a text to demystify. I first look at theories of reception from Wolfgang 
Iser, Roland Barthes, and Stanley Fish to understand historically what options are 
available to readers as they interact with texts before turning to Alejandro Zambra’s 
Multiple Choice and Samanta Schweblin’s Fever Dream, both of which target this issue 
through experimenting with the novel form. Zambra writes his novel as if it is a 
standardized test, and in doing so he comments on the neoliberalization of education in 
Chile; Schweblin plays with the conventions of the horror genre to cast neoliberalism as 
a system that generates environments of terror and violence. By altering generic 
conventions, both writers call attention to the contingency of meaning inherent within 




narratives, Zambra and Schweblin each show how the work of reception is inherently 
collaborative and that interpretive communities responding to neoliberalism can succeed 
in creating alternative forms of knowledge and meaning. In this way, Zambra and 
Schweblin’s novels connect to accepted theories of reception while also charting an 
agential space within the work of interpretation and locating it as an opportunity to 
produce a discourse that confronts the work of neoliberalism. 
Lastly, in the conclusion I consider some of the current and future challenges 
writers encounter when representing the often invisible work of neoliberal capitalism. 
Literature faces the tall task of essentially translating neoliberalism and its effects into 
legible terms via narrative form. Three novels in particular address this struggle. I first 
return to Hergé’s final and unfinished story Tintin and Alph-Art from the 1970s, where 
he revisits some of the concerns in The Broken Ear, only this time he queries what the 
lasting value and worth of Tintin is when private investment from the world of global 
corporate finance often supports the arts. Hergé’s conclusions act as a more cynical 
corrective to some of Benjamin’s optimism in the 1930s. Two more recent novels, 
Ghachar Ghochar by Vivek Shanbhag and The Emissary by Yoko Tawada, complement 
Hergé by considering how language itself is challenged by the rapid changes initiated by 
the global spread of neoliberal capitalism. Shanbhag notes how language must 
perpetually try to catch up to the present, an impossible task that can only come close to 
being accomplished through creative neologisms and the construction of alternative 
lexicons; Tawada, however, suggests that, even through the limits of language, the 
imaginative work of literature is still capable of helping us as readers come to terms with 




Finally, two comments on selection methods. First, this study covers only novels, 
not because other genres are incapable of speaking to the theoretical and practical issues 
surrounding literature and neoliberalism, but because the novel is uniquely positioned to 
engage with issues of economy, commodification, and interests. Novels continue to 
“uncover and historicize the economic paradigms of the present” through their formal 
and thematic changes that “speak to the epistemic changes” generated by neoliberal 
capitalism (Johansen and Karl 204). Indeed, the novel has always performed this kind of 
critical work by cataloguing “the history of the relation between subject and world” 
(Nilges 371). But we can also understand the novel as having always been the most 
capitalist of literary genres, either because it is the most profitable and bankable genre 
for authors that regularly dominates fiction bestseller lists or because of its political 
history, where the rise of the novel mirrors the ascendance of liberal thought and its 
values. In other words, the novel—whether a novelist wants this to be the case or not—is 
complicit in and reinforcing of many of the same market structures that the writers I 
study here are critical of. To paraphrase what Roy says in a recent work of nonfiction, 
Capitalism: A Ghost Story, everyone—novelists included—has blood on their hands. 
The writers covered in the ensuing chapters all use their novels to express their 
discomfort over the reality that the production, exchange, and dissemination of literature 
is caught within some of the more unsavory aspects of capitalism, yet they also consider 
how the political function of producing literature remains effective in its execution and 
necessary to undertake. 
Second, this study privileges global Anglophone texts, whether originally written 




language to write in, as the global literary marketplace still chiefly runs through London 
and New York City. However, the towering number of books published every year in 
English should not only be viewed as a sign of literary market hegemony within the 
English-speaking world. We can also understand some global texts written in English as 
a contemporary mode of “talking back,” a tradition with its roots in the mid-twentieth 
century as former colonies lambasted their oppressors by cataloguing their abuses in the 
language of the colonizer. On into today, I understand it as highly intentional for Roy to 
write in English and not Malayalam, for Hamid to choose English over Urdu, and for 
Schweblin to have Megan McDowell translate her novel from Spanish to English. 
Though we could understand these decisions as ones of personal interest—certainly few 
would object to the potential of having their book sales increase—we should also grasp 
the political imperative behind these choices. These writers produce novels that 
introduce alternative ways of viewing, thinking, and reading neoliberalism. This is 
perhaps less an example of the empire writing back, and more a case of a market 
irruption, a desire to narrate the contradictions, violence, and limitations of neoliberalism 












TRANSNATIONAL NEOLIBERALISM AND LITERARY VALUE IN HERGÉ’S 
THE ADVENTURES OF TINTIN 
 
To begin, two separate points in the history of capitalism. First, in his 1955 
reflections on the racial and economic violence of colonialism, Martinician poet and co-
founder of the Négritude movement Aimé Césaire contends that, no matter a Western 
power’s methods of conquest, the colonial project has always been devoid of “human 
contact” because it turns “the indigenous man into an instrument of production” (42). 
The result of this inhumane contact, Césaire argues, can be summed up by the following 
equation: “colonization = ‘thingification’” (42). Césaire positions the impetus to 
accumulate capital, capitalism’s raison d’être, as not only the engine driving 
colonization but one that ends up reshaping the pre-capitalist, indigenous world. As a 
result, “natural economies … have been disrupted” and “agricultural development [has 
been] oriented solely toward the benefit of the metropolitan countries” through “the 
looting of raw materials” (43, emphasis in original). Put simply, colonialism 
commodifies. Second, many scholars today describe neoliberalism, the latest iteration of 
capitalism, in terms that align with David Harvey’s—that it constitutes a “new 
imperialism” (106) precisely because the execution of neoliberal policies around the 
globe gives rise to a method of “accumulation by dispossession” that is “fragmented and 
particular” and, therefore, difficult to organize against (178).1 These two moments in 
 
1 Harvey appears to glean the term “new imperialism” from James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer’s 
assessment of the neoliberalization of Argentina’s economy and political system, where they argue that the 




capitalism’s history are, to be sure, markedly different from each other: Colonization 
was driven by decidedly more nationalist and territorialist modes of expansion, while the 
scope of neoliberalism is more international and transnational as its ends are achieved 
through privatization, deregulation, and imperialist interventions to protect Western 
democratic visions of “freedom.” For all their differences, though, we can also 
understand these shifts in capitalist method as unified by the continued dedication to 
expanding geographically, nurturing hegemony, and increasing commodification. 
First, both Césaire and Harvey stress that the accumulation of capital necessarily 
catalyzes geographic expansion. This, however, is rarely the story told about 
neoliberalism within literary studies. All too often, literary monographs that study the 
rise, spread, and effects of neoliberal ideology privilege American and British literature, 
despite their simultaneous acknowledgement of the global reach of neoliberalism.2 To an 
extent, this Eurocentric focus makes sense. As Frederic Jameson notes in his study of 
late capitalism’s effects on cultural forms, “this whole global, yet American, postmodern 
culture is the internal and superstructural expression of a whole new wave of American 
military and economic domination throughout the world” (Postmodernism 5). Therefore, 
                                                                                                                                           
enduring depression and massive impoverishment of the population [were] a consequence of the greatest 
concentration of wealth in Argentine history” (86). 
2 See Jasper Bernes, The Work of Art in the Age of Deindustrialization; Sarah Brouillette, Literature and 
the Creative Economy; Mitchum Huehls, After Critique: Twenty-First-Century Fiction in a Neoliberal 
Age; Caren Irr, Toward the Geopolitical Novel: U.S. Fiction in the Twenty-First Century; Leigh Claire La 
Berge, Scandals and Abstraction: Financial Fiction of the Long 1980s; Annie McClanahan, Dead 
Pledges: Debt, Crisis, and Twenty-First-Century Culture; and Rachel Greenwald Smith, Affect and 
American Literature in the Age of Neoliberalism. 
Some scholars, however, are beginning to shift their attention to a more global literary 
understanding of neoliberalism: see both Michael K. Walonen’s Contemporary World Narrative Fiction 
and the Spaces of Neoliberalism and Imagining Neoliberal Globalization in Contemporary World Fiction; 
Alison Shonkwiler, The Financial Imaginary Economic Mystification and the Limits of Realism (Chapter 





it is rather difficult to talk about economic trajectories without returning in some way to 
the US. But we would be wise to try, for Brett Levinson warns that any failure to 
substantively critique neoliberalism may stem from a similar limitation that 
deconstructionist thought encountered—namely, “the conflicts that ensued, at least 
within intellectual circles, did not take place between dominant and marginal voices, 
central and peripheral perspectives, canonical and noncanonical analyses, Same and 
Other” (Market 12). Simply put, when it comes to cultural understandings of 
neoliberalism and its effects, there are plenty of literary voices to bring to the table that 
are currently absent. 
Second, Césaire and Harvey underscore different modes of capitalism’s 
hegemonic power. I use the word hegemony in the sense theorized by Antonio 
Gramsci—that a dominant group’s power wielded over another group is not merely 
effected through a force of will; rather, the installment and preservation of the dominant 
group’s power also requires a measure of consent from a portion of the oppressed group 
(12). Césaire notes that colonial powers enact “the hasty manufacture of a few thousand 
subordinate functionaries, ‘boys,’ artisans, office clerks, and interpreters necessary for 
the smooth operation of business” (42). These are colonized locals helping to carry out 
the West’s administration of their own territory and community. Similarly, Harvey notes 
that consent to the notion that neoliberal ideology is tantamount to “common sense” 
formulates its hegemonic hold (39). By ostensibly standing for the protection and 
assurance of freedoms and universal rights, neoliberal nations are able to invade other 
countries on the suspicion that rights are being infringed upon or denied, even though 




determination” (Harvey 180).3 Which is to say that living within a neoliberal framework 
“is to accept that we have no alternative except to live under a regime of endless capital 
accumulation and economic growth no matter what the social, ecological, or political 
consequences” (Harvey 181). That necessarily includes the aforementioned geographic 
expansion of capitalism by violence.  
Third, Césaire and Harvey’s arguments, when paired, point to evolving trends of 
commodification. Not that the commodification of nature Césaire describes has stopped; 
indeed, the gutting of the world’s natural resources has only worsened as developing 
nations continue to modernize with the all-too-eager investment backing of the major 
Western capitalist powers. However, in addition to depleting natural resources, 
neoliberal ideology now establishes new methods of capital extraction by proposing and 
encouraging the application of economic analyses and rationalizations to formerly non-
economic spheres of everyday life. This stems from the neoliberal presumption that 
“markets and market signals can best determine all allocative decisions” (Harvey 165). 
Little exists today that cannot be filtered through assessments that measure the 
profit/loss margin, value, worth, or earning potential of an object, an event, an action, a 
partnership, etc. The commodification of “sexuality, culture, history, heritage … nature 
as spectacle or as rest cure … originality, authenticity, and uniqueness (of works or art, 
 
3 This has certainly been the case in Iraq the last 15 years. Brown points to the effect the Bremer Orders 
had on Iraqi agriculture in 2003 as a recent example of neoliberalism’s “instrumental rationality,” where 
market efficiency, rather than value, is all that is taken into account as the means to an end (119). The US 
met Iraq’s political crisis (social instability after years of war that led to the collapse of the wheat industry) 
with an economic solution (selling wheat seeds cheaply to farmers via agribusiness giants, such as 
Monsanto). Bremer Order 81, however, does not allow the “re-use of crop seeds of protected varities” 
(qtd. in Brown 143), which means that Iraqi farmers are dependent on continuing to buy seeds from 
Monsanto, and since the wheat provided is not part of the typical Iraqi diet, most of it is bought back by 
the US. Many Iraqi farmers are now “monocrop participants,” growing wheat to send to the US while 
importing “staples formerly grown on its own soil” (146). Iraq’s former “ecologically sustainable” wheat 




for example)—these all amount to putting a price on things that were never actually 
produced as commodities” to begin with (Harvey 166). 
This study, in turn, attends to just one aspect of culture commodified by a 
hegemonic neoliberal ideology: novels of various types—literary, popular, graphic. I do 
so by maintaining a globalized understanding of neoliberalism and turning my attention 
to transnational novelists. In the upcoming chapters, some Western writers unavoidably 
still appear, for as Jameson notes, it is difficult to talk about the effect of the economy on 
culture without somehow returning to the US or Europe. But I also consider novelists 
from nations that have their own complicated history with the imperialist spread of 
neoliberalism—Pakistan, India, Chile, Argentina, Japan—to understand how the current 
dominant capitalist ideology affects literary production, performance, and reception at 
different sites of contact. There is a troubling tendency within recent scholarship to 
speak of neoliberalism as an indomitable monolith, in that any critique of neoliberalism 
can be understood as simultaneously denouncing and supporting its values.4 However, 
literary representations and critiques of neoliberalism helpfully complicate that picture. 
Instead, it makes sense to speak of a “family of neoliberalisms” due to the “plurality of 
views” that make up conceptualizations of neoliberal theory (Plehwe et al. 2), and 
indeed, as I will discuss later, neoliberal theories contain key differences from Germany, 
Austria, and on to the US.  
 
4 See Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution, Smith, and Huehls. Harvey 
also notes that this is one complication that neoliberal ideology presents to those who would try to critique 
or resist its influence. For instance, the language of human rights directly plays into “the neoliberal 
insistence upon the individual as the foundational element in political-economic life” (176). When groups 
opposed to neoliberalism focus on those rights instead of “the creation or re-creation of substantive and 
open democratic governance structures, the opposition cultivates methods that cannot escape the 
neoliberal frame” (176). To a different extent, the US has made appeals to human rights to “justify 
imperialist interventions” and “military humanism” in the late-twentieth century and early-twenty-first 




By joining Césaire and Harvey’s arguments and identifying a common thread, 
my point is not to suggest there is a coherent narrative of capitalism covering the last 60 
years. Such an account neither exists nor would it tell an accurate story. What I do intend 
to stress, though, is how certain economic and political changes of the last 60 years help 
to explain the heightened commodification of the artistic process. Capitalism has 
certainly not gone away after decolonizing efforts in the mid-twentieth century; 
therefore, neither has the commodified world. Indeed, if colonization sent capitalism 
abroad and “thingified” formerly non-commodified realms of everyday life, we see a 
similar, if also distinct, impetus within methods of neoliberal capitalism to thingify areas 
or resources formerly regarded as non-economic. In order to understand these 
developments, I argue we must grasp how capitalism has also changed. We cannot 
understand shifts like these without attending to the transition from colonial capitalism 
to neoliberalism. In order to do that, I turn to theorists from the past century—Rosa 
Luxemburg, Vladimir Lenin, and Frantz Fanon—to understand how some of the key 
aspects of neoliberal ideology already existed within colonial capitalism. By placing 
these theorists in conversation with more recent scholars—Michel Foucault, Quinn 
Slobodian, and Harvey—we gain a clearer understanding of how neoliberalism becomes 
the next development in Western imperialism and that such a conceptualization has 
important ramifications for how we approach contemporary transnational literary 
accounts of neoliberalism at work. From there, I turn to Hergé’s The Adventures of 
Tintin, an earlier literary example that narrativizes the concerns surrounding the 





Colonial Capitalism: From Territory to Finance 
Determining when exactly neoliberalism “begins” continues to be open to debate. 
Harvey and many others privilege the 1970s with the coup in Chile and global oil crisis 
as key points in neoliberalism’s growth. However, Foucault looks to the formulation of 
ordoliberalism by the Freiburg School in 1930s Germany as the genesis for what we 
think of today as neoliberalism. Further, according to Giovanni Arrighi, many of the 
cycles of high financialization we tend to associate with neoliberalism form a fairly 
consistent pattern over the last 500 years, where an economic hegemon initially pursues 
commodity trade and territorial acquisition only to shift to more immaterial forms of 
capital accumulation via international investment of their accumulated surplus. 
Regardless of the disagreements over periodization, all of these scholars agree that 
contemporary forms of capitalism are imperialist or hegemonic, but even that claim 
necessitates clarification and historical context. 
For instance, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri differentiate between the terms 
colonialism and Empire, where colonialism is best understood as a militaristic, physical 
occupation of another territory, while Empire (or imperialism) is the continued 
dominance over, disenfranchisement of, and oppression of another territory via chiefly 
financial efforts (xii-xiv). Though Hardt and Negri’s claims are instructive, they are also 
overstated. Their conviction that the rise of financialized imperialism signals something 
completely new and alternative to what colonial powers have practiced throughout 
history does not stand up well to the burden of proof. Colonial hegemony, as Césaire 




Western desire for economic prowess.5 The same is true of neoliberal imperialism 
throughout the twentieth century and today. What has changed, however, in the shift 
from colonialism to neoliberalism are the means to the end of building economic 
prowess. Imperialism via a long-term physical, militant occupation of a colony and 
claiming it for the mother country is an approach now expanded and supplemented by 
economic modes of oppression. 
Today and in the last 70 years, imperialism spreads and is facilitated through 
international loans given to developing nations, many of whom default and lose a 
substantial portion of their political sovereignty to their lending nation.6 This pattern of 
financial imperialism, however, is not entirely new. Both Rosa Luxemburg and Vladimir 
Lenin identify how late colonial powers increasingly relied on economic methods to 
achieve their political ends, methods that Frantz Fanon would later expand on to 
understand how the violent inequality between the post-colony and its former colonizer 
was facilitated through financial means. These critics and theorists, among others, all 
made these claims across the first half of the twentieth century. What is compelling, 
however, is how all of these writers presciently or diagnostically identify the shift 
toward a form of imperialism that was chiefly driven and supported by financialization 
in an increasingly globalized world. 
 
5 Jason W. Moore has more recently argued that this is not necessarily unique to colonialism, either; 
rather, it has been the modus operandi of capitalism since the fifteenth century. Its industrial expansion has 
long been predicated on free work and an attendant Human/Nature split that excludes some populations 
from the category of Human and assigns them to Nature instead, which means they could be exploited in 
the race to accumulate more capital (79). 
6 This is a process Harvey describes as the “neoliberal state in practice” that has been seen in nations from 




For her part, Luxemburg identifies over-accumulation as “the problem,” the 
“characteristic phenomenon” of capitalism that creates financial crises and intensifies 
global economic inequality (190, emphasis in original). The core of this problem is the 
surplus value that capitalist production generates to proportions so large that the 
capitalist class can neither consume it nor funnel it back into the market without 
triggering a price collapse. At first, the capitalist class will hang on to its surplus value, 
“not for the purpose of hoarding,” but so that it can be put to work for greater 
capitalization. That, however, will require finding “the material prerequisites for its 
activity forthcoming” (Luxemburg 84), and within the confines of one nation, capitalists 
will at some point run out of “any buyers whatever for the commodities in which the 
accumulated part of the surplus value is embodied,” and that leaves only one option: 
“foreign trade” (Luxemburg 108). But this will not solve the problem of excess capital, 
for “the difficulties implicit in the analysis are simply shifted—quite unresolved—from 
one country to another” (Luxemburg 108). But capitalists have to locate “the economic 
demand for the surplus product” (Luxemburg 128). 
That necessary demand can be generated within societies that are not yet 
capitalist (Luxemburg 332). This is initiated by the “incessant transition from non-
capitalist to capitalist conditions of labour power that is cast off by pre-capitalist, not 
capitalist, modes of production in their progressive breakdown and disintegration” 
(Luxemburg 342). To do this, advanced capitalist nations have pursued the natural 
resources and non-white labor power of non-capitalist regions. Though the modes of 
production in these regions are at first non-capitalist, invading Western nations will 




own borders (Luxemburg 345-46); however, if profitable accumulation is to continue 
apace, Western nations cannot wait for pre-capitalist territories to become capitalist 
organically. Therefore, it is imperative that social structures and “primitive associations” 
in colonized communities be destroyed, since they stand as the strongest impediment to 
capitalism’s development; indeed, “[f]orce is the only solution open to capital,” and 
military occupation quickly follows (Luxemburg 350-51).7 Once a territory’s 
independence has been removed, a commodity economy will be introduced as soon as 
possible to replace the natural economy, and this usually begins with large-scale 
endeavors to build modern transport that facilitates the colonizer’s powers of extortion 
and their pirating of resources.8 The goal is to force the peasant economy to buy the 
colonizer’s commodities instead of its own, and this is quickly achieved by secluding 
peasants to one economic sphere: agriculture. Over time, though, even that sphere will 
be subjected to a commodified transition.9 
The irony is that capitalism cannot grow beyond its national borders without the 
initial assistance of pre-capitalist institutions, yet it also cannot go on afterward if these 
same territories do not become capitalist themselves. The accumulation of capital is only 
possible if it simultaneously obliterates pre-capitalist stanchions. Alluding to Marx, 
Luxemburg notes that theoretically there should be a point when the accumulation of 
capital must cease, but that is why imperialism is the historical imperative for 
 
7 British involvement in India and French policies in Algeria are cases in point. See Chapter 27, “The 
Struggle against Natural Economy”, in The Accumulation of Capital. 
8 England’s Opium Wars in China are an example. See Chapter 28, “The Introduction of Commodity 
Economy”, in The Accumulation of Capital. 
9 This occurred with agriculture in the post-bellum US. See Chapter 29, “The Struggle against Peasant 




capitalism’s continuance (397-98).10 When there seems to be no available use-form 
anymore for a nation’s over-accumulated capital, the nation can funnel it via 
international loans to developing nations to successfully broaden the possibilities for 
future accumulation.11 The lending Western country is happy to provide funds and 
materials to jumpstart production in the borrowing nation, since that accumulated capital 
sat in its coffers unused. Thus, “there has come about, voluntarily or by force, a new 
demand of the non-capitalist strata” (Luxemburg 407). The developing nation 
continually borrows to finance projects that would modernize its infrastructure, a plan 
that seems “to reach the height of madness,” but the lending colonizer is happy to watch 
its current or former colony fall into perpetual debt (Luxemburg 415). When the 
borrowing colony is unable to pay its crippling interest, the Western lender can 
commission regulations for the colony’s finances, thereby wielding enormous power 
over its political process. This ensures that oversight with militaristic occupation and 
force will follow, what Luxemburg labels “the executor of the accumulation of capital” 
that is “lurking behind international loans, railroad building, irrigation systems, and 
similar works of civilisation” (419). 
The main shift today within neoliberalism from what Luxemburg describes is the 
way that these lending and collection services are now facilitated by international 
lending groups established by (and after) the Bretton Woods Agreement—the World 
Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Trade Organization (WTO). But 
 
10 Luxemburg is also confident in capitalism’s future collapse because of its predilection for over-
accumulation. Even though, more than a hundred years later, capitalist systems seem stronger than ever, 
Luxemburg’s arguments remain crucial today due to the careful manner in which she provides a historical 
account of how and why capitalism operates in an imperialist mode. 
11 Luxemburg identifies a future problem here, though: Lending runs the risk of “creating new competition 




Luxemburg helps to remind us that the kind of loan-based imperialism we associate with 
neoliberalism today has a much longer history, one rooted in nineteenth-century colonial 
capitalist expansion. The industrialization of a colony’s natural resources, establishment 
of ports from which to export those resources, and the construction of modern industrial 
forms of travel, such as railroads, are all signs of a successful capitalist takeover of pre-
capitalist territory. Yet, at the same time, all of these would have been built on the 
financial backing of Western loans that rapidly place a colony in irrevocable debt to its 
colonizer. The seeds of today’s neoliberal methods of economic expansion are evident 
within the colonial work of industrial capitalism. 
For Vladimir Lenin, this capitalist invasion via developmental loans is what 
defines “modern capitalism” and its imperialist drive (62). Surplus capital ultimately has 
to be invested abroad wherever “capital is scarce, the price of land is relatively low, 
wages are low, [and] raw materials are cheap” (Lenin 63). Governments in developing 
nations are glad to undertake industrial projects like railways at the behest of Western 
capitalist powers because they bring an influx of capital. Lenin notes that none of these 
developing nations would refuse these loans, lest the lending Western nation move on to 
one of the developing nation’s rivals with its investment. But this export of capital 
through developmental loans also has a generative effect by turning the borrowing 
nation into a potential political pawn. 
Lenin claims that this turn toward finance capital requires us to redefine 
imperialism because of the “historical place of this stage of capitalism” (90). He does not 
label this shift as something never seen before, though. Instead, he adds this qualifier: 




and, consequently, it would be absurd to discuss the exact year or the decade in which 
imperialism ‘definitely’ became established” (90). Lenin’s arguments are instructive 
here because they provide a much earlier caution to the aforementioned work of Hardt 
and Negri, who argue that we are seeing something wholly new within imperialist modes 
of finance capital. But Lenin argues otherwise.12 What he is willing to characterize as 
“new” within late capitalism are the “obvious features of something transitory,” where 
“free competition and monopoly” are combined (40). This vaguely defined “transitory” 
feature leads Lenin to ask what this form of capitalism will lead to, and by “transitory” 
he means banking is now its own industry, a sector of the business world where labor is 
largely immaterial (40). But manual labor is certainly still required, and material 
commodities are still at play. Luxemburg notes that, try as capitalist nations might, the 
social element of material labor cannot be eliminated from economic processes when we 
consider that there is no part of a commodity’s value that does not somehow involve 
human labor that both “creates value” and also leads to “value-in-use” (37-38).13 Lenin’s 
reference to immateriality, however, appears to refer to the Western side of the capitalist 
equation and how the economic work of the West in the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth century becomes increasingly ghostlike, predicated on the movement of money 
 
12 Though Lenin, writing in the early 1900s, marvels at how the work of finance capital has surpassed 
commodity trading, Arrighi has also persuasively shown how this, too, is nothing new. The shift from a 
commodity-driven economy to one of finance capital and lending has been the pattern that the past four 
economic hegemons of the last 500 years have followed, the four being the Genoese, Dutch, English, and 
American financial empires; see The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our 
Times. 
13 Lenin’s arguments anticipate the twentieth-century Italian Marxists, or Autonomists, who argue that 
labor is largely immaterial now. This is a rather narrow view of capitalism, one that considers only the 
financialized metropole and not the developing world where much of the material labor that necessarily 
underpins modern luxury and convenience has been outsourced. For arguments against contemporary 
theorizations of labor’s immateriality, see Brouillette, Literature and the Creative Economy (Chapter 2) 




via investments, credit, and interest. Some of the privileges Western lenders acquire via 
developmental loans beyond their centers of finance are certainly intangible—
commercial and political interest, future contracts—but others are also specifically 
material, too—natural resources, territory for industrial expansion (Lenin 65). 
Lenin’s arguments anticipate Frantz Fanon’s study of the political and economic 
situation in the post-colony. Writing with France’s occupation of Algeria in mind, Fanon 
takes specific interest in the ways the Western colonizer continues to dominate the 
former colony from afar after it ostensibly gains independence. Of key importance is the 
involvement of the comprador class, or “nationalist bourgeoisie” (Fanon, Wretched 62), 
which is devoted to compromising with the former colonizer because it does not want to 
lose any financial benefits derived from an economy built on exports. The comprador 
class has had a taste of modern living and would prefer to hold onto it, so they separate 
themselves from peasant rebels. The former colonizer keeps peaceable ties open with the 
comprador class because it still needs the cheap labor and natural resources the former 
colony offers to buoy its economic interests. Therefore, a colony could gain 
independence without the economic relationship changing at all (Fanon, Wretched 65-
67).14 
As imperial countries continue to build their wealth by exploiting colonies, that 
economic disparity remains a stranglehold. Western nations will not invest if they see 
there is political instability, but newly-independent colonies need money, so an 
economic pact will be struck that allows the Western nation to continue to have political 
 
14 Lenin foresaw much of the same, arguing that imperialism “creates the economic possibility of 
corrupting the upper strata of the proletariat, and thereby fosters … opportunism” (104). It has “the 
tendency to create privileged sections even among the workers, and to detach them from the main 




input in the former colony (Fanon, Wretched 101-4). Lenin argues, via economist Rudolf 
Hilferding, that this kind of political arrangement will only result in greater political 
unrest. Hilferding notes that capitalist occupation and oppression cannot occur ad 
infinitum without colonized people eventually being awoken to “national 
consciousness.” Over time, the colonized will pursue the same goal European powers 
had in the past: “the creation of a united national state as a means to economic and 
cultural freedom.” The only way for European nations to avoid this scenario is “by 
continually increasing [their] means of exerting violence” (qtd. in Lenin 121). 
Fanon, however, observes that former colonizers also have help from the 
comprador class within the developing nation, since independence becomes an attempted 
money grab on their part. For example, industries are not revamped or set up to benefit 
the former colony; instead, they continue to export to the former colonizer, who gladly 
participates in this continued profitable degradation of its former colony (Fanon, 
Wretched 150-54). This neocolonial form of control inevitably and ultimately takes a 
neoliberal turn when, through economic incentivizing and unequal distribution of 
wealth, the former colonizer continues to control the now “independent” nation with 
help from the comprador class. The newly-independent government exploits its own 
people and their resources for the sake of funds from the former (and still-present) 
colonizer (Fanon, Wretched 166-67). Little, then, has changed since independence, 
except that the methods of economic and political exploitation have changed. While 
developmental loans have aided the brutal work of Western colonialism since the 
nineteenth century, they also facilitate a specific shift from militant colonialism to 




becoming less and less necessary when entities like the World Bank and IMF allow for 
political takeover in a specifically financial manner. If a nation is unable to pay the 
interest on their loans, structural readjustments or economic reform is forced upon the 
borrowing nation at the behest of the nations who hold the largest voting share in the 
World Bank and IMF. Not coincidentally, those nations are the Western capitalist 
powers that formerly colonized the most territory in the past few centuries.15 
 
Neoliberal Capitalism: From Finance to the Economization of the Everyday 
It is more than a little ironic, then, that initial theorizations of neoliberalism were 
attempts to address issues of excessive state power that had ballooned into unchecked 
empires. But as is evident from reviewing early neoliberal theory and considering 
contemporary manifestations of neoliberal ideology, the narrative surrounding 
capitalism’s latest form is a conflicted one. That is because, depending on the theorist 
one is reading, neoliberalism can appear to be either a failed project or a resounding 
success in achieving its preliminary objectives. What is less confusing about 
neoliberalism is ascertaining what it has become: a capitalist ideology predicated on 
 
15 For this and other information on voting percentages within the different organizations of the World 
Bank, see the “Voting Powers” page on the World Bank’s website: 
 
Organization US UK Germany France 
Intl Bank for Reconstruction and Development (189 voting countries) 16.28% 3.85% 4.11% 3.85% 
Intl Finance Corporation (184 voting countries) 20.99% 4.48% 4.77% 4.48% 
Intl Development Association (173 voting countries) 10.21% 6.23% 5.46% 3.81% 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (181 voting countries) 15.02% 4.03% 4.20% 4.03% 
 
The voting percentages for the IMF are (“IMF Members’ Quotas”): 
 
Organization US UK Germany France 





transnational forms of imperialist expansion that limit political and economic liberties 
even as it promises to expand individual freedoms. 
The earliest theorizations of neoliberalism were decidedly opposed to the 
construction of yet another hegemonic political force. Indeed, the limitation of state-
based imperialism was at the heart of the work of the Freiburg School, an influential 
collective of early neoliberal thought whose theory of ordoliberalism was named after 
the journal Ordo that economist Walter Eucken created in 1936.16 The Freiburg school 
aimed to create or describe an economic rationality that would rectify the social 
irrationality of capitalism (Foucault 106). This resulted in a lengthy examination of how 
Nazism grew, and one of the key realizations for the ordoliberals was that, though Nazi 
Germany could seem socialist due to its massive state power, its political might was 
merely an intensification of capitalism. So while the objective of liberalism since the 
eighteenth century was to limit imperial impulses and state power for the sake of 
economic limits, the state apparatus actually grew and did the very thing liberals such as 
Adam Smith set out to avoid. The ordoliberals’ solution to overturn what had led to the 
growth of Nazism was a rather simple one: invert the political theory that stated a large 
market economy would be destructive and that such power should be given to the state 
(Foucault 116). Instead, the reverse would be true: the market would now supervise the 
state. This is what distinguishes neoliberalism from being merely a resurgence of liberal 
ideas, since it flips the emphasis from the state to the market, from the political to the 
 
16 Disagreement exists over whether or not ordoliberalism aligns with our contemporary understanding of 
neoliberalism. See Taylor C. Boas and Jordan Gans-Morse, “Neoliberalism: From New Liberal 
Philosophy to Anti-Liberal Slogan.” Foucault observes that US neoliberalism does differ slightly from 
ordoliberalism in that, from the beginning, neoliberalism helped to build up the state apparatus in the US 




economic. As a result, exchange is no longer the most important aspect of the market; 
instead, it is competition (Foucault 119). 
Foucault identifies three aspects that comprise a neoliberal form of governmental 
style: monopolies, conformable economic action, and social policy. First, neoliberal 
economists are intent on showing that monopolies are not an offshoot of capitalist logic, 
contrary to what Lenin argues. The ordoliberals genuinely believed that the market 
would correct and balance itself, so the only thing governments needed to do is prevent 
“external processes” from intervening in the market and trying to create monopolies 
(Foucault 137). Here we can detect an early formulation of the neoliberal distaste for 
governmental regulations that interfere with economic processes.17 Second, the 
ordoliberals’ goal was not to try and find an economic paradigm that would fit 
preexisting enterprises, such as agriculture; instead, the focus became a new “set of 
technical, scientific, legal, geographic … social factors” that governments could conform 
in service to the economy (Foucault 141). This constitutes a chiefly neoliberal form of 
biopolitical control, wherein adjustments are made to society for the benefit of 
facilitating market activity. Third, the ordoliberals’ social policy held that everyone 
should have equal access to goods. Since regulatory redistribution of wealth would be 
considered state intervention in the market, the very thing that was now to be avoided, 
privatization became the answer. As a way to ensure access to consumer goods, instead 
of redistributing capital, the state would use private property as its key instrument, 
 
17 However, as Lenin notes, capitalist economies do not require external processes that build monopolies, 
for it is capitalism’s logical endpoint. He is skeptical about any supposedly natural law that economics 
follow, pointing instead to the role that free trade and concentrated production play in promising the rise of 
monopolies (20). The same monopolizing impulse was visible within the banking industry at the start of 
the twentieth century, where larger, centralized banks would absorb smaller ones in the act of “affiliation,” 




making the only social policy one of “economic growth” (Foucault 144). The emphasis 
on privatization now left it up to individuals to protect themselves from economic risks. 
The ordoliberals concluded that society could be regulated, but the market should 
not, and that this arrangement would compensate for any destructive aspects of the 
market. It is here that we begin to see the first signs of arguments later made popular by 
economists such as Milton Friedman in their defense of neoliberalism—that the market 
follows certain natural laws, as if by an organic process, and it is one that works best 
when left alone.18 For reasons already made clear by Luxemburg, this theoretical 
approach to a politics of the market as a way to limit the destructive expansion of 
political and economic power could never work. Indeed, privileging the economic over 
the political and placing emphasis on competition instead of exchange would only 
further encourage, if not intensify, the sort of capitalist and territorialist expansion that 
marked the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Foucault similarly acknowledges that 
at some point the market will have nowhere to expand but beyond its own borders (54-
 
18 For instance, Friedman argues that the Federal Reserve System did nothing to preserve economic 
stability; if anything, it had the reverse effect, and banks failed after the Great Depression. Instead, 
Friedman proposes monetary laws in place instead of a centralized body, something akin to a Bill of 
Rights for economic matters. Rather than a price level rule, he suggests a legislated rule that would specify 
a rate of growth for the nation’s stock of money (44-55). Friedman also calls for international trade free of 
interference, criticizing the price control of commodities. He proposes different ways to create an equal 
standing amongst foreign entities when it comes to currencies and commodities, the end goal being “a 
system of freely floating exchange rates determined in the market by private transactions without 
governmental intervention” (67). Prices could fluctuate, but in a minimal way, since the participating 
countries would have stable systems. 
Karl Polanyi, however, takes issue with the view that the market is naturally self-correcting in 
words that prophetically anticipate much of the political and economic conditions around the globe today: 
To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their 
natural environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of purchasing power, would 
result in the demolition of society. … Robbed of the protective covering of cultural 
institutions, human beings would perish from the effects of social exposure; they would 
die as victims of acute social dislocation through vice, perversion, crime, and starvation. 
Nature would be reduced to its elements, neighborhoods and landscapes defiled, rivers 





55). The imperialist impulse of capitalism, whether in liberal or neoliberal societies, 
cannot be abated as long as competition, ever-enlarging reproduction, and the increase of 
surplus value are its chief ends. The ordoliberals’ goal of limiting state power may have 
been well intentioned, but privileging and protecting the market as the means to avoiding 
imperial overreach seems, in retrospect, like attempting to put out a fire by pouring 
gasoline on it. 
More recently, however, Quinn Slobodian has argued that the reining in of 
political power was never the intention of any conceptualization of neoliberalism; rather, 
early neoliberal theorists understood that, if such an economic system were to thrive, it 
would have to be global in scope and one that was successfully inured to democratic 
attempts to challenge it. The focus of early German ordoliberals and Austrian 
economists was not specifically the economy or the market but, rather, “institutions 
creating a space for the economy”; furthermore, the diminishment or dissolution of the 
state in favor of the market was not their chief aim; instead, economists sought to 
understand how the market was just one institution embedded within many other social 
institutions (Slobodian 7). Slobodian especially privileges the often-overlooked Austrian 
economists in the Geneva School in his study, for they were concerned with “less a 
discipline of economics than a discipline of statecraft and law” (11). They were not 
interested in “making markets”; rather, their focus was the creation of “market 
enforcers,” and this is significantly different than the ordoliberals, who advocated for an 
“‘economic constitution’ at the level of the nation,” while the Geneva School set about 
crafting “an economic constitution for the world” (11). Slobodian calls this a “rethinking 




accurately capture its intent (12). There is, then, for ordoliberals, ordoglobalists, and 
neoliberals a significant conflict between national and global forms of market-oriented 
policies. The nation-state form helpfully provides “services of stabilization” for the 
market, but neoliberals were concerned about that influence “tipping into excess” 
(Slobodian 15). Thus, they promoted a concept of “militant globalism” comprised of “a 
set of institutional safeguards and legal constraints to prevent nation-states from 
transgressing their commitments to the world economic order” (Slobodian 15). A 
neoliberal world, then, is not a “borderless market without states”; rather, it is predicated 
on a number of institutions that help to “encase the global market from interference by 
national governments” (Slobodian 16, 20). In other words, neoliberalism was long 
designed to become a “project of law, state and organizations at the global level” 
(Slobodian 87). 
This globalist understanding of neoliberal ideology helpfully contributes to 
whether we should approach neoliberalism as a national, international, or transnational 
phenomenon, and it is clear that how one answers that question necessarily depends on 
context. Plehwe et al. argue that there are “neoliberal hegemonic constellations” that can 
be identified and understood at “national, transnational, world-regional, and global 
levels” (3).19 So while neoliberal capitalism is dependent on national actors, Fanon, for 
instance, has noted the limits of a national consciousness in the post-colony. The world 
of empires was broken down into nation-states in the twentieth century, but the 
 
19 Likewise, Roy et al. note that there are many “market-oriented systems” that can fall under the umbrella 
of neoliberalism, and that the way they are introduced into new markets will vary from nation to nation, 
meaning there are many “neoliberalisms” to speak of (5). That said, such economic experiments in 
different geographical and cultural contexts remain driven by a “common set of ideas”—what Slobodian 
describes as a global economic constitution—that can be categorized as a “neoliberal shared mental 




continued flow of resources and commodities from the post-colony to the metropole 
points to a continued international imbalance of power and capital, not an entirely 
successful resurgence of national sovereignty that would somehow be capable of 
eschewing participation in a global economy.20 Indeed, according to Laura Doyle, this 
type of political arrangement is precisely what defines the transnational, where nations 
exist primarily as “transnations or internations” because their relation to other countries 
is “dialectical and dyadic yet also multiple and circumferential or horizonal. Nations are 
invested in each other, in every sense of the word, and they are invested in and attuned to 
each other’s investments” (11). It is worth remembering that the limitations to national 
sovereignty Fanon describes were what the Geneva School understood as necessary for 
the legitimation of a world economic order, which would require national entities 
“appealing above their own nations, or to world law within their nations”; however, this 
course of action today has been “taken largely by corporations” (Slobodian 280).  
Whether different architects of neoliberalism intended for it to limit state power, 
expand the market, or encourage states to submit to a global economic order, it is clear 
from the last 40 years that private corporations have been able to seize a considerable 
amount of political and economic influence on a transnational scale. Globalization has 
been markedly different from its earlier stages during Western colonialism and the 
industrial revolution, for “nearly every corner of the world is rapidly becoming an 
integral part of a global economic system that is increasingly dominated by large 
 
20 Ankie Hoogvelt does a thorough study of the ways that the global economic crisis of the 1970s 
transformed the structure of the world economy as well as its modes of production and distribution 
throughout the postcolonial world. The growth of global economic inequality is what she terms the 
“postcolonial condition” driven by the combination of “external pressures” such as globalization and 





transnational corporations” (Harris and Seid 5). These corporations are bolstered and 
sheltered by the IMF, World Bank, and WTO, where “the governments of the major 
capitalist countries … are the main actors” (Harris and Seid 6). What makes this 
development specifically neoliberal is the extent to which powerful capitalist countries 
and corporations “have promoted major structural changes … in the economies of most 
developing countries in order to facilitate the increased integration of these countries 
into the global capitalist economy” (Harris and Seid 11), a pattern Luxemburg would say 
is taken directly from colonialism’s playbook. 
Harvey also observes that the “neoliberal state” commonly institutes policies that 
protect corporations from collectivist action (77). In return, private corporations in the 
US have been able to make unlimited financial contributions to political parties since 
1976 as a form of protected free speech (Harvey 49), and the political involvement of 
US corporations has significant transnational implications. This has been most clearly 
seen within business schools, such as Stanford, Harvard, and the University of Chicago 
that promote neoliberal ideology and receive substantial corporate donations; the latter 
especially became a hub for international graduates to take methods of neoliberal 
economic reform back to their home countries or into political institutions such as the 
IMF, World Bank and UN (Harvey 54). Besides helping spread neoliberal reform 
globally, corporations also receive numerous benefits at home, such as adjustments to 
US tax code and lucrative subsidies that further increase their revenue. As heavy tax cuts 
are passed through policy measures, much public money formerly sent towards social 
welfare programs is now redirected to corporations, which are then able to expand 




order must be protected and private corporations become just as (if not more) powerful 
than some small countries, profit is paramount. This shift fundamentally changes how 
we view labor, land, and money across the globe, things that historically have not been 
thought of as commodities but now have “coherent markets” created for them (Harvey 
166). To further facilitate the extraction of capital from these now-commodified 
resources, neoliberal reforms play a key role by limiting or eliminating labor unions, and 
workers in a variety of markets become disposable as corporations hunt for the lowest 
production costs (Harvey 168-69). 
The drive to extract capital from any and all sectors of life encourages the 
commonplace practice of placing any number of adjectives in front of the word 
capital—social capital, human capital, cultural capital (Harvey 167). Which is to say, we 
can also turn to these capitalized realms to garner additional narratives of capitalism and 
its work. Indeed, neoliberalism, theoretical and ideological though it is, possesses a 
“materiality of ideas” that we must attend to, and we can best understand that materiality 
by focusing on its “social aspects” (Plehwe et al. 5). The extensive commodification of 
the everyday certainly does not bypass culture, not that economic concerns and cultural 
production, such as the arts, have ever been separate. Historically, artists have long been 
dependent on the wealth of others, relationships of patronage that have placed artists and 
their work in close proximity to political and religious power. But the commodification 
of art is noteworthy, and, specifically with literature in mind, it is still a fairly new 
development when compared against the long view of art history. Culture, as Max 
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno famously observed, is now its own industry geared 




meaning, and social value of art when capitalist methods of “standardization and mass 
production” are introduced (95). These methods can create a “sameness” of culture, a 
homogenization that allows for “the general [to] replace the particular and vice versa” 
(94, 102). 
There is, today, no shortage of narratives that can speak to those processes of 
standardization and mass production, especially as neoliberal reforms have helped send 
those processes even farther out into the world than when Horkheimer and Adorno were 
writing. The commodifying impulse of capitalism has been global in scope for centuries, 
but contemporary modes of capitalism have sent commodification into overdrive and 
exported it to formerly untapped sectors of everyday life and experience. By attending to 
literary renderings of these effects from a variety of national and cultural spaces, we can 
garner a more nuanced—and, therefore, less totalizing—understanding of not only 
neoliberalism’s effects, but also its limits. True, literature (and especially the novel) 
constitutes its own capitalized form of culture today, one that can be commodified to an 
extent that many writers grapple with in their work. It is through that very intellectual 
and artistic angst that writers use their novels to engage both the material and immaterial 
fallout of this capitalizing force. They narrativize its violence while also acknowledging 
with unease the various ways their own artistic production is caught within the same 
disruptive economic work it would seek to critique. 
 
Reproduction and Commodification in The Adventures of Tintin 
The aforementioned theorists chart the slow changeover from more industrial forms of 




form of neoliberalism. What Luxemburg describes as the colonial method of forcing 
natural economies to become commodity-driven and capitalist initiates a concomitant 
change in the world of art by altering a pre-capitalist culture’s understanding of what 
constitutes art’s value, meaning, and significance. As a way to ground a literary 
understanding of this shift, I turn to a graphic novel that appears far earlier than the other 
texts I consider in this study, but I do so in order to emphasize how writers and artists 
have been engaging with the steady march toward neoliberalism for quite some time. 
That text is Hergé’s series The Adventures of Tintin, where the shift to a market-driven 
commodification of art appears as a frequent concern in multiple stories.21 I turn here to 
Hergé’s life work because, in addition to its attention to commodification, we can read 
the rising popularity of Tintin, written from the late 1920s to the early 1970s, alongside 
the development of neoliberalism. Within that shared timeline, Hergé frequently queries 
what the commodifying work of capitalism means for art in general and Tintin 
specifically. In one of the earlier stories from 1935, The Broken Ear, Hergé questions 
how capitalist reproduction affects the value and meaning of art in an increasingly 
postcolonial world. He does this by placing both ritualistic art and reproducible art in his 
narrative and examines what the meaning and value of both are, the two examples being 
a “rare fetish” made by the fictional Arumbaya people and Tintin itself (Hergé, Broken 
1). The story begins with the theft of the fetish from a museum, and Tintin becomes 
 
21 I view the entire Tintin corpus as a cohesive graphic novel, even though it is often labeled as a comics 
strip and not a coherent series due to its initial serial publication (Peeters 147). However, all 24 stories can 
be read as a lengthy graphic novel, since myriad peripheral characters return at various junctures and later 
Tintin stories assume the reader is familiar with events in earlier texts. It is a sustained narrative across 




interested in locating the sculpture, only to escape an attempt on his life by two other 
men, Alonso and Ramón, who are also looking for it. 
The Broken Ear acts as a sort of reset for Tintin. By this point in the series, Hergé 
had already started moving away from stories with explicit colonial storylines and 
references.22 Instead, in this story, the hunt for the fetish leads Tintin, Alonso, and 
Ramón to the fictional South American nation of San Theodoros, where they are caught 
up in the country’s revolution. General Alcazar overthrows General Tapioca, and 
through a series of events Tintin becomes Alcazar’s aide-de-camp. In the midst of the 
country’s fragile state, the General American Oil Company encourages Alcazar to 
invade the neighboring nation, Nuevo Rico, and seize control of the oil-rich Gran Chapo 
region that both countries share. This American corporation seeks to devolve the 
political stability of the region for profit and pays a European arms dealer to supply both 
the San Theodoran and Nuevo Rican militaries with advanced weapons.23 Tintin tries to 
dissuade Alcazar from taking the American offer and is quickly regarded as a traitor. He 
flees San Theodoros and hides deep in the jungle with the Arumbaya people. There, he 
learns the reason Alonso and Ramón are intent on finding the original fetish: It houses a 
 
22 From 1929 to 1935, Hergé consistently worked from a colonial mindset with stories that sent Tintin to 
the Belgian Congo, Native American reservations, Egypt, and China during the Japanese invasion. These 
stories are rather notorious for their instances of racist and stereotyped depictions of non-White people. 
Then, from 1938 to 1946, Hergé set some Tintin stories in fictional nations amid plots that emphasized 
national sovereignty as a comment on Belgium’s conflict with Germany during World War II. After 
WWII, Hergé’s attention turned to political tensions stemming from the boom in the oil trade and opening 
of new foreign markets as the US rose to prominence as the new global superpower. 
23 Hergé wrote The Broken Ear with “the war of Gran Chaco” in mind, “which pitted Bolivia and 
Paraguay against each other from 1932 to 1935. This bloody conflict had been stirred up by two oil 
companies, and as in the book, the expected oil deposits had finally proven unusable. Hergé also took on 
one of the most notorious and respected arms dealers of the time, Sir Bazil Zaharoff. The arms company 
Vickers was rechristened the ‘Vicking Arms Company, Ltd.’ in the original version and later ‘Korrupt 
Arms.’ Zaharoff was renamed Bazarov, but his features and manner of dressing so closely resembled the 




large diamond. Meanwhile, San Theodoros and Nuevo Rico continue to escalate toward 
war, until it is discovered there is not a trace of oil in the Gran Chapo region. A cease-
fire is agreed to, and Tintin returns home, dumbfounded as to where the original fetish 
is. Upon finding a store with dozens of replicas of the fetish, he learns that the sculptor’s 
brother, an art collector, had the original. Only days prior, though, it had been sold to a 
wealthy American, Mr. Goldbarr, who that morning sails back to the US. Tintin catches 
the ship, but so do Alonso and Ramón. In the scuffle that follows, the fetish is dropped, 
cracks open, and the diamond rolls overboard with all three men after it. Tintin is pulled 
to safety while the others drown, and the fetish, in pieces, is returned to the museum and 
patched back together. 
The Broken Ear is one of Hergé’s more complex stories, and against the 
backdrop of political and economic conflict on a global scale, the story is primarily 
concerned with the value of art in the modern, increasingly postcolonial world. The 
setting of the museum that begins the story is key, for it recalls Benedict Anderson’s 
observation that the museum is a site where nationalist pride can be strengthened, for it 
serves as storehouse where a Western nation’s prowess over numerous colonies is on 
display (181-84). But at a time when Western nations were becoming increasingly 
anxious about the stability of their territorial prowess, what is the value of something 
like the Arumbaya fetish? The artifact possesses no “intrinsic value” (Hergé, Broken 2), 
as is made clear multiple times throughout the story by characters unaware of the 
diamond housed inside it. One radio broadcast describes the fetish as a “sacred tribal 
object” (Hergé, Broken 1), which places it within a religious, ritualistic context. Here we 




Indigenous religious rituals and their related objects are likely meaningless for any 
Belgian museum patrons. All that is left, then, is the sculpture’s aesthetic quality, yet the 
fetish is fairly simple, plain, and altogether unimpressive. 
While it is unlikely Hergé read Walter Benjamin (Peeters 83), it is noteworthy 
that he raises concerns in The Broken Ear that are notably similar to Benjamin’s 
arguments on the aestheticization of politics. Additionally, both Hergé and Benjamin 
examine changes to art that follow Luxemburg’s description of the imperial process that 
forcibly changes natural economies into commodity economies that eventually become 
capitalist sectors. Within those same three stages, Benjamin is interested in what 
happens to the cultural, social, or political significance of art, and he describes three 
changes that are also central to the conflicts in The Broken Ear. First, in natural or pre-
capitalist economies, art could possess an aura whose significance is attached to 
communal and/or religious ritual. In such pre-colonial communities, an artwork’s 
“existence,” not its “being on view,” is all that matters; if anything, an artwork’s “cult 
value” may very well demand that it stay hidden instead of being put on display 
(Benjamin 225). Second, in commodified or capitalist economies, the rise of 
Renaissance and Enlightenment ideals of art for art’s sake (“l’art pour l’art”) points to 
the moment when Eurocentric universalizations about form and aesthetics were being 
established (Benjamin 224). These standards and norms would form the “secular cult of 
beauty” against which indigenous works of art would be judged and deemed inferior and 




altogether (Benjamin 224).24 These ritualistic forms of art carry deep political 
significance for the West because their acquisition and display in museums play a key 
role in strengthening the colonizing nation’s identity. So while a small sculpture, such as 
the Arumbaya fetish in The Broken Ear, may not meet a European standard of beauty or 
pure art, the desecularizing display of what would be formerly hidden in an indigenous 
culture helps Europe to establish not only its military might, but also its cultural 
dominance.25 Thus, art for art’s sake is not necessarily about the eschewal of ritual as 
much as it is an establishment of a new global ritual, that of deference to the power of 
the West. 
But even that political ritual comes to be replaced by industrialized capitalism’s 
machinery that facilitates reproducible commodities, and this is the third key part of 
Benjamin’s arguments: He shifts his attention away from art for art’s sake to consider 
how the dominance of the market necessitates artists’ foremost consideration of their 
consumer base (231). The market—not religion, not the state—becomes the driving 
force behind artistic production.26 This shift further chips away at any notion of art for 
art’s sake because of the political and economic interests surrounding art’s production; 
 
24 Edward Said writes extensively about a colonialist history of aesthetics, most notably in Orientalism and 
Culture and Imperialism. 
25 Therefore, we can complicate Benjamin’s claim that art was based on politics once it could be 
reproduced. If the Western acquisition and display of indigenous art was not just about beauty, but also 
about establishing one’s own standard of beauty as superior to that of ostensibly unenlightened cultures on 
other continents, then we can and should regard the systemization of European aesthetic standards as an 
inherently political project. 
26 I want to underscore here that Benjamin is too easily read as presenting an optimistic vision of the 
democratic potential within the capitalist reproduction of art. Indeed, John Berger’s expansion on 
Benjamin’s ideas in Ways of Seeing influences much of how we read Benjamin today, for Berger more 
explicitly articulates how the reproducibility of art challenges or even dissolves certain social hierarchies 
that the world of high art maintained for so many centuries. While Benjamin certainly does gesture toward 
the democratic possibilities of art, his consideration of how artists must now be deferential to the market 





instead, art for the market’s sake takes precedence if reproducibility with one’s base of 
consumers is foremost in the artist’s mind. What happens as a result is that any “unique 
aura” the artist might possess also disappears, and it is replaced by the “phony spell of a 
commodity” (Benjamin 231).27 Benjamin understands that within colonialism’s twilight, 
the market is now one of the strongest driving forces behind artistic production, a 
catalyst that replaces ritualistic symbolism and the imperialist establishment of aesthetic 
standards as the new creative and generative factors undergirding artworks. Which 
brings us back to Hergé and the implicit question running throughout The Broken Ear: If 
the aura of the Arumbaya fetish has disappeared long ago and the sculpture itself isn’t 
much to look at, what replaces its value? 
As a partial answer, the syntactical double entendre of “fetish” is telling here.28 
On the one hand, the fetish could represent attempts to uphold artifacts of the past to say 
something about the present. For example, there is clearly a political imperative behind 
privileging such an artifact in that it speaks to a nation’s colonial legacy. Paul Gilroy 
notes that this continues today—the perpetual re-referencing of different symbolic forms 
of national accomplishments from the past in an effort to regenerate patriotic pride for 
Western nations (88-89). But, on the other hand, Hergé actually undercuts such a 
reading, since the fetish itself is a (literal) hollow signifier. The fetish, which I also read 
to stand in for art in general, is simply a hollowed-out vessel for something of economic 
 
27 Benjamin specifically refers here to the work of a movie star and how the financing of an entire film 
industry helps to build an actor’s persona, but the implications of his argument are still applicable, if not 
anticipatory, of a time under neoliberalism when the artist—and any individual for that matter—should 
primarily think of themselves as potential capital. 
28 There is certainly a sexual double meaning we can read into Hergé’s decision to refer to the sculpture as 
a fetish, and the sexualized aspects of colonialism have been convincingly explored by Robert J. C. Young 
in Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race and Anne McClintock in Imperial Leather: 




value—in this case, the diamond inside it. It only holds interest and value for those in 
pursuit of it because of the diamond; after all, Alonso and Ramón were going to break 
the sculpture open anyway to extract it. It is stated repeatedly that the fetish holds no 
cultural value for the West and, thus, is not a signifier of cultural or national pride. 
Overall, it is meaningless. What is more, the Arumbaya fetish as a text is misread in 
many ways, and, indeed, the act of misreading is one of the key frameworks in The 
Broken Ear. Instances occur repeatedly where nothing is what it seems, and initial 
expectations or assumptions are quickly subverted.29 The most consequential misreading 
is that the Gran Chapo region actually is not saturated with oil. Hergé suggests here that 
misreadings have significant geopolitical consequences. Both San Theodoros and Nuevo 
Rico are prepared to engage in armed conflict with each other to lay claim to the latent 
wealth promised by the ostensible oil beneath their soldiers’ feet. Those political and 
economic tensions also extend beyond South America. The General American Oil 
Company wants Alcazar to invade the Gran Chapo region so it can succeed in “beat[ing] 
British South-American Petrol,” taking over its interests, and crowding it out of the oil 
drilling futures in the region (Hergé, Broken 42). Here, as he did in his second story 
Tintin in the Congo, where the US is intent on entering the global diamond trade, Hergé 
depicts the US as the fledgling global economic hegemon, a nation blooming with 
 
29 When Alonso and Ramón attempt to run over Tintin with their car, he jots down their license plate only 
to find the wrong car later. Upon dropping his notebook on the ground upside-down, “169 MW” becomes 
“MW 691,” and he realizes they have simply flipped their plates (Hergé, Broken 10-11). Later, when being 
pursued by Alonso and Ramón aboard a steamship, Tintin hides by disguising himself with blackface and 
a waiter’s jacket. Further, Tintin finds what should be the original fetish, but it is merely a fake. Likewise, 
he has his suitcase stolen in San Theodoros and switched with a lookalike containing bombs, an attempt to 




surplus capital to utilize beyond its borders. If military conflicts should break out 
because of its bidding wars, so be it. 
The Broken Ear, then, spans from ritualistic art to conflict over natural resources funded 
by corporate investment. Lest the political chaos of The Broken Ear take precedence, it 
is important to remember that all of this begins with a pre-capitalist culture’s artwork 
that houses a diamond. It is telling that Hergé decides to use a ritualistic artifact as the 
piece that begins the domino effect of the plot, an artwork that, as is stressed multiple 
times throughout the story, has no significant monetary value. In doing so, he traces a 
consistent thread from precolonial to commodified artwork. Gone is the fetish’s aura and 
symbolic significance, and near the close of militant colonialism, the fetish provides 
little more than wistful nostalgia in terms of its value, alluding as it does to a time of 
former territorial expansion. Instead, the fetish traces a direct line to the 
commodification of art in The Broken Ear. While Hergé does not reveal the fetish 
contains a diamond until near the end of the story, it is upon that revelation that the 
earlier instances of misreadings take on a greater significance. They have been preparing 
the reader for the moment when Tintin stumbles upon a sculptor’s workshop where 
replica after replica of the original Arumbaya fetish is being produced (see Figure 1). If 
everyday life in Belgium and the chaos of potentially seismic political conflicts in San 
Theodoros are marked by repeated misinterpretations, Hergé shows here that the 
contemporary art world is even more difficult to make sense of. By the end of The 
Broken Ear, Tintin encounters the machine of reproducibility when he enters the 
workshop to see numerous copies of the original fetish, an image of the twentieth 




If the original artifact has hardly any monetary value to begin with, what is it worth now 





Fig. 1. Tintin finds a sculptor’s workshop, the source of the copies of 
the original Arumbabya fetish. Reprinted from Hergé, The Broken 




By placing questions of value around the Arumbaya fetish within his own 
artwork, Hergé self-reflexively considers what the worth and value of Tintin is in an 
increasingly capitalist postcolonial world. The fetish and Tintin occupy vastly different 
historical moments. The fetish is a ritualistic sculpture, one of a kind, and not originally 
intended for reproduction. Tintin, however, has only ever existed in a time of 
reproducibility. Hergé never had to rely on a sense of ritual for Tintin’s derivative 
cultural meaning, and, due to that lack of dependence on ritual, Tintin is enmeshed in the 
changes to the very purpose and function of art within an age of reproduction, a global 
one at that, where the series’ readership would quickly begin to span countries and 




translated work. As Benjamin notes, “the work of art reproduced becomes the work of 
art designed for reproducibility” (224), but Rebecca L. Walkowitz argues we could just 
as easily change that to mean art is produced for translation’s sake. Indeed, many novels 
today “start as world literature” and are written with translation in mind, what 
Walkowitz refers to as a text “born translated” (2, 3). The paradox translation presents is 
that “it is contemporary, above all, because it is historical,” for born-translated works 
“highlight the effects of circulation on production” since they are “engaged in thinking 
about that process” (Walkowitz 6). Similarly, The Broken Ear traces how the Arumbaya 
fetish becomes a translated work, taken from its original context and made into either a 
political player facilitating the movement of diamonds or as a hollow economic signifier, 
made to facilitate methods of exchange as a reproducible commodity. Likewise, Tintin is 
a born-translated work that frequently grapples with “the effects of circulation on 
production” that Walkowitz describes. This is evident in different stories throughout the 
series as Hergé became more keenly aware that Tintin’s growing popularity, sales, and 
international readership placed it in a mode of reproduction that constantly redefined its 
artistic value and cultural significance. Not that Hergé was against this; rather, by the 
late 1930s, he already had plans for expanding Tintin to new markets in Switzerland, 
Canada, and England, and he began to imagine what merchandising might look like by 
moving Tintin into new formats such as “puzzles, calendars, and coloring books” 
(Peeters 95-96). Hergé also began to envision a Tintin store, whose shelves would carry 
“children’s clothing, decorated mugs, and phonograph records … tablecloths, dolls, 




Most telling, though, is how market expansion also affected the actual content of 
Tintin, for Hergé seized opportunities to undertake large-scale rewrites of previously 
published stories. For example, Hergé made the decision to produce colorized books for 
the first time because, though expensive, he felt that “the benefits that would result from 
[it] are nothing to be dismissed lightly” (qtd. in Peeters 136). But that move to colorize 
also gave him a chance to revisit the first eight Tintin stories, many of which had been 
criticized for their racist content.30 Hergé’s biographer Benoît Peeters notes that in some 
cases complete rewrites of those stories were inevitable, since “the lettering, the layout 
of images, [and] the rhythm of the plot” for the books was completely different from the 
black-and-white weekly Tintin initially appeared in (138). Even so, the content changes 
Hergé elected to make are noteworthy, for they were an opportunity for him to rework 
Tintin’s image, what Peeters calls the series’ “first stylistic self-realization” where 
content could be “carefully reviewed and rationalized” (140).31 Similarly, Hergé 
changed the content of Tintin during his time writing for Le Soir, a German-run weekly 
printed out of occupied Belgium during WWII. The series greatly benefited from its run 
in the weekly, reaching new thresholds of exposure and profit.32 But since Le Soir was 
 
30 The prototypical Western gaze in early Tintin stories is easy to identify, and it has been the subject of 
much critical work. See Philip Dine, “The French Colonial Empire in Juvenile Fiction: From Jules Verne 
to Tintin”; Hugo Frey, “Contagious Colonial Diseases in Hergé’s The Adventures of Tintin”; and Philippe 
Met, “Of Men and Animal: Hergé’s Tintin au Congo, a Study in Primitivism.” It is important to note that 
Congo was not deemed controversial when it was first published (Assouline 28). Even 70 years later, 
Congolese perspectives on the book vary (see Norimitsu Onishi, “Kinshasa Journal; Tintin at 70: 
Colonialism’s Comic-Book Puppet?”). 
31 In some ways, Peeters’ assessments are a bit overstated. Though some of the more overtly ethnocentric 
content is either toned down or removed, stories such as Tintin in the Congo and Tintin in America still 
contain brazenly racist depictions of the Congolese and Native Americans, respectively. While Hergé 
certainly made substantial changes to his earlier work, the stories did not exactly undergo a wholesale 
rewrite, either. 
32 By late 1940, Le Soir had a run of more than three million copies, and its promotional abilities helped 
generate larger readerships for Hergé’s work (Peeters 121, 126). Profits from Tintin book sales also surged 




supportive of the German war effort and published overtly anti-Semitic content, Hergé 
also had to cover himself and did so by writing stories whose content centered on the 
more classic adventure tropes of sunken pirate ships and buried treasure, which 
altogether avoided commenting on the politics of the moment in Europe. Indeed, most of 
the Tintin stories in Le Soir are decidedly neutral in terms of their political content, and 
this shift reflects Hergé’s response to the political and economic pressures that 
surrounded him, a certain mode of economic survival and deference to the shifting 
concerns of lucrative markets in order to keep Tintin afloat.33 
Hergé’s deference to the market is also visible in Tintin’s expansion beyond the 
European continent. For instance, the convenient appearance of the USS Los Angeles 
coming in to save the day at the end of The Red Sea Sharks, which was serialized from 
1956 to 1958, is a decidedly more heroic and flattering portrayal of Americans than in 
1932’s Tintin in America, “a change of direction not unconnected to the fact that 
negotiations were [currently] underway with the Golden Press for Tintin books to go on 
sale in the USA for the first time” (Thompson 226).34 The Red Sea Sharks is also 
interesting as a case in point because Tintin’s growing international readership led to a 
                                                                                                                                           
that limited publishers’ outputs (Peeters 126, 141-42). Further, by 1942, many of Hergé’s ideas for 
merchandising had come to fruition, and it is clear that without Le Soir, Hergé would likely have had to 
shutter Tintin. 
33 For many, Hergé’s decision to work with Le Soir is the moral failing that continues to sully his legacy, 
perhaps even more so because Tintin’s profits increased dramatically during the years at Le Soir. Without 
defending Hergé, Peeters notes that, short of quitting Tintin altogether, there was no potential of writing 
anything subversive at the weekly. A court file from a post-war Belgian military hearing on the activities 
of Le Soir notes that a journalist “could write whatever he wanted as long as it conformed to German 
wishes” and could “write nothing that was in opposition to the ideas patronized by the Germans” (qtd. in 
Peeters 117). Thus, earlier Tintin stories about nationalistic sovereignty, such as King Ottokar’s Sceptre, 
would certainly not have passed muster at Le Soir, hardly veiled as that story is in its critique of 
Germany’s invasion and occupation of other European powers. 
34 For an fascinating account of these negotiations with the Golden Press, see Chris Owens, “Tintin 




greater criticism of Hergé’s representations of non-Western characters and cultures. This 
criticism led Hergé yet again to make frequent and significant revisions to already 
published Tintin stories.35 As Walkowitz notes, the prospect of addressing multiple 
audiences changes how and what authors write (21), and this is clearly evident in the 
Tintin revisions. These different examples of Hergé’s artistic deference to the market 
illustrate Tintin’s status as a born-translated work that was always already produced with 
reproduction in mind. But that also makes it exceedingly difficult to know how to 
interpret The Broken Ear, since it reveals a rather pessimistic vision of artistic 
reproduction. 
At this early juncture in his life’s work, Hergé begins to explore, seemingly with 
unease, the notion that art may be merely a vessel that facilitates larger economic 
interests. It is not accidental in The Broken Ear that the Arumbaya fetish and the chaos 
surrounding it are entangled in global conflicts ostensibly over oil and the international 
trade of weapons. Just as these political and economic negotiations, the fetish is also a 
vehicle of exchange, a potential conduit for money changing hands. The concern is that, 
over time, Tintin may become nothing more than a commodity, a receptacle for 
 
35 A scathing critique of The Red Sea Sharks and the Tintin series as a whole appeared in Jeune Afrique in 
1962, concluding with an observation that characters portrayed in a racist manner often come from 
countries where Tintin had yet to be translated into their own language: “Tintin does not seem very 
concerned with himself and his exploits being read on a greater stage. And he has reason; this eternal 
conqueror risks this being his first defeat” (Rolin 25, my translation). Likewise, a piece in Le Canard 
enchaîné also cautioned parents about “this ‘hero’ for whom Whites are all white and Blacks all black. If 
your children must be as wise as images, do not let these images be the cartoonist Hergé’s” (qtd. in Peeters 
307). Reviews like these bothered Casterman, Hergé’s publisher, since sales and the reputation of the 
series could suffer. With the market and Tintin’s growing collective of global readers in mind, Hergé was 
also sensitive to this kind of criticism and rewrote parts of stories at Casterman’s request. Editors 
suggested Hergé lighten the complexion of some of the Africans and alter the way they speak in The Red 
Sea Sharks (Assouline 204). By 1967, Hergé had completed changes and removed the pidgin language of 
the Africans, replacing it with “conversant French, [that conveys] some phonetic flavour through the 




exchange, which raises the question: Do Hergé’s stories in and of themselves contain 
intrinsic value? Benjamin suggests that if there is value within an artwork, it comes from 
its ability to contribute politically and/or economically. If Tintin occupies a similar place 
as the Arumbaya fetish due to the ease of its reproducibility as a text, the implication is 
that the production of Tintin cannot possibly escape larger economic concerns that 
politicize its writing and dissemination. 
However, given the aforementioned longer history of Tintin’s production, 
Hergé’s concerns in The Broken Ear are also rather disingenuous, for over time he did 
not shy away from producing art that could capitalize on new markets. The repeated 
reshapings of Tintin in response to different political, economic, and cultural upheavals 
were chiefly done with the intent of helping Tintin enter new countries, increase its 
profits, and grow its merchandising arm. In light of this, a phrase from Foucault aptly 
applies to Hergé’s work: Tintin becomes art that can “make the market possible” (146). 
Indeed, Tintin lives on today and, as of 2007, had sold more than 200 million book 
copies in some 70 languages (Farr, Creator of Tintin 4). After Hergé’s death, no new 
Tintin books were produced, and all work was instead channeled into licensing to create 
more merchandise “that catered to nostalgic tastes of adults more than just being for 
children” (Peeters 338). Tintin quickly became and continues to be a commodified 
empire. While the books continue to sell well, they are not an end in themselves now 
but, rather, a launching pad into a world of an assortment of collectible figurines, 






The Work of Art and Culture in the Economy 
Hergé would grapple with the commodification of art throughout the rest of the Tintin 
corpus, most pointedly in the final incomplete story that was published posthumously, 
Tintin and Alph-Art. I will return to that story in the conclusion because it provides an 
interesting coda to The Broken Ear that shows how, in the 40 years between the two 
stories, Hergé had become more keenly aware of the art world’s entanglement in the 
global political interests of transnational finance and competing private corporations. 
Hergé became concerned with what that meant for the more intangible forms of value—
cultural, social, personal—that art can possess. Similar concerns have become a central 
component of much contemporary literature, especially as neoliberal hegemony has only 
grown in its influence since the time of Hergé’s work. Hergé only lived to see the 
beginnings of neoliberalism’s effect on artistic production, and he was not encouraged 
by what he saw. Today, culture, the arts, and literature have become highly profitable 
enterprises, which simultaneously means they are of significant political importance as 
well. The chapters that follow consider novels that engage with the economic, political, 
and cultural shifts of the last few decades and query what it means to produce, perform, 
and receive the literary arts in an age where neoliberal ideals constitute a form of 
common sense and culture is highly profitable. 
Before turning to these novelists, it is worth noting how exactly culture and the 
arts are put to work toward achieving economic and political ends. Arlene Dávila notes 
how culture and creative projects are utilized “as anchors of urban development, 
tourism, or other creative economies that sustain neoliberal reforms” across the 




different global contexts that benefit the growth of the “political economy” (Dávila 2). 
Indeed, because of the different social, racial, and ethnic hierarchies and “imperial 
legacies” connected to cultural forms that are or aren’t considered mainstream, “the 
process of commercialization and commodification of culture into creative products and 
industries has never been free of contestation” (Dávila 3). In many instances, “the 
upscaling of culture” traffics in and encourages “salient racial hierarchies and social 
disparities” (Dávila 8). George Yúdice points out that the limiting of state social services 
within neoliberal policies has created an “expanded role for culture,” whereby the arts 
and other programs are understood to be capable of mitigating social ills (11). This, for 
Yúdice, is an example of the recent rise in the “expediency of culture,” where it is 
“increasingly wielded as a resource for both sociopolitical and economic amelioration” 
(10). While the intersection of culture with politics and economics is not new, we are 
seeing a significant turn where culture’s “legitimation [is] based on utility”—
specifically, the extent to which it is profitable for the state in “spurring capital 
accumulation” (Yúdice 11, 26). Referencing literature specifically, Sarah Brouillette 
contends that these different social, political, and economic forces put writers in 
complicated positions. For instance, some writers critique the excesses and problems of 
neoliberalism in their work, but then they become marketable precisely by making such 
a critique; other writers are expected to play to their minority status for market success 
and are accused of selling out if they do or accused of inauthenticity if they don’t 
(Brouillette, Literature 9-10). Due to this impossible situation, some writers have shifted 




effective critique—not least, the incorporation of critique into neoliberal capitalization” 
(Brouillette, Literature 17). 
Given these scholars’ arguments, we can begin to understand other critics’ 
tendency to render neoliberalism in more monolithic and indomitable hues. 
Contemporary capitalism’s influence is felt seemingly everywhere—from art, 
entertainment, and sports to parenting, education, and grocery shopping. But the capacity 
for critique remains a more complicated issue than simply saying neoliberalism nullifies 
any potential of that happening. Though Brouillette cautions that the very interiority of 
the language arts lends to the kind of hyperindividualized ethos the creative economy 
privileges, writers often do present representations of the self that problematize the 
neoliberal vision of the ideal self as merely another creative outlet for the state to 
mobilize (Literature 13-14). Further, Dávila reminds us that the move to regard culture 
as its own industry is merely a “reductive treatment” that does not successfully account 
for “the variety of living and politicized manifestations and treatments of culture” that 
directly confront “its reduction on the basis of simple economic imperatives” (9). 
Similarly, Plehwe et al. call for a “comparative perspective” that approaches how 
neoliberalism functions in different cultural contexts in order to determine 
“commonalities and differences across space and time” (3). This is precisely the intent of 
the following chapters. 
Before moving on to specific literary examples, some of Friedrich A. Hayek’s 
arguments are worth revisiting as a way to complicate some of the supposed 
indomitability of neoliberalism. Granted, turning to Hayek may seem an odd choice, 




and thinkers who were instrumental in conceptualizing and promoting neoliberal 
ideology that would challenge Keynesian policies. Though Hayek was against state 
interventionism in market affairs and advocated for individualism over collectivism, it 
would also be inaccurate to suggest his work articulates a totalizing vision of 
neoliberalism. Indeed, to hear skepticism about certain longheld truths about 
neoliberalism from one of its key founders should lead us to reconsider just how 
impervious its theories, values, and practices are to critique and resistance. For example, 
Hayek notes: 
The assumption of a perfect market, then, means nothing less than that all 
the members of the community, even if they are not supposed to be 
strictly omniscient, are at least supposed to know automatically all that is 
relevant for their decisions. It seems that that skeleton in our cupboard, 
the “economic man,” whom we have exorcised with prayer and fasting, 
has returned through the back door in the form of a quasi-omniscient 
individual. (Individualism 45-46) 
Hayek here rejects the rationalized view of the individual subject that has come to typify 
homo oeconomicus. This is an important distinction to make when other neoliberal 
theorists, perhaps most notably Gary Becker, reduce the individual by referring to 
him/her as a “consumer unit” whose eminently rational conduct can support entire 
systematic assessments of how to map and influence behavior (134). Foucault argues 
that views of the individual like Becker’s assume behavior is always predictable to the 
point that “someone who accepts reality” eventually “appears precisely as someone 




artificially introduced into the environment” (269, 270). But this is surely a non-sequitur, 
for human behavior is hardly so dependably rational. Hayek argues much the same, 
finding it baffling that John Stuart Mill and Adam Smith were being credited with 
defining the individual by “strictly rational behavior” when they never described any 
such thing (Individualism 11). 
Instead, Hayek understands human behavior and our formulation of knowledge 
and reason as largely predicated on mimetic “observance”: “Man acted before he 
thought and did not understand before he acted. What we call understanding is in the last 
resort simply his capacity to respond to his environment with a pattern of actions that 
helps him to persist” (Law 18). On the contrary, Hayek came to envision the individual 
and his/her behavior as located within market systems that were best understood through 
the metaphor of a web or network. This was because “comprehensive knowledge” would 
always be outside of the economist’s grasp due to its “necessary dispersal among all 
members of society” (Slobodian 58). The “spontaneous order of the market” meant that 
a full knowledge of its inner-workings eluded any one individual, economist or 
otherwise; instead, “[k]nowledge that is used in it is that of all its members” (Hayek, 
“Competition” 308). Short of suggesting that Hayek is sympathetic here to collectivism, 
Slobodian does note that Hayek’s perceived stringent individualism is likely overstated 
and worth qualifying, especially when Hayek believed the “world economy was 
basically unknowable” in its complexity (Slobodian 18). How rational and predictable, 
then, can homo oeconomicus—or neoliberalism for that matter—be? 
There is no shortage of contradictions within neoliberal ideology. Greater 




violent methods. The “utopian rhetoric” of benefits for all surrounding neoliberalism has 
been followed mostly by financial benefits for the global elite (Harvey 203). On the 
whole, the promise of socially just “market-oriented reforms” have generally failed 
because equitable treatment is not regarded as an “a-priori condition for efficient 
economic growth” (Auerbach 29-30). But perhaps the most curious contradiction 
currently circulating around neoliberal ideology is the argument that it has become 
impervious to critique precisely because any criticisms of neoliberalism can be re-
fashioned to look like arguments in its favor. Rarely, though, is anything so simple. This 
fatalistic stance makes sense on the one hand, for little has changed since Harvey wrote 
in 2007 that neoliberalism’s failures create the basis for “a resurgence of mass 
movements voicing egalitarian political demands and seeking economic justice, fair 
trade, and greater economic security” (203-04). On the other hand, perhaps the 
contradictions are not recognizable enough. But if the materiality and tangible reality of 
neoliberal ideology and its consequences are best understood by attending to its “social 
aspects” (Plehwe et al. 5), literature is a good place to start in pursuit of that 
understanding. Neoliberalism is not a totalizing narrative any more than one novel is; 
hence, the necessity of attending to multiple accounts. As Judith Butler puts it, the 
“production of texts can be one way of reconfiguring what will count as the world,” but 
since no one text reflects the world in its entirety, it will produce “partial provocations,” 
the likes of which ignite a “set of appropriations and criticism that call into question 
[the] fundamental premises” of what came before it (19). Let us move, then, to the 






NEOLIBERAL ARTISTIC PRODUCTION IN RUTH L. OZEKI’S MY YEAR OF 
MEATS AND MOHSIN HAMID’S HOW TO GET FILTHY RICH IN RISING ASIA* 
 
When the values and practices of neoliberalism constitute a socially hegemonic 
authority, the economization of nearly everything in culture unavoidably affects artistic 
production. Just to what extent that occurs has been asked more broadly about industrial 
and late capitalism by Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno, which has generated an 
extensive conversation that has recently turned to include neoliberalism.1 This chapter 
considers the novel genre in connection with that discussion, and today, contemporary 
transnational novels are written in a way that reflects the dominance of neoliberal 
practices, either by telling stories about neoliberal conflict or even co-opting and 
mimicking the language and structures generated by neoliberal values. Within such 
novels, writers also interrogate the difficulty they face in finding ways to substantively 
critique the very capitalist system that also undergirds the production, exchange, and 
reception of their texts. Two cases in point are My Year of Meats by Ruth L. Ozeki and 
How to Get Filthy Rich in Rising Asia by Mohsin Hamid. Each explores how 
neoliberalism operates on a transnational level that has unique effects on art and 
literature’s production and circulation as a commodity. These novelists also examine 
how their own work is constituted and facilitated by a global marketplace predicated on 
 
* A portion of this chapter appears in slightly different form in ariel Volume 50, Issue 1, January, 2019, 
pages 141-70 (copyright © 2019 Johns Hopkins University Press and the University of Calgary). It is 
reprinted with the permission of the publishers. 
1 I am thinking chiefly here of Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” and 




commodified exchange.2 Since the 1930s, literary and Marxist theorists have argued that 
art cannot exist outside the influence of a capitalist system that commodifies objects in 
order to usher them into a competitive market economy built on a system of value 
exchange.3 What is less clear, though, is how the neoliberal turn further affects artistic 
production as texts are drawn into and moved about by transnational financial flows. 
Whether the adjective used to describe late capitalism is “neoliberal,” “multinational,” 
“postindustrial,” “deindustrial,” or “post-Fordist,” the point remains that the production 
of art is currently caught within the globe-spanning financial work of neoliberalism. 
This chapter turns to the subject of literary production within neoliberal 
capitalism, and it is worth noting how Ozeki and Hamid structure their critique of 
neoliberalism by considering how their own novels are shaped by other forms of media. 
My Year of Meats specifically explores how the documentary form of filmmaking both 
challenges and contributes to the growth of neoliberal values. Ozeki considers at length 
how documentary film, a form generally regarded as factual and nonfictional in 
structure, is also carefully constructed through editing to elicit certain reactions from 
viewers. More pointedly, My Year of Meats follows the progress of a documentary that 
is critical of the neoliberal corporate state, and Ozeki positions the documentary as 
largely ineffective in its political critique, so much so that its message is reappropriated 
 
2 Both novels, focused as they are on artistic production, are self-reflexively taken up with their own 
creation. This is, of course, not a new literary approach. Artworks have long been self-reflexive about their 
own production before the late-twentieth century—The Faerie Queen and Tristam Shandy, for example—
but Ozeki and Hamid undertake the kind of work Frederic Jameson describes in Postmodernism, where 
self-reflexivity is understood as influenced and driven by contemporary, globe-spanning developments 
within late capitalist modes. 
3 Beyond Benjamin and Adorno, some key texts in this debate have been Terry Eagleton’s Marxism and 
Literary Criticism and Criticism and Ideology, Raymond Williams’ Marxism and Literature, Jameson’s 
Marxism and Form, Herbert Marcuse’s The Aesthetic Dimension, Jacques Rancière’s The Politics of 
Aesthetics, Ernst Bloch’s The Principle of Hope, and, though written before his turn to Marxism/Leninism, 




by a neoliberal discourse of freedom. Simultaneously, Ozeki queries how successful the 
novel’s constructed attempts at political and social critique can be when neoliberalism so 
often commodifies new realms by replacing a thing’s use value with exchange value. 
One way My Year of Meats answers this question is by exploring how people and the art 
they create provide space for agency even as they are simultaneously subsumed by the 
transnational flows of neoliberal capitalism. There is both freedom and coercion, room 
for both the creativity to critique oppressive economic conditions as well as the 
impossibility of ever having one’s art fully liberated from becoming a marketized unit of 
exchange. By tracing these complicated positionalities, Ozeki imagines not only how to 
navigate them, but also how to successfully challenge a neoliberal ethic driven by 
private corporations, challenges that are directly facilitated through artistic production 
and a renewed dedication to fostering diverse communities that rejects the hyper-
individualized ethos of neoliberalism. 
Hamid chiefly considers how other forms such as the self-help book shape the 
novel genre. How to Get Filthy Rich in Rising Asia self-referentially queries what the 
novel can or should look like in a world dominated by neoliberal finance. Written as a 
parodic self-help book in the second person, which turns the “you” of the reader into the 
novel’s main character, Filthy Rich questions not only the contemporary purpose of 
literature, but also envisions how its processes of production continue beyond the page. 
Hamid situates books—and especially novels—as active and agential subjects in their 
own right, or, at the very least, he suggests they hold such potential. Filthy Rich 
considers not only how narratives have substantive political potential, but also how that 




individual freedom, for Hamid questions whether literature is produced with a larger 
social responsibility in mind or if novels simply serve an economic function. Hamid 
suggests that both are true, meaning that neoliberalism’s influence has not fully 
foreclosed literature’s political potential, yet at the same time the commodification of 
literature can certainly limit its socially progressive effects. 
 
The Work of Art in the Age of Neoliberalism 
Both Ozeki and Hamid use their novels to examine how their writing and other art forms 
are both vehicles of critique and commodities that circulate in a world market dominated 
by the transnational work of private corporations. In this way, their novels interrogate a 
more contemporary dimension of the interactions between art and capitalism by 
considering how the higher emphases today on individual freedom, entrepreneurship, 
self-investment, and self-determination affect not only the production of art but also the 
ways that individuals interact with different art forms. These texts, then, contribute to a 
longer history of critique that questions whether art’s often-romanticized socially 
progressive potential is nullified by the ubiquity of a global capitalist system. This has 
long been a subject of study due largely to the belief, as Nicholas Brown suggests, that 
art occupies a unique social and cultural space because it does not possess only use-
value (3). In other words, art is not merely an object, since it has the ability to levy a 
critique in ways that other commodities cannot. Therefore, even though a painting or a 
book is a commodity in the sense that it can be transferred from one buyer to another via 
monetary exchange, it cannot be reduced solely to its material exchangeability. For 




cannot be reduced solely to its material existence of paper, ink, glue, and binding. Its 
pages, when read, have the potential to “speak up” or “talk back” in ways that a potato 
cannot—so the argument goes. Yet despite this supposed critical space that art occupies, 
there is increasing uncertainty over its ability to preserve at least some space of critical 
autonomy that remains unsullied by capitalism. 
Specifically, Adorno questions whether there comes a point when art is so 
thoroughly commodified that it can no longer successfully and substantively critique the 
very market system that commodifies it. Adorno’s arguments came at a key juncture in 
the 1960s shortly before neoliberal policies began to be implemented in experimental 
ways in the US and abroad.4 At the same time, though, his arguments precede the full-
fledged economization of everyday life that has more recently been visible in different 
neoliberal practices and attitudes. Adorno’s view of the changing nature of the capitalist 
market economy and its effect on artistic production is also decidedly less optimistic 
than Benjamin’s and does not suggest that capitalist reproduction and accumulation can 
lead to politically and socially progressive outcomes. That is not to say he advocates for 
art’s distancing from capitalism. If an artist were to do this, the result would be the 
production of art that fails to launch any form of critique. For Adorno, this kind of 
resistance to capitalism via withdrawal is not only inadvisable, it is impossible. If art is 
going to have any substantive political effect, it cannot simply ignore the growth of 
 
4 As Harvey notes, the 1970s were marked by global crises of capital accumulation, unemployment, and 
inflation precipitated by such events as the 1973 OPEC oil embargo. In addition to economic uncertainty, 
the rise of Communist and socialist parties in capitalist and developing nations signaled a political threat 
for moneyed elites. Some of the solutions to these problems were “forced privatization” via the US-
supported coup in Chile and military overthrow in Argentina (12-16). Harvey suggests that such 
imperialist action was undertaken to “prise open new investment opportunities” abroad and, thus, mitigate 




commodification; it would do so “only at the price of its own powerlessness” (Adorno 
21). Only by acknowledging the excessive commodification of everyday life—by 
“immersing its autonomy” in that reality—can art become “eloquent” (Adorno 21). 
Ultimately, then, art’s place within capitalism is an issue of representation, because art 
that will successfully achieve modern political relevance must do so “through mimesis 
of the hardened and alienated” aspects of capitalism’s dominance (Adorno 21). 
The risk, however, is that this mimetic process risks presenting art as a fetishized 
commodity, an object whose social and material conditions of its production are 
obscured. Art, then, occupies a slippery terrain in a system of commodity exchange: Art 
that tries to claim it is “absolute” and free from the influence of the “free” market would 
be “worthless from the start” because of the absurdity of that claim; yet at the same time 
“the survival of art becomes precarious” when it “insists obstinately” on its own 
fetishization to a world where labor is largely made invisible (Adorno 228). In other 
words, art should not overlook the existence of capitalism’s violent effects, but neither 
can artists pretend as if their creative production is not somehow also connected to, 
influenced, or supported by the commodifying work of capitalist economies. Adorno 
claims that this problematic dialectic “forces art into an aporia” (228), where it cannot 
free itself from commodification nor fully represent it either. This impediment to 
faithful, realistic representation stems from audiences who have no interest in 
encountering art that displays how labor undergirds myriad forms of production. If we 
are to see through to the methods of production, Adorno argues that the ways we 
consume art—viewing it, listening to it, reading it—also have to change. To focus 




and foremost “social in that it is the product of the division of labor”; indeed, 
“production” is the social connection to art that is “anterior to reception” (Adorno 228). 
To chiefly consider how audiences receive a work of art misses the point about its social 
significance, for the initial moment of contact between society and the artwork happened 
when social forms of labor produced it. Or to put it in more traditional Marxist terms, 
reception is merely a superstructure of the much larger base of social labor. Adorno 
contends that if we are to truly understand a work of art, we have to look to the social 
conditions of its production first. Why was the artwork produced? How was it produced? 
From there, we begin to derive a sense of its political significance. This does not mean 
reception is unimportant, for an audience’s interaction with a work of art certainly 
carries crucial political and social implications, too. But Adorno asserts that to pretend 
the “social effect” of reception is all that matters in relation to an artwork never “comes 
close to understanding what is social in art” (228).  
However, the thorny issue of art’s “aporia” still remains, but it can be resolved 
through Adorno’s underdeveloped pronouncement “The absolute artwork converges 
with the absolute commodity” (21). Adorno does not fully suggest how art can remain 
absolute—that is, still maintain some level of autonomy—from commodification even as 
it is commodified, but Stewart Martin points out that Adorno’s claims are best 
understood if we avoid yielding to the typically binary structure that this discussion has 
taken over several decades (i.e., art is either a commodity or it is not). Instead, we should 
approach autonomous art as a paradox that commodification does not eliminate but, 
rather, generates as its “contradictory product,” which is to say that an autonomous 




ideology and its critique” (Martin 17, emphasis in original). It is precisely through that 
simultaneous activation and destruction that “culture can be resisted and criticized” 
through art (Martin 17). What this would look like is an “immanent critique: the 
generation of art’s autonomy from out of commodification,” which an artist could 
achieve via “the refusal of commodification by a subversive mimesis of it” (18, 
emphasis in original).5 
To call for mimesis can paint a misleading picture, though. The point here is not 
that artists should attempt to merely duplicate or imitate capitalism’s effects through 
their art. The risk there would be the creation of an absolute artwork that is nothing more 
than another fetishized commodity that “conceals the extent to which it is actually the 
product of social labour” (Martin 18). What Martin means here is that the concept of an 
artwork absolutely free from the influence of the market is a fiction, which is to say that 
the belief in any such idea simultaneously opens a space for critique. Similarly, there is 
no such thing as an absolute commodity, for exchange-value can never be fully free of 
use-value, “since it is use that is ultimately exchanged” (Martin 19). If a commodity no 
longer has a use, the necessity of its exchange also disappears, and this reveals the 
 
5 What Martin describes here as “subversive mimesis” is similar to Jameson’s theories on the production 
of art in postmodern society. Jameson suggests that commodification’s effect on art is not something to be 
concerned by. Instead, commodification offers both a “cultural and experiential break” (Postmodernism 
xiii) because postmodernism asks us to take up “new forms of practice and social and mental habits … 
with the new forms of economic production and organization thrown up by the modification of capitalism” 
(Postmodernism xiv). This means that artistic production has moved away from modernism in the sense 
that “aesthetic production today has become integrated into commodity production generally” 
(Postmodernism 4). However, like Adorno, Jameson does concede that making an effective critique 
through one’s art is certainly challenging. Making any “moralizing judgments” as an artist is difficult since 
nearly everyone—artists, critics, and audiences alike—is “so deeply immersed in [the] postmodernist 
space” of late capitalism that “the luxury of the old-fashioned ideological critique, the indignant moral 
denunciation of the other, becomes unavailable” (Postmodernism 46). The reason that critique has become 
so problematic is because that long-honored value of “critical distance” has become compromised 
(Postmodernism 48). This is postmodernism’s “moment of truth”—that late capitalism’s effects are 




impossibility of capital’s “self-valorization”; this very impossibility creates a space of 
critique for art because “an artwork’s affinity to a commodity does not prevent it from 
contradicting capital, but rather enables it” (Martin 19). Martin’s point here helpfully 
clarifies Adorno’s claim that the “absolute artwork converges with the absolute 
commodity.” Whether Adorno’s verb should be translated as “converge,” “meet,” or 
“merge,” the point remains that when artistic and commodity production collide, the 
dissolution of the artwork into the commodity form can only be partial, not total.6 In 
other words, both absolutes are fictions. A commodity is not absolute (i.e., divorced) 
from the different social and material conditions of its production anymore than an 
artwork is. At the same time, an artwork is not absolutely free from the commodifying 
reach of capitalism. To pretend otherwise would be to fetishize art. 
Though both the “absolute” qualities of an artwork and a commodity are 
mistruths, Martin understands Adorno’s verb choice to mean that it is the effect of the 
absolute commodity fiction that activates and enables the semblance of an artwork’s 
supposed autonomy, or, its ability to feign autonomy. This effect of the commodity form 
cannot foreclose art’s ability to make a dialogic critique; instead, the force of 
commodification creates and provides a solution: “the distancing of the artwork from a 
commodified world through the abstraction of the commodity form itself” (Martin 20). 
Martin uses abstraction in the dual sense: that art in its critical capacities seeks to 
separate or distance itself from the commodity form yet simultaneously draws something 
 
6 There is disagreement over how to most accurately translate that verb from Adorno’s German into 
English. Martin prefers “meets,” the Hullot-Kentor translation referenced in this chapter uses “converges,” 
and the 1984 Lenhardt translation for Routledge chooses “merges.” Martin explains that he wanted to 
preserve Adorno’s implication that there is “an affinity [between the artwork and commodity] that is 




from the commodity form and its abstracted (i.e., fetishized) processes. That is to say, art 
can playfully imitate capital’s “internalization of abstract labour” and pretend that it is 
somehow independent of the social labor that created it (Martin 20). This places art in 
critical opposition against the impossible self-valorization of capitalism, even as it draws 
from the realm of fetishized commodities for its subject matter. The “objectivity of the 
autonomous artwork”—its labor, its creation—“takes on a subject-like character” 
(Martin 23), which has become a recognizable focal point in postmodern literature where 
the creative process of artistic production itself is narrativized. This kind of artistic 
subjectivity stands as a “singular subject contra the universal subject of capital,” and 
through this contradiction it identifies “a link to an alternative collective subjectivity” 
(Martin 23). In this way, the force and work of capital does not fully absorb and 
neutralize an artwork’s critique even as it determines some of its parodic and/or process-
driven content. 
Others are not so optimistic. Brown contends that the processes of artistic 
production today are wholly subsumed under capitalism because the shift from a 
commodity exchange to a monetary one means an object’s use-value is no longer central 
to its existence (6). So while Martin argues that a commodity’s use-value never fully 
goes away, Brown suggests that whether it does or not is beside the point. This is 
because what determines not only the production but also the value of a commodity 
changes when an object’s raison d’être is no longer informed by the personal intentions 
of the producer, but by what people are willing to pay for.7 This change affects art 
 
7 The difference here being the production of something for oneself versus producing it for others; in the 




because the work of interpretation undergoes a subsequent alteration as well, for if art is 
reduced to a commodity, “the form the object takes is determined elsewhere than where 
it is made, namely on the market,” and it then makes more sense to study “the desires 
represented by the market” (Brown 7). When the goal becomes making one’s art appeal 
to a certain audience, “the appropriation of commodities” has come to influence artistic 
decisions (Brown 8).8 Like Jameson, Brown suggests that artworks lack critical distance 
and are, therefore, incapable of being anything other than commodities. Perhaps most 
interesting, though, is his suggestion that the subsumption of art under capital only 
leaves the decidedly neoliberal option for an artist to conduct herself as an entrepreneur 
of her self who has to turn to a “great gallery of dead forms” to appeal “theatrically to 
consumer desires” (14).9  
I argue, however, that Martin and Brown have more in common than initially 
meets the eye. Martin notes that art must display an understanding of its production’s 
entanglement in the commodifying process, lest it become irrelevant, while Brown 
 
8 Martha Woodmansee charts how the commercialization of literature and existence of a literary market 
that makes it possible for writers to carve out a sustainable living from their work goes back at least as far 
as the eighteenth-century rise of the middle class and increased literacy rates. See The Author, Art, and the 
Market: Rereading the History of Aesthetics. 
9 Brown’s treatment of art as wholly subsumed by a market economy is understandable in light of recent 
studies of neoliberalism’s effect on literature. Jasper Bernes tracks how artistic work in the 1960s and 
1970s specifically “helped to articulate … new qualitative complaints and demands” in response to the 
dissatisfaction with the increasingly mechanized and routinized forms of blue-collar and white-collar work 
(8, emphasis in original). However, that “aesthetic critique has been neutralized and naturalized” with “the 
recuperation of that critique via the refashioning of labor in aesthetic terms,” and the clock will likely 
never turn back on that shift (Bernes 181). For other arguments that correspond with Bernes’, see Mark 
Banks, “Autonomy Guaranteed? Cultural Work and the ‘Art-Commerce Relation’”; Peter Fleming, 
Authenticity and the Cultural Politics of Work: New Forms of Informal Control; and Bill Ryan, Making 
Capital from Culture: The Corporate Form of Capitalist Cultural Production. 
The shift to rebrand work and labor as creative endeavors is discussed (and encouraged) at length 
in Richard Florida’s well-known The Rise of the Creative Class, a text that Imre Szeman argues acts as a 
“lobbyist on behalf of creativity to government, business, and the general public” and tries “to help 
encourage and harness creativity” in order to improve how different work systems operate (24-25). 
Further, Sarah Brouillette demonstrates how New Labour in the UK has “trumpeted the use of culture, 
including literature, in nation-branding strategies that would encourage investment in the UK and sell 




suggests that self-referentiality via the recycling of old forms is the only option in an 
artistic world overrun by commodification. Accordingly, both Martin and Brown suggest 
that, aside from artistic playfulness, most content is predetermined, though there are 
countless options available within the realms of parody and pastiche. But what Martin 
sees as still offering grounds for critique, Brown does not, and Brown’s decision to 
specifically identify neoliberalism as playing a significant role in these changes, while 
Martin does not, should give us pause. Brown essentially regards art as fully objectified 
within neoliberalism, a text reduced to its exchange-value by the commodifying forces 
of late capitalism; Martin, however, theorizes that art still retains some measure of 
subjective force, even if that autonomy is paradoxically activated by the façade of 
absolute commodification. Art, then, for Martin, possesses a subjective strength even 
as—or precisely because—it is objectified through commodification. 
Taken together, Martin and Brown’s arguments point to a complication that 
Mitchum Huehls examines at length—namely, the immense difficulty in critiquing 
neoliberal ideology without one’s arguments sounding as if they are making a case for it. 
Huehls argues that writers consistently encounter this frustration when neoliberal 
ideology so successfully co-opts critique. Just as Martin and Brown disagree over art’s 
subjective or objectified potential within late capitalism, Huehls identifies this 
subject/object conflict as one of neoliberalism’s central contradictions that shapes 
society and culture. For example, neoliberal theorists draw up the individual as either a 
free entrepreneurial agent or an objectified unit of data in service to the market, one that 
can be managed and learn to manage itself. But Huehls notes that neoliberal theorists 




back and forth between subjective and objective conceptualizations “defines neoliberal 
discourse” (Huehls 9). Though both of these representations seem contradictory, both 
play into the values system of neoliberalism and support its laissez-faire stance.10 The 
critical impasse within neoliberalism comes from trying to challenge one paradigm of 
the world with its opposite, to continue to think of subjects and objects as purified 
distinctions from each other (Huehls 14-15). Similarly, Stuart Hall and Alan O’Shea 
note how most of us occupy multiple roles at once—“citizens, taxpayers and workers”—
meaning that “discourses which try to win us over must privilege one way of positioning 
ourselves over others” (11). 
A key problem within these contradictions is the tendency to treat neoliberalism 
as normative, but Huehls recommends viewing neoliberalism as post-normative—that is, 
still powerful but not an ideology that primarily constructs subjects by creating norms 
for society. Instead, neoliberalism is more hands-off and influences people by shaping 
environments.11 But if that is the case, that matters for issues of representation and, 
therefore, the representational arts. Normative culture establishes its specific modes and 
preferences representationally and, thus, invites a representational critique, but if 
neoliberalism is post-normative and only indirectly influences our actions or beliefs, 
then it would be “producing its value and influence non-representationally,” which 
would require treating it as an ontological force (Huehls 3-4). Normative neoliberalism 
 
10 For example, you could advocate for the communal good in an attempt to counter the exploitation of 
individuals-as-objects, but that same language of social justice nicely advocates for the freedom of 
individuals’ self-determination, a social stance that neoliberal ethics quickly adopts as the necessity of 
protecting an individual’s ability to move through society as a budding entrepreneur. To speak of rights 
and justice, then, may help to strengthen the same structures of injustice one hopes to confront. 
11 Huehls’ understanding of neoliberalism and its post-normative structure is informed by Michel 
Foucault’s conceptualization of neoliberalism in The Birth of Biopolitics, where neoliberalism primarily 




invites critique, but post-normative neoliberalism would not respond to it. A responsive 
politics, then, would require intervening in an ontological manner by highlighting 
neoliberalism’s contradictions.  
This form of ontological critique is precisely what the novel can undertake, 
though the genre is not often regarded in such a manner. Anna Kornbluh criticizes how 
the social import of the novel has been turned into little more than a vehicle for 
increasing readers’ affective maturity or a diagnostic mirror to remind us of society’s 
ills. Instead, she contends that novels have always been more than this because of their 
“speculative, generative utopianism” that imagines forms of existence and belonging 
alternative to the violence of “capitalist contradiction” (398). In this way, the novel not 
only occupies “both the negative and affirmative poles of critique”; rather, critique is its 
“robust ontology” (398, 399). To say the novel does not produce critique but, rather, is 
critique is a key semantic distinction to make. It positions the novel as a “mode of 
knowing” in its own right instead of an “ideology” or “object of knowledge” to be 
utilized in service to some greater arena of discourse (Kornbluh 399). Indeed, the novel 
is “more than evidence, more than information, [and] more than data” that can be rallied 
in the support of various social and political causes (Kornbluh 400). To move on from 
this currently en vogue critical approach and return to the novel’s immanent critical 
capacities requires an attendance to its “otherworldliness, its making of something new” 
(400). To regard the novel as ontologically critical corresponds with Huehls’ call for 
critique that inhabits the “doubled subject-object ontology” neoliberalism produces but 




neoliberalism, Huehls suggests instead that artists would be embracing what 
neoliberalism refuses to represent—ontological complexity. 
Engaging neoliberalism with a critique on the plane of normative culture may do 
little good, for it runs the risk of merely targeting its symptoms, not its underlying 
causes. Kornbluh argues that this is precisely how the novel has been put to work within 
social and political discourse, and such an approach fails to search for a novel’s “formal 
actuation” of how it “work[s] out problems” (405). To be clear, a novel that possesses 
“immanent critique” (Kornbluh 406) is quite different than engaging in normative 
critique. While neoliberalism certainly generates norms, to engage neoliberal ideas 
through a normative critique of epistemology or ideology would fail to address the 
ontological impact of neoliberal values on individuals and cultural forms. Huehls 
observes that an ontological approach to critique places a premium on the significance of 
words and language, for if they “neither reduce to nor stand apart from the world,” then 
the word/world are simultaneous occurrences just as a subject/object existence is; 
therefore, we would have to reconsider the poststructuralist assumption that language, 
via representation, “points to the world without joining it” (Huehls 25). Fiction has an 
ability to intervene in a neoliberal world by attending to the “representational impasses 
that both neoliberalism and critique have produced,” and that would productively 
complicate “the purified divide between subject and object, word and world” (Huehls 
29). Huehls’ description of this both/and approach mirrors Martin’s conviction that art’s 
ability to maintain some level of autonomy in its ability to critique is activated by 




not be deemed capitulation, for as Adorno reminds us, to produce art that tries to avoid 
the subject of capitalism’s dominance would be to create something “innocuous.” 
While Marxist and neo-Marxist anxieties about the commodification of art are 
primarily taken up with Western culture, we must also consider how these are 
simultaneously global concerns if we are to disrupt what Dipesh Chakrabarty calls the 
“first in Europe, then elsewhere” critical perspective that often surrounds such debates 
(7). To consider how global capitalism affects artistic production beyond Eurocentric 
contexts is not done for the sake of preserving outdated center/periphery models. True, 
capitalist modernity initiated a cultural transition of the developing world, which has 
been a “process of translating diverse forms, practices, and understandings of life into 
universalist political-theoretical categories of deeply European origin” (Chakrabarty 17). 
But we are also at a point when “non-European capitalist societies make their own 
claims on the history of capitalism,” and this “economic fragmentation” leads to 
“cultural fragmentation” or “multiculturalism” (Dirlik 71). Ozeki and Hamid’s novels do 
precisely this by moving beyond an early-twentieth-century period of capitalist 
modernity and formulating a re-translation that narrativizes how the global influence of 
neoliberal ideology affects the way artistic productions circulate in different national and 
transnational contexts.  
Such literary terrain is not without its pitfalls. For instance, Graham Huggan 
notes how postcolonial literatures quickly became a “cultural commodity” because of the 
“complicity between local oppositional discourses and the global late-capitalist system 
in which these discourses circulate and are contained” (vii). As postcolonial literature 




intellectual field, it “capitalized on its perceived marginality” (Huggan viii). With the 
largest publishing centers firmly established in major metropolitan areas of the West, 
there continues to be the sense that any non-Western literature must cater to its buying 
audience. As a result, postcolonial literature and its “rhetoric of resistance have 
themselves become consumer products” (Huggan 6). This has most successfully 
happened within exoticized representations of non-Western people and their cultures, a 
practice that “manufactures otherness” for Western readers (Huggan 13). These 
exoticized renderings mirror Marx’s concept of commodity fetishism, for exoticization 
also veils processes of production by covering up the politics that makes non-Western 
cultures legible and saleable to Western readers (Huggan 18). 
Such consumerist pressures certainly affect non-Western writers. Their attendant 
“anxiety about commercialization” reveals the compromises they might have to make if 
they are going to gain a foothold in the “global market for English-language literary 
texts” (Brouillette, Postcolonial 3).12 While it is tempting to want to believe that 
literature can resist being relegated merely to the status of a commodity, postcolonial 
literature especially disproves the possibility that “autonomy from the commercial 
sphere” can exist for a writer from a former colony, since postcolonial writers often feel 
pressure to perform to certain expectations of Western publishers and readers 
(Brouillette, Postcolonial 3-4). It often becomes a no-win situation. A self-conscious and 
self-critical writing style can help to anticipate certain criticism of “selling out” to 
Anglo-American audiences; however, at the same time, such a postmodernist narrative 
 
12 In turn, this creates a form of hegemonic cultural capital. For how these ideas play out specifically in the 
realm of literary prizes, see James F. English, The Economy of Prestige: Prizes, Awards, and the 




style can be “highly saleable” (Brouillette, Postcolonial 5). But, as Vivek Chibber 
argues, any accusation of selling out in a postcolonial or transnational artistic context is 
not entirely fair, either. Because of the universalizing force of capitalism’s modern 
growth in post-colonies, there is little of culture—whether economic, political, or 
artistic—that has not somehow been constituted by colonial and intra-national efforts to 
convert to a capitalist economy. If we view artists as agents who can choose to ruminate 
on or eschew parts of their culture, they can also make artistic choices with their 
“material interests” in mind (Chibber 196). The latter is not automatically tantamount to 
maximizing “economic interests” or being “relentlessly self-oriented” (Chibber 198). To 
write and sell stories can also be a choice made out of well-being, the desire to provide 
for oneself. The individual and communal decisions to protect well-being and freedom 
of choice are not somehow uniquely Western motivations, yet the narrative has existed 
since the Enlightenment that those are the West’s chief exports—freedom, 
responsibility, rationality, choice, self-determination (Chibber 204-06). This is, of 
course, an extensively reductive understanding of world history, but these grander, 
Western-driven narratives have had a phenomenal shelf life. So, for a postcolonial writer 
to use the Western genre of the novel, court a literary agent in New York City or 
London, and land a publishing deal with, say, Penguin Random House does not mean 
that writer is condoning the near-global ubiquity of capitalism. Such accusations run the 
risk of further nurturing the myth of the West’s primacy and immanence in all things 
economic, political, cultural, and social. 
Yet it is also undeniable that the circulation of non-Western literature in 




possibility that both Ozeki and Hamid explore in their novels in relation to the 
documentary form and the financial endgame of self-help books.13 Further, many 
scholars express unease over the significant formalist changes in literature that the rise of 
a global capitalist system has precipitated. The shorthand labels “world literature” or 
“global literature” are frequently used to describe literature that is delocalized, written 
for ease of translation, and easily disseminated across the globe to increase sales. Pascale 
Casanova describes the new world literature as promising readers “denationalized 
content [that] can be absorbed without any risk of misunderstanding,” which turns 
today’s books into “products based on tested aesthetic formulas [that are] designed to 
appeal to the widest possible readership” in a publishing industry that has become an 
“international business” (171-72).14 Casanova, similar to Brown, holds the concern that 
artistic considerations like form, content, or style are only important insofar as they are 
attractive to as many consumers as possible. Within this development, Emily Apter 
identifies the tendency for world literature to embrace a “reflexive endorsement of 
cultural equivalence and substitutability” as well as the “entrepreneurial, bulimic drive to 
anthologize and curricularize the world’s cultural resources” (2-3). Here, Apter alludes 
 
13 Arundhati Roy also identifies how several private corporations in India have various partnerships that 
influence the arts, like Reliance Industries Limited, which owns “mines, gas fields, steel plants, telephone, 
and cable TV and broadband networks” in addition to “a publishing company” (Capitalism 9). Mining 
corporations like Vedanta, the Jindal Group, Essar, Tata Steel, and Rio Tinto have begun to sponsor 
literary festivals, publish art magazines, commission individual artists, and defend free speech at the same 
time that they mine illegally, denude forests, and relocate impoverished communities (Capitalism 18-19). 
An unavoidable impasse remains for an artist as politically outspoken as Roy, and she asks, “But which of 
us sinners was going to cast the first stone? Not me, who lives off royalties from corporate publishing 
houses” (Capitalism 20). Roy is well aware that she is fully enmeshed personally and professionally in a 
world where nearly everything she touches and uses can be traced back to the high-volume production of 
massive corporations. Her fiction and political writing are no different. 
14 It is perhaps not surprising, then, how an algorithm was recently fed 20,000 bestselling novels and can 
now predict with 80% accuracy whether or not a new book will land on the New York Times bestseller list. 




to the criticisms surrounding multiculturalism and how its ostensible celebration of 
cultural difference actually dissolves it. Similarly, Arlene Dávila notes how the logic of 
neoliberalism “demand[s] the transformation and proper repackaging of culture for 
public consumption” (4). As a result, entire social and economic classes, as well as 
histories, are reduced and altered for mainstream consumption. Culture, then, is 
infrequently “an antidote to economic imperatives”; instead, it is more often a “central 
component” of neoliberalism’s continued growth (5). This, as Walter Benn Michaels 
argues, is a hallmark of neoliberal practice: culture and cultural difference is celebrated 
while the economic inequality neoliberalism generates continues to be ignored 
(“Neoliberal” 75). These concerns diagnose a certain blind spot that some “world” or 
“global” texts can possess, where writers produce texts that are driven by capitalism and 
not self-conscious about it. When the pursuit of greater readership becomes tantamount, 
the opportunity for critique is passed over during a text’s production. Gone from the text 
is the self-referential awareness that Martin and others call for as a way to preserve 
literature’s critique of its own commodification. 
Accordingly, the editors of n+1 note in their controversial 2013 piece “World 
Lite” that many works of world literature are “only vestigially social and geographical.” 
This elision of specific senses of place and culture enable books to become more 
accessible and, thereby, saleable. The n+1 editors worry that literature of this kind 
surrenders its ability to launch any effective political critique. Adam Kirsch, however, 
posits that these arguments also expose “a form of nostalgia for the union of modernist 
aesthetics and radical politics” from the 1930s and 1940s (16). Nostalgic though it may 




spread to and takeover of formerly non-capitalist spheres has rendered many non-
Western cultures “legible”—i.e., more capitalist—the same homogenizing force of its 
industrial means of (re)production makes non-Western literatures increasingly readable. 
An interesting example is Heinemann’s African Writers Series (AWS) that began 
in the 1960s.15 On the one hand, the series helped create the category of literature we 
think of today as African Literature, and it also launched the careers and/or legacies of 
many acclaimed writers, from Chinua Achebe and Ngugi wa Thiong’o to Bessie Head 
and Wole Soyinka. The series also initiated necessary conversations about canonicity 
and rightfully challenged certain secure assumptions, such as the inclusion of Joseph 
Conrad’s Heart of Darkness within the British canon (Stec 142). On the other hand, the 
series is also a case in point for continued Western dominance of certain sectors of life in 
former colonies—financial and educational especially. For instance, Phaswane Mpe 
notes how “the development of African literature is inextricably bound with both the 
dynamics of publishing and politics of book promotion” in the West (106-07). Similarly, 
Loretta Stec argues the AWS was created “because the editors saw both an opportunity 
to bring new writers into print and a potential for making profits” in new sectors (141). 
We specifically tend to regard Achebe, Ngugi, and Soyinka as the greats of African 
literature “because these were the writers chosen to be published and reviewed and 
acclaimed by companies with the capital and the prestige to do so” (Stec 142). While 
these arguments do not intend to diminish the political or artistic significance of these 
writers’ works, they do remind us how literature that we associate with decolonial 
 
15 For historical accounts of the development and growth of the African Writers Series, see James Currey, 
“Africa Writes Back: Heinemann African Writers Series – A Publisher’s Memoir” and Adewale Maja-





movements is still largely driven and supported by the influence of Western capital.16 
Granted, this is also simply the structure of the business. To quote a British publishing 
executive, “There are those who think because they are publishing books with artistic 
worth they don’t have to worry about balance sheets … but publishing is a business. You 
have to sell to survive” (qtd. in Stec 140).17 
Concerns over artistic production are made more complex by the sheer global 
scale of capitalism’s political and cultural effect. While none of the aforementioned 
scholars calls for or even believes it is possible to arrive at satisfactory answers to the 
question of critique, they do continue to suggest that it can be addressed in helpful ways, 
especially by the novel genre. By turning to My Year of Meats and How to Get Filthy 
Rich in Rising Asia, I consider how two writers compellingly explore the complexity of 
what it means to produce art in contexts driven by a neoliberal logic of economization. 
Ozeki explores the numerous ways that art and the genre of the novel are entangled in 
the privatized and transnational work of industrial corporations. She shows how there is 
no space of critique where art is not somehow supported—and therefore affected or even 
altered—by the interests of investors, shareholders, and consumers as national 
economies compete for dominance over one another. In this sense, the art in My Year of 
Meats—the television documentary—is certainly a commodity. Yet at the same time, 
Ozeki envisions how art and literature, commodified though they are, have the ability to 
 
16 In her article “In Pursuit of Publishing: Heinemann’s African Writers Series,” Gail Low charts some of 
the paternalistic aspects of Heinemann’s efforts behind the development of the series; however, Olabode 
Ibironke has recently argued in Remapping African Literature that writers like Achebe, Soyinka, and 
Ngugi retained a considerable measure of agency in their work and publication with Heinemann. 
17 The dominating force of the English language can certainly be over- and under-stated in these debates. 
See Simon Gikandi, “Provincializing English” for considerations and evidences of English’s hegemonic 




activate subjective forms of resistance to a neoliberal ethic, such that new forms of social 
belonging are encouraged within tight-knit communities. 
How to Get Filthy Rich in Rising Asia, meanwhile, questions what literature’s 
social and economic role is within neoliberal contexts by considering what value 
literature presents to enterprising individuals and to the communities around would-be 
entrepreneurs. A key tension in Hamid’s novel is the role of the self and how the 
neoliberal tendency to view the individual as chiefly an economic agent complicates and 
frustrates our understanding of what it means to be human. If economics and the 
movement of commodities can be measured in terms of a zero-sum game, Hamid 
suggests conflict will arise when an attempt is made to transfer those same theories onto 
literature, its production, and the individuals who interact with literature. Though Filthy 
Rich never suggests that the ubiquity and force of neoliberal capitalism can be fully 
rejected, Hamid does envision how the production and dissemination of literature-as-
commodity spotlights myriad limits to the values and ideologies of neoliberalism, limits 
that Filthy Rich suggests literature can uniquely expose. 
 
Neoliberal Limitation and Artistic Potential in My Year of Meats 
My Year of Meats ends in a confounding manner. Japanese housewife Akiko Ueno 
achieves the “happy life” she desires by immigrating to the United States with help from 
Asian-American filmmaker Jane Takagi-Little (214). Akiko escapes her abusive 
husband, John, who rapes her earlier in the story, and, after learning she is pregnant from 
the assault, she flees to the US to start what she believes can now be that happy life. It is 




novel seem like yet another immigrant story that problematically supports an American 
self-told tale of exceptionalism and freedom.18 This complicated resolution owes to the 
way Akiko forms her expectations of the US—from watching a television documentary 
filmed by Jane that showcases American families. The show is financed by BEEF-EX, a 
fictional US “national lobby organization” for the American meat industry (Ozeki 9). 
Jane tries to use the show to broadcast a more diverse vision of what it means to be an 
American, but that nuanced image of the US is different than what Akiko sees. She 
assumes the US is simply a place where happy lives are lived. Jane’s documentary, then, 
both succeeds and fails in its aims. On the one hand, it is the catalyst that helps Akiko 
escape a life-threatening situation; on the other hand, it only confirms certain 
exceptionalist assumptions about the US. Jane’s artwork, then, is politically resistant and 
subsumed, dynamic and neutralized. 
My examination of My Year of Meats is two-fold. First, I look at Jane’s 
documentary My American Wife! It is essentially a commercial for BEEF-EX with the 
lofty goal of securing Japanese importation of American beef in an effort to counter 
Japan’s burgeoning financial prowess over the US in the 1990s. Jane’s art is never 
outside of the influence of the meat industry that finances her work, yet at the same time 
she finds ways to resist those artistic confines to significant effect. Her art is 
simultaneously constituted by neoliberal capital and able to subvert it. Second, I 
 
18 My conceptualization of US exceptionalism is informed by Ali Behdad and Donald E. Pease’s 
arguments, where the US is exceptional precisely because its global acts of violence are presented as the 
exception to the socially-produced norm of America’s ostensible promise of freedom and liberty for all. 
To combine some of these terms, Ong has also pointed out how neoliberalism often functions in an 
exceptional manner. Though we tend to think of the political notion of exception from Carl Schmitt as 
“mark[ing] out excludable subjects who are denied protections,” Ong notes that “the exception can also be 
a positive decision to include selected populations and spaces as targets … associated with neoliberal 




consider Akiko and what happens to her as an example of the myriad subject and object 
positions involved in global interactions initiated by neoliberal capitalism, and how 
those dual positions cannot be separated from one another. Moments of individual 
agency and instances of the individual being acted upon occur simultaneously in My 
Year of Meats to the point they cannot be distinguished. Ozeki’s novel embodies the 
approach to art that Adorno calls for because of its back-and-forth narration of Jane and 
Akiko’s experiences, but it does so in a specifically transnational and neoliberal way 
because of the influence of BEEF-EX’s transpacific reach. The production of Jane’s 
documentary and her first-person running commentary on its creation enable us to look 
at the social and material conditions of the production of art to understand its political 
significance within the setting of My Year of Meats. Adorno’s second aspect of 
understanding the production of art within capitalism—audience reception—also 
comprises a significant portion of the text through Akiko’s connection to My American 
Wife! In other words, to only analyze how My American Wife! is produced and not how 
it affects Akiko would fail render a full picture of what Ozeki understands as the 
significance of art’s production and its sociopolitical meaning within neoliberal 
capitalism. Akiko’s reception of the television documentary completes Ozeki’s vision of 
the work of art in an age of neoliberalism, for Jane’s documentary is the catalyst for 
progressive, healthy change in Akiko’s life. Though My American Wife! is subsumed by 
neoliberal capital, Ozeki suggests that it can still have substantive effect beyond itself 
that is liberating for Akiko. In this way, My Year of Meats contributes to our 
understanding of the complicated positionalities within political theories of 




spotlights how opportunities for agency or autonomy are simultaneously possible and 
impossible because of how neoliberalism activates Jane’s artistic production while also 
unable to fully contain what she creates. 
Jane’s work on My American Wife! is easily co-opted by the ever-present US 
self-narrative of exceptionalism, despite her careful attempts to complicate that national 
narrative. At first, each episode showcases an “ideal” US housewife—white, attractive, 
heterosexual—who makes a beef recipe for her family. Akiko’s husband, John, produces 
the show, and as Jane becomes acquainted with the unethical practices of the US beef 
industry, she sabotages his homogenous vision of the US by filming a more diverse set 
of Americans instead—Mexican immigrants, parents of a disabled daughter, a biracial 
vegetarian lesbian couple. Completing a viewer survey, Akiko gives Jane’s episodes 
higher marks for authenticity than John’s presentations of “typical” American 
housewives. Akiko is also intrigued by Jane’s ability to thwart John and contacts her. 
Jane eventually facilitates Akiko’s escape to the US, and Akiko travels around to meet 
some of the families featured on the show, cementing her feeling of belonging in her 
new country.19 But My American Wife! is also an artistic production that is fully 
entangled by the interests of US capital, since its purpose is to aid the US meat 
industry’s entrance into the Japanese market. Thus, Jane’s more socially progressive 
aims seem immediately compromised. This is important to consider, especially in light 
 
19 Some scholars have suggested that Jane and Akiko, as a sort of feminist pairing, are successful in 
liberating themselves from patriarchal paradigms. For readings in this vein, see Jennifer K. Ladino’s 
Reclaiming Nostalgia: Longing for Nature in American Literature (specifically chapter six) and Shameem 
Black’s “Fertile Cosmofeminism: Ruth L. Ozeki and Transnational Reproduction.” For scholars who 
disagree with such a reading, see Palumbo-Liu’s “Rational and Irrational Choices: Form, Affect, and 
Ethics” and Monica Chiu’s “Postnational Globalization and (En)Gendered Meat Production in Ruth L. 




of recent suggestions that the most efficient means for resistance against neoliberal 
capitalism are already housed within its very structures.20 Ozeki posits just the 
opposite—that any critique of or resistance against the neoliberal state that privileges 
privatized corporate interests, no matter how seemingly effective that critique may be, 
can easily be used to the state’s advantage. This ends up being mostly true with Jane’s 
documentary. As Huehls identifies, this co-optation is one of the hallmarks of neoliberal 
thought that produces and preserves a rhetoric of common sense around itself that makes 
it seemingly impervious to transformative criticism. But despite these multiple 
limitations surrounding her artistic work, Jane still finds a way to exact a political 
resistance that is effective because it produces an alternative vision of American ways of 
being and belonging. 
Ozeki portrays this both/and aspect of Jane’s artistic work—how it is constituted 
by the work of neoliberalism yet also resistant to it—by first foregrounding how My 
American Wife! is caught in the economic conflict between the US and Japan in the late 
1980s/early 1990s. My Year of Meats, published in 1998 and set during the Gulf War, 
places the production of the show a year after “the New Beef Agreement was signed 
with Japan” in 1990, which “relax[ed] import quotas and increas[ed] the American share 
of Japan’s red-meat market” (Ozeki 127). The show’s broader, privatized goal is to 
“inveigle a nice woman with her civic duty to promote American meat abroad and 
thereby help rectify the trade imbalance with Japan” (Ozeki 35). Each episode becomes 
a polemic, as Jane and her film crew are to quiz subject families at the end with a 
 
20 See Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Empire, Michael Feher’s “Self-Appreciation: or, The 





segment called “The Survey,” and one of the questions is “Do you think Japan is an 
economic threat to America?” (Ozeki 23). Four commercial spots for BEEF-EX also 
accompany every episode with the idea that the “commercials were to bleed into the 
documentaries, and documentaries were to function as commercials” (Ozeki 41). In this 
way, the documentary facilitates what Brown describes as the late capitalist 
prioritization of exchange-value. If the show does have use-value, it is geared toward 
increasing the exchange of imports/exports. My American Wife! is intended to fill the 
American economic need to regain financial prowess when Japan was becoming the 
latest global center of capital. As Giovanni Arrighi has carefully shown, capital typically 
has moved from declining centers to rising centers over the past five centuries, where the 
latter expands capitalist power to a greater extent than its hegemonic predecessor could 
(15). But this ultimately did not happen between Japan and the US. Japan eventually 
found it difficult to redistribute assets from the US to its own economy because “the 
world’s richest and most developed continental power proved to be not as devoid of 
control over foreign business” as Japan soon found out (Arrighi 18). My American Wife! 
exists as one such effort to continue to control foreign markets via the interests of private 
US corporations. 
Initially, Jane resists the idea that her artistic work is compromised by BEEF-EX 
and any American efforts to reestablish financial dominance over Japan. She claims that 
John’s “wanton capitalist mandate had nothing to do with [her] vocation” (167), but this 
is ultimately incorrect, for it is the very reason her job exists. But that does not stop Jane 
from first approaching her work on My American Wife! as if it contains a way to subvert 




documentary. She has recuperative intentions with the show, “to use this window into 
mainstream network television to educate. Perhaps it was naïve, but I believed, honestly, 
that I could use wives to sell meat in the service of a Larger Truth” (27, emphasis in 
original). Jane displays an intriguing peace here with the entanglement of art and 
business at the beginning of her work on the program. She realizes the contradictions yet 
still believes she can navigate them ethically or, at the very least, work around them to 
arrive at a locus of artistic autonomy similar to what Martin describes. 
But Jane’s belief in any kind of autonomy is quickly challenged. When she is 
aghast that John will not film an African-American family in Mississippi, he replies, 
“It’s not about me. It’s a question of meats” (118), and when she does find a way to film 
a family with a physically disabled daughter while John is indisposed, he becomes 
enraged. As John puts it in his broken English, such content is “not good for program 
sponsor of BEEF-EX” and “TV program depend on sponsor. It is business” (164). Jane’s 
producer in New York, Kenji, delivers a similar message: “BEEF-EX is paying your 
rent. … And mine too. So don’t get all auteur on me” (165). Eventually, Jane comes to 
accept that My American Wife! is not some kind of altruistic, idealistic mission. She 
reiterates verbatim her earlier conviction “that you could use wives to sell meat in the 
service of a greater Truth,” but includes an addendum: “I was broke after my divorce 
and desperate for a job” (176). Ozeki suggests here that the use-value and exchange-
value of My American Wife! dissolve into each other in complicated ways. The 
documentary certainly has an individual, utilitarian value for Jane in that it keeps her 
employed; however, the show’s exchange-value must be delicately preserved so that it 




American Wife! needs to do well enough to keep her employed, but John’s metric for the 
success of each episode is whether or not its content corresponds to the values of a lobby 
organization that represents the US beef industry. Use-value, exchange-value, and ethics 
cannot all be satisfied for Jane because the show needs to be worthy of dissemination—
or exchange—in the eyes of John, Kenji, BEEF-EX, and Japanese trade partners. Jane, 
then, comes to a conclusion similar to Brown’s—that artistic production is eventually so 
saturated by the interests of capital that it becomes little more than a conduit of 
exchange. Indeed, Jane tells her boyfriend later, “You see my quandary? I peddle the 
stuff” (223). 
Any critique of the US meat industry Jane would try to slip into the show’s 
episodes would lack a higher moral or ethical ground. For that matter, any critique 
would likely be unsuccessful, for, as I will discuss later with Akiko’s reception of Jane’s 
episodes, audience reception can easily nullify any substantive critique of capital that the 
artist might try to effect. So what Jane eventually decides to do to subvert John’s 
reductive vision of American families is create art that conveys the kind of “doubled 
subject-object ontology” Huehls describes, where people whose quotidian experience is 
driven by neoliberal capital (20). By filming more diverse families than John would 
prefer, Jane is not merely producing a representational critique, for as Michaels reminds 
us, neoliberalism’s penchant for a rhetoric of diversity would co-opt such talking points. 
Instead, Jane’s episodes make sure to spotlight the family’s simultaneous subject and 
object positions. Each family is objectified in the sense that they are never outside the 
influence of the meat industry. After all, every family of the week on My American Wife! 




persuaded to make the same meals, thus driving up sales of US meat across the Pacific 
Ocean. (In fact, one episode’s family even runs a cattle operation on a massive, 
industrial scale.) But the families Jane films also always retain their subjecthood. At no 
point does Jane reduce them to a certain categorization of American life like John aims 
for. They are always more than stereotypes, each of them embodying, in subtle or 
obvious ways, alternative ways of being and belonging. 
Jane’s subversive episodes are not representational critiques, for she does not 
pretend they achieve verisimilitude, even if she formerly held the conviction that she can 
make a better show than John with her “residual loyalty to an ideal” of authenticity (28). 
By authenticity, Jane means she hopes viewers would “learn something real about 
America,” and the problem with John’s creative direction is that it produces 
“documentaries about an exotic and vanishing America for consumption” (15). The US 
he would have her portray is vanishing because it displays a whitewashed, heterosexual, 
homogenized America of some amorphous yesteryear that never fully existed anyway, 
and it is exotic because John’s episodes fetishize this very construction.21 But Jane’s 
episodes still register as constructions by the time they are broadcast in Japan. She 
admits as much about the episode featuring Lara and Dyann, a lesbian couple who also 
happen to be vegetarians. While filming them, she sees the episode’s affective potential 
unfolding into “another heart-wrenching documentary moment” (175). While there was 
a time when Jane believed in a “singular, empirical, absolute” truth, as she worked more 
with “editing and camera angles and the effect that music can have on meaning,” she 
 
21 John’s episodes are fetishizations in both the Freudian and Marxist senses of the word. His vision is a 
reductive portrayal of US culture made to look enticing or desiring, but his episodes also obscure more 




came to realize how truth was measured in “ever-diminishing approximations” (176). 
Indeed, some of the complexities of American lived experience are altogether absent 
from Lara and Dyann’s episode that Akiko eventually views. This is not to say the 
episode is meaningless, but its meaning has been carefully manufactured, and the 
elisions are significant. While the crew sets up the cameras to film Lara and Dyann, Jane 
notices how “the backs of [the couple’s] hands brushed and their fingers entwined for a 
brief squeeze before releasing, quickly, well-trained in circumspection” (173). This 
circumspection, though, never appears in the final cut of their episode, but it is a nuance 
that could begin to show that not everything about Lara and Dyann’s life in the US is 
happy. With that omission, any viewer is denied the knowledge of social hardships Lara 
and Dyann have experienced, since the necessity for circumspection does not appear as 
part of their “official” story. Their lives become exceptional because of the exceptions 
Jane makes with her editing. All the viewer will see is a couple living a happy life. 
This is not to discount the emotional power of Lara and Dyann’s story in the 
episode. The footage is moving for Jane, too. But as she edits, she realizes she never 
actually told the two vegetarians that BEEF-EX sponsors the show. And then Jane 
herself admits she has to “strive for the truth and believe in it wholeheartedly” while 
filming, even as she knows she is manipulating it (177). So everyone involved has 
blinders on—some self-imposed, others imposed for them—yet, from this same episode, 
Akiko acquires what she believes is an authentic understanding of the US. Jane identifies 
the simultaneity of truth and construction in the final cut of the episode, describing it as 
“a good one, really solid, moving, the best I’d made,” but then continues to fine-tune the 




[Lara and Dyann’s] and not quite so real anymore” (179). That which is “really solid” 
and deeply “moving” isn’t actually real at all. But this still amounts to effective artistic 
resistance to the kind of reductive political and cultural work represented by John and 
BEEF-EX. As a way to give hope to the efficacy of art in a neoliberal world, Jane 
expresses a certain detached acceptance of the dual position she occupies as an artist 
with subjective power who is also an objectified pawn for BEEF-EX. She labels this 
contradiction “[h]alf documentarian, half fabulist” (360), or, to put it another way, she is 
partially hampered by the status quo of the neoliberal interests that support her own 
work and she is partially liberated by the politically resistant work that the artistic 
imagination can produce. Jane concludes, “Maybe sometimes you have to make things 
up, to tell truths that alter outcomes” (360). To “make things up” becomes tantamount to 
“tell[ing] truths,” a way to navigate the limitations presented to the work of art in an age 
of neoliberalism. Therefore, Jane is not hamstrung creatively or politically in the sense 
that her culpability by working on My American Wife! keeps her from seeing the forest 
for the trees. She has not completely sold out in an ethical sense. But the frustrating 
duality of Jane’s artistic work still remains, which she acknowledges by observing, 
“Maybe this exempts me as an individual, but it sure makes me entirely culpable as a 
global media maker” (335). Ozeki positions Jane as aware of both her own needs and 
different matrices of social responsibility that come with being an artist working within a 
global capitalist system. As Martin notes, that both limits and activates certain 
potentialities for the shape her art can take. 
Just as Jane repeatedly tries to assert some kind of autonomy or agency within 




objectified positions. When she comes to the US, she enters a complex power dynamic 
as an immigrant on the path to cultural citizenship.22 Different political theorists have 
observed how there is no historically consistent American stance toward immigrants.23 
Bonnie Honig claims this ambivalence stems from positive and negative views of what 
immigrants bring to the US. On the one hand, their arrival implies the US is 
“choiceworthy,” but, on the other hand, immigrants never cease to pose a threat to the 
US because of the “undecidability of foreignness” (75, 97). While both sides of the 
American political aisle admire the industrious immigrant, ambivalence never fully goes 
away because the US can never truly know if it is only witnessing “immigrant 
practicality,” where a newcomer does and says the right things out of the will to survive 
(Honig 53). Honig suggests that at the core of these concerns is the question of which 
side has the greatest impact—the immigrant on the nation or the nation on the 
immigrant? This question ultimately poses whether an immigrant retains subjecthood or 
becomes an object acted upon by the state. Thus, the figure of the immigrant embodies 
the same contradictions that neoliberalism grapples with, that “hybrid ontology that 
 
22 Aihwa Ong defines cultural citizenship as a set of “cultural practices and beliefs produced out of 
negotiating the often ambivalent and contested relations with the state and its hegemonic forms that 
establish the criteria of belonging within a national population and territory.” Being a cultural citizen 
means becoming enmeshed in “a dual process of self-making and being-made within webs of power 
linked to the nation-state and civil society” (“Cultural” 738), and this simultaneity of “self-
making”/“being-made” is precisely Akiko’s positionality in My Year of Meats. Renato Rosaldo has been 
credited with coining the term “cultural citizenship,” defining it as the minority’s “right to be different and 
to belong in a participatory democratic sense” (402). His theorization, though, does not sufficiently 
account for the overwhelming influence of the nation-state on a foreigner or immigrant like Ong’s does. 
More recently, Nick Stevenson has further problematized the idea that “cultural citizenship” is as closely 
tied to the nation-state as Ong argues. He conceptualizes a more cosmopolitan understanding of the 
outsider’s level of agency as he or she works to connect the “self and society” (43). 
23 Ali Behdad argues that, on the whole, the US has a “national consciousness” marked by “ambivalence” 
when it comes to immigration because there is an “irreconcilable difference between competing 
perceptions of national identity” (17). Will Kymlicka understands this ambivalence as stemming from 
what American citizens are and are not willing to admit—that the US is certainly “polyethnic,” but there is 
an internal hesitation to view the US as “multinational,” since the latter might require granting certain 




neoliberalism has produced for us” (Huehls 20), which Akiko represents.24 Ozeki 
narrates how powerful the allure of US exceptionalism and freedom are for Akiko, while 
also suggesting that she and Jane do find small ways to productively resist forms of 
oppression. Akiko is both subsumed by a narrative of US exceptionalism while also an 
agential subject within it. Before ever thinking of moving to the US, Akiko receives an 
image of a welcoming nation via My American Wife!, building an expectation of what it 
would be like to live in the US and start a new life. But even though Jane’s episodes 
contain a more nuanced vision of American life, they actually succeed in inculcating 
Akiko with a romanticized view of the US. In one sense, Jane’s episodes fail in their 
aims, but in another sense, they also succeed because they encourage and activate 
Akiko’s determined agency. 
Akiko’s connection to My American Wife! marks the beginning of her growing 
cultural citizenship, the dynamic of “self-making”/“being-made” Ong identifies 
 
24 Ozeki is doing something quite compelling here in that her novel carefully subverts our literary and 
political understanding of simultaneity. Benedict Anderson famously postulated that the novel form 
creates a nationally unifying sense of “meanwhile” as it encourages readers to imagine themselves 
connected to fellow citizens across time and space (24-25). While Anderson’s “meanwhile” is a unifying 
metric, one that grows national identities, Ozeki shows that literary simultaneity should be understood as a 
point of divergence, not convergence. The community of fellow-citizens may continue to be imagined, but 
what is imagined is not as unified as Anderson would lead us to believe. Instead, Akiko and Jane’s 
different readings of My American Wife! and of the US reveal that any imagined community is diverse and 
varied in its interpretive framework. Or, to put it as Jenny Sampirisi does, narrative exists “as a series of 
events that happen and fail to happen simultaneously within the uncertain structure of language” (71). The 
act of writing itself enters “an all-at-onceness” that we should not regard as a moment of either/or or even 
both/and, but as “n/either” (73). 
What Sampirisi describes here recalls Henri Bergson’s concept of duration, that the ceaseless 
flow of past into present as a way to mark the passage of time amounts to a fluidity of experience where 
the “present [is] ceaselessly reborn” (44). Bergson would likely disagree with Anderson, claiming that 
imagining a “link among all individual consciousnesses” is not a unifying moment but, rather, the instance 
when our consciousness should actually grasp “multiple events lying at different points in space.” That is 
to say, “simultaneity would be precisely the possibility of two or more events entering within a single, 
instantaneous perception” (45). The kind of nationalistically homogenizing and unifying imaginative 
moment within Anderson’s “meanwhile” is, for Bergson, instead an opportunity to grasp the relativity of 
meaning within simultaneous events. Or, to return to Huehls, simultaneity is a space to productively 




(“Cultural” 738). The most compelling episode for Akiko is the one that features Lara 
and Dyann. While watching, she begins to cry “tears of admiration for the strong 
women” who found ways to have a family on their own terms (181). Their story moves 
her to write a letter to Jane, saying the episode has changed her life and motivated her to 
leave John. She closes the letter by asking Jane where she can go to “live my happy life 
like” the one Lara and Dyann have (214). The connection Akiko makes between the US 
and a “happy life” is complicated because, as Emily Cheng argues, it “posit[s] the 
United States as an unquestioned space of freedom” (203). But more than that, Akiko 
compares herself and her own unhappiness to a construction. What she perceives to be a 
better situation or outlet for relief in the real world is a carefully edited composition, 
pieced together to trigger the viewer’s emotions, as noted earlier with Jane’s comments 
on the post-production doctoring of the footage. The constructed nature of a television 
program is not the problem here, since those are simply aspects of the medium. The 
complication comes when, after watching the episode, Akiko believes what she has just 
seen confirms that the US is where her “happy life” can occur. What Jane labels an 
“ever-diminishing approximation” of the US, Akiko accepts as truth, which primes her 
for her move to America. In light of Adorno’s arguments, if one were only to read 
Akiko’s reception of My American Wife! to understand the documentary, it would be a 
reductive approach. By only seeing the finished, edited product, Akiko is shut out from 
the conditions in which Jane made each episode. She receives the documentary as if it 
were an absolute commodity. 
Akiko’s determination that the US is a space of freedom is solidified before she 




growing inside her and “didn’t turn on the television, not even once” (317). This is a 
significant moment. Akiko has sat dutifully in front of the television for most of the 
novel, rating the authenticity of the US and its citizens from what she sees on My 
American Wife! Her decision to leave the television off at first appears to imply that she 
is now avoiding constructions of “reality,” which would suggest a growing autonomy as 
she gets ready to escape to the US. But simply avoiding a mediating force like television 
does not change the fact that Akiko has already taken in the mediated message of My 
American Wife! Rather than do an about-face from the simplistic vision of the US she 
has adopted, Akiko’s decision to turn off the television is more of a declaration that she 
has seen enough and determinedly made up her mind about what she thinks the US is 
like. This is further evidenced by her comment to a friend that she is convinced her baby 
is a girl and hopes she “can grow up to become an American Wife” (318), a strong 
woman like Lara or Dyann. The US, captured as it is through Lara and Dyann’s 
manufactured and carefully packaged story, is the ideal to strive for. 
Yet even for all the ways this moment seems like a surrender of agency on 
Akiko’s part, Ozeki still positions Akiko as asserting her agency by deciding to leave 
John and Japan. While it would be easy to view the agency of her decision as undercut 
by her pre-packaged, romanticized view of the US, Akiko still decides what to do with 
her life. Nobody forces her hand. My American Wife! influences her decision, but there 
is nothing about Lara and Dyann’s episode that somehow announces it is imperative for 
her to move to the US and only the US. This is the compelling complication that My 
Year of Meats presents before Akiko leaves Japan: She is simultaneously agential and 




carefully calibrated affective properties touch her deeply. In that sense, Akiko functions 
in an objectified manner as a faceless consumer, a mere number within a larger mass of 
coveted viewer ratings. But what she does with that experience as a viewer is up to her 
and is the moment when she becomes an agent, producing something of value for 
herself. This is not to say that there is a transitional moment where Akiko moves from 
being objectified one moment to an acting subject the next. She is both simultaneously, 
for it is clear that the affective propulsion of My American Wife! stays with her once she 
arrives in the US.25 
Indeed, affect is a key part of Akiko’s devotion to her idealized view of the US. 
As noted earlier, individual agency, industriousness, and economic power are key 
concerns of immigration, but as Honig reminds us, the ambivalence over the subject and 
object positions of the immigrant stems largely from something more affective in its 
constitution—namely, will the immigrant be devoted to the new nation? It is through the 
level of devotion to the immigrant’s new country that the dyad within cultural 
 
25 Another way to state this is to say that Akiko occupies both a challenged and advantageous position as 
an Asian immigrant, a situatedness that both theories of immigration and neoliberalism help us to 
understand. Specifically, the stereotyping that Asian immigrants experience in the US as the “model 
minority” can work both in and against Akiko’s favor when economic buying power carries more and 
more influence in an increasingly neoliberal, corporatized nation-state. The racialized stereotype of Asians 
as family oriented, hard workers, and financially successful is problematic because these perceived signs 
that Asians know how to “make it” in America testifies to the ability of the US to take in outsiders and 
assimilate them into its socio-economic apparatuses (Lee 7). The economic trends that buoy these 
stereotypes have continued into the present. The Census Bureau reports that as of 2017 the median 
household income for Asian Americans was $81,331 compared to $68,145 for White Americans (Semega 
et al.). One way to understand this aspect of stereotyping is through Honig’s arguments, mentioned earlier, 
that economically savvy immigrants are viewed as less of a threat in the US. Though the model minority 
trope contains racialized assumptions, it is a form of stereotyping that regards the Asian immigrant as a 
safe newcomer. For more on how the “model minority” stereotype is an acculturating tool, see Lisa Lowe, 
Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics and Ellen D. Wu, The Color of Success: Asian 
Americans and the Origins of the Model Minority. Others, however, have more recently argued that Asian 
immigrants are productively resisting and complicating this stereotype: See Aihwa Ong, Flexible 
Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality and Walter Benn Michaels, “Model Minorities and 
the Minority Model – the Neoliberal Novel.” For a comprehensive rendering of this debate, see Madeline 




citizenship of “self-making”/“being-made” is further clarified. By the end of My Year of 
Meats, it is clear that Akiko’s agential decisions are still simultaneously driven by the 
national narrative of the US she gleaned from My American Wife! Akiko’s expression of 
patriotism plays a crucial role in this further development. Once she arrives in the US, 
her attachment to a romantic view of the nation quickly blossoms into full-fledged 
dedication, though it is briefly challenged while she rides a train in the Deep South. 
From the train, Akiko sees people living in poverty, and the sight hits her “with a 
shock.” In her mind, Americans are not poor. “Maybe in the past” they were, “or in the 
movies, but not now. Not these days. Not in real life” (336). Ozeki presents Akiko’s 
thoughts in a complicated way. For Akiko, poverty is either a historical moment or a 
cinematic one. If she believes that poverty is a thing of the past, then her image of the 
US is unrealistically optimistic in an economic sense. It is an exceptionalist view in that 
it takes poverty to be the exception to the norm of American life. But attaching 
American poverty to movies creates a difficult contradiction in her thinking. By saying 
that poverty is in the past, she claims it no longer exists. The “or” in Akiko’s thoughts 
separates “the past” and “the movies,” meaning that one way for poverty not to exist is 
for it to be featured in movies. In other words, movies are not real or, rather, they show 
things that are not real anymore. 
Given how devoted she has been to accepting My American Wife! as reality, this 
is an important admission in Akiko’s inner dialogue. She knows what she sees in movies 
is fake, but this concession is immediately followed by her conviction that poverty is not 
around “these days. Not in real life.” So despite seeing tangible poverty, Akiko brushes 




poverty does not fit her conceptualization of “real life,” which is tantamount to Akiko 
confessing that her notion of “real life” is also an empty construction, devoid of 
actuality. She is not completely unaware of American history, since she considers that 
there was a time—“maybe in the past”—when Americans were poor. But even when she 
sees poverty from the train, she chooses to disavow the possibility that people could still 
be poor “these days.” In many ways, Akiko is still watching television, only this time 
she is seated on a train, and the window by her seat frames the picture she views. What 
is real is fake, and what is constructed is real. This moment on the train has potential to 
be a breakthrough in the narrative, the point at which Akiko realizes she is pursuing a 
mere idea of the US. If Akiko would readily admit that movies are not “real life,” then 
neither is television, and that means the representation of America and its housewives in 
My American Wife! are also not “real life.” Therefore, her romanticized view of the US 
gleaned from television is not a dependable basis upon which to pin her hopes for the 
future. But she continues to do this anyway, reflecting back on another family from My 
American Wife! with whom she recently spent the Thanksgiving holiday. She thinks 
about how they were “authentic, exactly what she had seen on TV” (336). Movies and 
“real life” may not be the same for Akiko, but television and authenticity are.26 
Akiko’s train ride continues, and her cultural subsumption deepens as she accepts 
a romanticized form of the US as authentic. The majority of her fellow passengers are 
African American, and the train attendant, Maurice, informs her that she is riding the 
 
26 Akiko’s ready acceptance of an exceptional America is also facilitated by the genre of Jane’s 
storytelling. That Jane’s work is done as a documentary—and not, say, a sitcom—demands a certain sort 
of faith from a viewer. The documentary ostensibly presents that which is real, authentic, or unscripted. It 
is understandable why Akiko would more readily accept what she sees on her television as fact if it is in 





Chicken Bone Special, the name deriving from its passengers often being too poor to 
buy the lounge car’s meals. Maurice notes how “these poor colored folk, they gotta 
make do with lugging along some home-cooked fried chicken instead” (338). The 
passengers around Akiko share their fried chicken and potato salad with her while 
Maurice starts clapping and leading the passengers in a chant of “chicken bone” over 
and over (339). Akiko “shiver[s] with excitement” over the communal camaraderie. As a 
result, she feels 
as if somehow she’d been absorbed into a massive body that had 
taken over the functions of her own, and now it was infusing her 
small heart with the superabundance of its feeling, teaching her 
taut belly to swell, stretching her rib cage, and pumping spurts of 
happy life into her fetus. This is America! she thought. She 
clapped her hands then hugged herself with delight. (339) 
These sentences are complicated because they situate Akiko as being the agent in her 
search for the “true” America. Her pronouncement “This is America!” acts as a kind of 
confirmation of success. Yet she is also very much not the acting subject here. Ozeki’s 
use of the passive voice—“somehow she’d been absorbed”—makes it clear that 
something other than Akiko’s own willed optimism infuses her with patriotic euphoria. 
A romanticized view of the US is swallowing her up. By being “absorbed into a massive 
body,” the US claims Akiko and challenges her autonomy, since it “take[s] over the 
functions of her own” body. After this physiological commandeering, an affective 




also spreads to her baby. Both mother and child have been filled with a patriotic 
happiness and awe. 
Akiko believes that what she is witnessing on the train constitutes American 
reality and that it is something to be giddy over. Rather than consider why her fellow 
passengers are unable to afford food on the train, which might reveal some negative 
socio-economic and racial truth about the US, Akiko sees the situation around her as a 
joyous moment. Monica Chiu notes that Akiko’s reaction here “soften[s] America’s 
harsher realities” through a “normalizing of difference” (109), and Michaels argues that 
this effacement of difference via normalization is precisely the work of neoliberalism 
where issues of race and identity are over-privileged and the celebration of cultural 
difference overshadows the urgency of “minimizing economic difference” (“Model” 
1023-24). Akiko commits this oversight earlier when first boarding the train. She notices 
that most of the people on the train are black and assumes they are also “taking the train 
to find their happy life” like her (336). Akiko does not consider that there could be social 
or economic reasons for taking a train instead of, say, a car or a plane, assuming instead 
that everyone in America is destined for a happy life. What Ozeki envisions here 
confirms Michaels’ position that a carefree attitude toward difference or inequality in 
this scene hides other dire political truths. Accordingly, the joyous sing-a-long moment 
on the Chicken Bone Special does nothing to counter Akiko’s assumptions.27 
 
27 The setting of this scene is telling, for the train car is frequently a site where claims to citizenship and 
belonging have been challenged or negated. Daylanne K. English notes how train car vignettes are familiar 
stock scenes throughout African American literature where the law would seek to “reinforce the 
noncitizenship status of African Americans” by moving black passengers to the back of the train to make 
room for white travelers (53). The train car, then, is where the juridical and cultural objectification of 
people groups has overruled their agency and autonomy as subjects. Further, the symbolism of Akiko’s 




The absolute nature of Akiko’s patriotism productively supports the nation in 
different ways, and though these train scenes could appear to problematically 
metonymize the Deep South with fried-chicken-loving African Americans, the 
stereotypically racist constructions serve a purpose here. Akiko is surrounded by a bunch 
of happy-go-lucky African Americans, an allusion to the long history of docile Uncle-
Tom-type characters that have populated American fiction. Such stock characters have 
helped to place a shroud over black outrage at centuries of oppression. Akiko’s fellow 
passengers, then, are American exceptionalism personified. They are nostalgic 
stereotypes that gloss over slavery, racism, and economic inequality as aberrations 
within an otherwise consistent national narrative of freedom and opportunity. It is no 
wonder that the black passengers’ cheer, congeniality, and chant (as if a religious 
mantra) all help to accelerate the inculcation of patriotic fervor within Akiko, the likes of 
which encourage the formation of her cultural citizenship. Oblivious to the racialized 
history of the poverty she views from the train, she is able to maintain her idyllic view of 
the US, supported as it is by this stereotypical block of fellow passengers.28 
Paradoxically, this scene simultaneously does and does not mirror Jane’s work on the 
television documentary. What Akiko witnesses is similar to the images of the US in 
                                                                                                                                           
is more than a little ironic that Akiko is on a train in the Deep South traveling north to New York, 
mimicking a journey purportedly to freedom. 
28 One counter reading to entertain is that the almost hallucinogenic effect of this train ride is actually a 
sign of Akiko’s agential ability to represent. The reader learns earlier in the novel that Akiko was a manga 
artist before her marriage to John and would also write poetry for fun. One could read the descriptions of 
Akiko’s time in the US as a kind of ode to the hyperreality of the manga form, a way of seeing the world, 
which would imply Akiko is more in control of her contact with US exceptionalism than is initially 
apparent. These arguments largely amount to conjecture, though, since Akiko’s portions of the novel are in 
third-person, unlike the first-person narration of Jane’s sections. We are never really privy to Akiko’s 
thought process in the same way we are with Jane. However, we do know that Akiko pictures herself as 
the woman in the song “Polk Salad Annie,” which plays at the end of one of the episodes of My American 





Jane’s episodes where the US is diverse in a myriad of ways—racial, ethnic, economic, 
gendered, and sexual. Yet, at the same time, Akiko does not grasp the reality that is 
directly in front of her, just as she does not grasp the vision of the US that Jane would 
have viewers of My American Wife! understand. 
Ironically, Akiko’s thought “This is America!” can be read as her first moment of 
true clarity about the US in the novel.29 This is America, the nation that takes immigrants 
and attempts to acculturate them to its larger narrative by convincing them to believe 
that other forms of social and cultural violence or inequality are merely exceptions to the 
norm. Michaels reminds us that neoliberal values encourage this type of cultural 
narrative, the glossing over of economic inequalities to the benefit of the multicultural 
project (“Neoliberal” 74). American multiculturalism often takes a “new cultural politics 
of difference” and uses it to display “its power of absorption,” which turns into “a linear 
narrative that begins with difference but ends in sameness” (Behdad 12-13), the 
sameness being that everyone—citizens and immigrants—agrees to America’s self-told 
tale of exceptionalism. Akiko may have seized her own agency by deciding to leave 
Japan and move to the US, but that does not remove the continued effects of the state on 
newcomers. While Akiko’s absorption into the US—her objectification, the “being-
made” aspect of cultural citizenship—does not negate her autonomous efforts of “self-
making,” it does suggest that attempts to extricate oneself from oppressive environments 
can only ever be partial. The friction of subjecthood and objectification seem destined to 
 
29 Akiko’s exclamation here is quite similar to the main refrain “Ain’t that America!” in John 
Mellencamp’s “Pink Houses,” a song that both sides of the US political establishment have used as a 
patriotic aesthetic at campaign rallies. Similar to Akiko’s dismissal of the poverty around her, the first 
verse of “Pink Houses” describes a vision of American black poverty, only to move on to the chorus and 




continue in their simultaneity, regardless of one’s efforts to land fully on the side of 
freedom. 
Though Akiko never leaves the path to patriotic cultural citizenship, she does not 
fully yield her agency, either. Akiko asserts her agency by making a decision to change 
the trajectory of her life.30 The life Akiko embraces by moving to the US is certainly an 
improvement on her situation in Japan. Her decision to leave is an assertion of her self-
worth and a resolution to survive, personally and for her progeny. The problematics of 
American exceptionalism aside, Ozeki portrays Akiko’s options as better in the US than 
in Japan, and it is easy to forget that there is not always something implicitly 
ethnocentric in the possibility that one place is preferable to another. After all, Ozeki is 
writing about one character. Akiko is not a stand-in for Japan anymore than Jane is for 
the US. Then again, as noted earlier, Ozeki does also place these characters within the 
larger economic conflicts taking place between the US and Japan in the 1990s. While 
Akiko is not representative of all of Japan, Ozeki still places her East-to-West movement 
at the beginning of the 1990s when transfers of capital between Japan and the US were 
further showing signs of American imperialist dominance. While Ozeki writes just one 
story, its trajectory mirrors the neoliberal conflict between Japan and the US at that time. 
Though Akiko’s situation in the novel improves dramatically, we must also consider 
what Ozeki shows to have declined, almost all of which is Japanese: The novel ends 
with John abandoned, his television program destroyed, and parts of the US beef 
industry shut down in a way that will certainly not please Japanese investors. These plot 
 
30 It is important to note that this choice does not fall into the realm of what Jane Elliott terms “suffering 
agency,” a key feature of recent neoliberal novels where characters have the freedom to choose, but only 
between deplorable options. Instead, Ozeki shows something more complex than just a buffet of bad 




points form a denouement where Japan, more or less, ends up losing and the US remains 
fairly unscathed. If the reader doubts for a moment that the US is unaffected, Ozeki 
leaves Akiko’s subsumption into patriotic fervor as one of the novel’s final images. 
It is not uncommon to find within public discourse the description of Ozeki’s 
novels as didactic, or what Shameem Black has labeled “entertainment-education 
fiction” (Fiction 14). My Year of Meats does contain some soapbox moments where 
readers are essentially told how they should feel and think about the US meat industry, 
and Ozeki’s reliance on different genres (faxes, news articles, etc.) to quickly 
disseminate information about questionable practices within food and drug corporations 
can feel like gimmicky efforts to break from the rigors of narrative. But this didacticism 
is a surface ploy that functions as an expertly crafted framing device. Ozeki positions a 
didactic text (My American Wife!) within a larger, seemingly didactic frame (My Year of 
Meats). If My American Wife! falls short of Jane’s intended political effect given how 
Akiko does not grasp the nuanced vision of the US that Jane hopes to give the show’s 
viewers. However, we should view this as a self-referential exchange where Ozeki 
questions how successful My Year of Meats is in the neoliberal moment. In other words, 
does this novel do anything? Should readers expect that art and entertainment do 
something? Ozeki’s answer, via the character of Akiko, seems to be yes to both 
questions, albeit not without the qualification that artistically-generated social change 
may only happen in small ways. For example, My American Wife! for all its problems, 
constructed presentations of reality, and connections to neoliberal corporate America, is 
transformative for Akiko in positive ways. The documentary does nothing to holistically 




life is changed for the better. My Year of Meats seems to suggest that that’s probably 
enough. 
Ozeki has made vague comments on how to approach the happy, irresolute 
ending of her novel. She says that she gave the story a happy ending because she 
believes it is important to imagine how to “change the future” for the better; however, 
she admits being “suspicious of the efficacy” of writing happy endings, even if she 
hopes they would encourage readers to contemplate the issues long after they have put 
the book down (“Conversation” 13). She mentions that she has Jane “discuss the 
shortcomings of happy endings” in My Year of Meats to nudge the reader toward “a 
more complex relationship with that ending” (“Conversation” 13). Here, Ozeki shares a 
conviction more recently expressed by Jessica Berman, that fiction can encourage 
“ethical and imaginative freedom and, by virtue of its social situatedness, can also 
anticipate or rework relationships in the world” (22). These moments are a 
“redescription,” where an alternative narrative of our environment potentially “resists or 
revises social reality” (25). Ozeki acknowledges that she is “point[ing] an authorial 
finger at the very thing [she] is writing” in order to “poke a hole in the seamlessness of 
the happy ending by making it self-referential and reflexive”; even so, she wants to 
emphasize “the power of the imagination” and holds firm to the stance that we “cannot 
make a better world unless [we] imagine it to be so” (“Conversation” 13). Similar to 
Kornbluh, Ozeki cautiously regards the novel as is immanently and ontologically a form 
of critique. 
By the novel’s conclusion, nothing has successfully challenged Akiko’s 




ride as she delightedly accepts an idealized conceptualization of the US. As she sits on 
the train, moving from the Deep South to the North in a reiteration of a historical and 
mythic journey out of bondage to freedom, she enters a scripted future. In other words, it 
seems that Akiko’s story has been absorbed into the American myth of immigrant 
freedom. Certainly, stories can be co-opted and probably always will be to some extent. 
But what Ozeki presents in My Year of Meats is a smaller vision of possible hope within 
larger political concerns: two women pushing against a violently masculine, imperialist, 
and neoliberal world by taking the reins of representation and, in the end, using art to 
forge a small community of femininity that tries to protect and provide for future 
generations. Ozeki’s novel, then, suggests something rather hopeful, if also cynically 
realistic, about the hard but worthwhile undertaking of producing artistic critique. All 
things are not rectified by the end of My Year of Meats, but small, restorative victories 
can still be had. 
 
Collaborative Literary Production in How to Get Filthy Rich in Rising Asia 
Ozeki’s novel addresses how to navigate the complications of producing politically 
efficacious art amid the violence of neoliberal capitalism by using the fictional story of a 
television documentary to comment tangentially on the status of literature. Mohsin 
Hamid, however, makes literary production within neoliberalism the key concern in How 
to Get Filthy Rich in Rising Asia. Though the novel is a rags-to-riches and slums-to-the-
suburbs tale on the surface, Hamid’s story is eminently about literature and, more 
specifically, novels. On the one hand, Filthy Rich initially appears to be concerned with 




worth by entering the market; on the other hand, Hamid uses that plot as a backdrop to 
explore questions about literary production itself: Why is literature sold? Why is it read? 
What is the status of a literary work’s production when it is being received? All of these 
questions are posed within the novel’s neoliberal setting, a world animated by an ethics 
of individualism that lauds and idealizes the self-made entrepreneur. In this sense, Filthy 
Rich suggests we could regard literature as one of many tools that exist to support the 
economic advancement of the individual. Indeed, Hamid considers different ways that 
literature and the novel appear to be just that—functional commodities. However, Filthy 
Rich also challenges the notion that literature can be reduced to the status of a 
commodity. While Hamid understands the ubiquity of neoliberalism as activating 
literary texts in certain profitable and utilitarian ways, the kind that do cause it to 
function as a commodity, Filthy Rich also envisions how, even within the forceful 
subsumption of literature, neoliberal capitalism cannot wholly objectify literature. Or, to 
put it another way, Hamid explores how neoliberalism cannot account for or control all 
of the processes of production surrounding literature. 
The events of Filthy Rich occur squarely within the transnational scope of 
neoliberal capitalism. The narrative voice addresses a “you”—possibly the reader, 
possibly someone else—who is intent on becoming a rich man within an unnamed South 
Asian nation rapidly modernizing itself to become more capitalist.31 It is a setting where 
the rural and pre-capitalist sectors steadily give way to the industrial: farmers sell their 
“communal land to a refrigerator assembly plant looking to expand” (82); the sky is 
 
31 For a closer examination of Hamid’s use of second-person voice, see Jarmila Mildorf, “Pragmatic 
Implications of ‘You’-Narration for Postcolonial Fiction: Mohsin Hamid’s How to Get Filthy Rich in 





perpetually clouded by construction dust, what was formerly “fertile soil [now] gouged 
by shovels, dried by the sun, and scattered by the wind” (113); and, as a result, the city 
You lives in receives a continual influx of migrants looking for work, their arrival 
swelling “the urban belly” of the city past new roads before their construction can even 
be completed (82). To move from the rural to the urban where privatized, corporatized, 
and industrial development happens nonstop is to “witness a passage of time that 
outstrips its chronological equivalent”; only “a few hours on a bus … appear to span 
millennia” (13). The city mirrors You’s desires: to modernize, to gain wealth, to play the 
global corporate game and win it. Accordingly, Filthy Rich is written in the style of a 
self-help book, each chapter’s title announcing a specific task that You needs to 
complete to achieve his goal of outrageous financial success, tasks like “Get an 
Education,” “Work for Yourself,” and “Be Prepared to Use Violence.” That Filthy Rich 
is written as a parodic self-help book places it squarely within the ethos of neoliberalism 
that privileges individual freedom to self-invest and become a player in the market. To 
read a self-help book is to responsibly cater to one’s self. Such a stylistic move on 
Hamid’s part echoes Martin’s concept of the autonomous artwork. To structure Filthy 
Rich as if it is a get-rich-quick text, Hamid acknowledges the ubiquity of the self-help 
form even as that very genre activates the grounds for the novel’s critique. In this 
delicate balance, neither takes over the other and both remain in the foreground of the 
narrative in a sustained tension. 
Each chapter’s opening section helps build Filthy Rich’s surgical focus on the 
role and importance of literature within neoliberalism. Every chapter begins with a brief 




pauses to reflect on the role of self-help books specifically and books in general in a 
world dominated by neoliberal finance and commerce. These reflections ask what or 
where the “self” is within the self-help genre and, more broadly, what purpose or 
function books serve in the heavily financialized present.32 The narrator vacillates 
between two options: The self and books certainly appear to be swallowed up by 
You’s—or anyone else’s—determination to become filthy rich; however, the narrator 
also identifies different ways the self and books are not limited by the common-sense 
rationale to reduce everything to a bottom line or profit/loss margin. 
To be sure, the narrator does not diminish the forcefulness of neoliberal values. 
The narrator acknowledges how the cultural pressure to modernize and financialize 
oneself within the spread of global capitalism turns books into little more than 
commodities. They become objectified tools for personal advancement and economic 
betterment of the self. The narrator, however, does not only consider self-help books as 
fulfilling this function for the reader; rather, he immediately includes novels in this 
genre.33 First, there is the literary masterpiece, “that much-praised, breathtakingly boring 
foreign novel” that is full of “tar-slow prose and blush-inducing formal conceit” (19). 
Someone like You reads this novel “out of an impulse to understand distant lands that 
because of globalization are increasingly affecting life in your own,” and the narrator 
 
32 Just as the self is difficult to locate in Filthy Rich, the “You” in the novel is both fixed and multiple. The 
narrator is clearly referring to a singular, specific individual throughout the story; however, at the same 
time, the narrator’s level of direct address never enters into a reciprocating dialogue with that singular 
You, so much so that the narrator’s observations and comments are understood to target any individual 
reader, whomever that might be.  
33 Though it is never stated, we should read the anonymous narrator of Filthy Rich as male. This is because 
throughout the novel it is made clear that the drive to become filthy rich is a game at which a man can 
more easily succeed. While “the pretty girl” in the novel also embarks on her own journey to become 
filthy rich, her attainment and preservation of wealth is far more precarious than You’s. Indeed, in order to 
stay afloat, she has to change careers three times, while You does not. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the narrator 




rhetorically questions how we could possibly understand such an impulse as anything 
but motivated by a desire to help the self (19). The narrator here clearly refers to 
Western literary novels, the kind written by the canonized “greats,” what has become 
ostensibly required reading for any aspiring middle class (or higher) individual. Indeed, 
the connection between reading high-brow literature and economic standing is an idea 
that goes back at least as far as the eighteenth century, the notion being that middle-class 
readers should not bother themselves with lower forms of literature—i.e., “lite” reading 
versus the classics (Woodmansee 4-5). But Hamid adds another layer, one more 
transnational, to this old idea: to read the Western novel—in this case, reading in the 
direction from East to West, from Global South to the North—buoys one’s effort to rise 
through the ranks of global finance. In other words, it is not enough to maintain a 
diversified portfolio; You must know his Charles Dickens, too.34 
Hamid adds another twist to the old idea that reading more “serious” literature 
helps one enter the wealthier classes, which is that genre fiction works just as well, too. 
Or, at the very least, novels “you actually enjoy and read with delighted hunger” also 
fulfill a self-help function because they “help you pass the time, and time is the stuff of 
which a self is made” (19). But this turn to genre fiction also falls under the guise of 
reading-as-self-improvement within a globalized framework. If the literary novel helps 
You better understand the faraway West that “increasingly affect[s]” his life, so would a 
book full of “frequent gratuitous and graphic sex,” for it would provide both a cultural 
 
34 To be sure, the marketability of globalized reading practices goes both ways. Within Western 
institutions of higher learning, for example, the goal of helping students become “global citizens” is an oft-
heard term in the university system’s neoliberal parlance. As others have noted, this move to create global 
citizens has significant political and Western imperial implications: see April Biccum, “Marketing 
Development: Live 8 and the Production of the Global Citizen” and Debra D. Chapman, et al., “Global 




and economic education (e.g., what is permissible, what sells in the West, what is 
marketable, what the consumer wants, etc.) (19). The narrator suggests, then, that no 
matter the genre of text being produced and read, it can be “offered to the reader as a 
form of self-help” (20). The narrator’s claim here echoes Nicholas Brown’s argument 
that the way books are received makes “desires legible in the market” (14). Books 
certainly can and do exist for personal enjoyment, but the implication here in Filthy Rich 
is that the self-focused desire for economic advancement is equally at play. The narrator 
asserts that books, no matter their genre, reveal a desire to try and enter into a realm of 
financial abundance. In this sense, like Brown, the narrator notes how a book’s use-value 
is primarily linked to its ability to facilitate exchange, the thing that crucially drives its 
continued production. The book, similar to the documentary in My Year of Meats, has 
been subsumed into a commodity form, a commodity whose exchangeability goes both 
ways, since “more often than not, the self [these books] help is their writer’s self, not 
yours” (Hamid 57). Thus, both the writer and the reader are convinced their contact with 
the book form can result in some kind of financial benefit for themselves. 
Like the book, the notion of the self in Filthy Rich is also saturated by 
neoliberalism, which is specifically visible in the significant value placed on the 
individual—his freedom, his ability to choose, his responsibility. Because of the 
importance of these values, the narrator firmly states that the pursuit of wealth must take 
precedence over all other considerations, especially love. The selflessness that a healthy 
relationship would require could be detrimental to that “essential propulsion” necessary 
in the “journey to the heart of financial success,” a journey that is “already fraught” 




opponents, You must maintain the ability to “inspire, motivate, uplift, and kill” (37). The 
de-emphasis of the self that love would require, though, is never really a concern for 
You, for he eventually comes to understand love in commodified terms. Indeed, when 
trying to woo the pretty girl later in adult life, the narrator informs us that You knows 
very little about women but does “know a fair bit about sales” and assumes romantic 
interests are a situation where he should “let the customer seek [him] out, lest [he] 
devalue [his] product completely” (88-89). It is, perhaps, not surprising when You’s later 
marriage—to a woman other than the pretty girl—is hopelessly empty and devoid of any 
intimacy. For You, the self is simply another commodity, a product that holds a 
negotiable and ever-fluctuating level of value. Therefore, the self has the potential to be 
made marketable to others to the extent that potential lovers are reduced to mere 
customers. This fairly dull prospect, however, is precisely what is necessary according to 
the narrator. Successful accumulation of capital becomes dependent on a kind of 
nihilism, not idealism, since ideals go beyond “humans [by] repositing meaning in vast 
abstract concepts instead, [which] are by their very nature anti-self” (57). 
However, Filthy Rich also explores the limits of neoliberal ideas, values, and 
practices in relation to books and the self. The narrator’s reflections additionally 
consider how global capitalism cannot fully subsume and commodify the self and 
literary production. This is not to say that both cannot be economized, for they certainly 
can be in the ways already discussed by Martin and Brown. To imply that our books and 
our concept of the individual are somehow immune to the pervasive effects of neoliberal 
values would be foolhardy at best. But Filthy Rich also envisions how their subsumption 




very production and presentation as a useful commodity points us to ways that it resists 
such a classification. In this way, Hamid’s novel echoes Martin’s conviction that, while 
artwork is commodified, it can never be absolutely a commodity; if anything, its ability 
to critique the contradictions of contemporary capitalism is activated precisely by its 
commodification. Weihsin Gui similarly argues that Hamid “render[s] the expansive 
networks of neoliberal[ism] … as aesthetic objects rather than sovereign subjects and 
fetishized commodities” (175). It is somewhere in between, and the way the narrator 
speaks of the self and literature makes it difficult to separate the two. He shifts back and 
forth between them repeatedly to underscore how the existence, construction, and 
growth of the self is intimately connected to literary production because of how You (or 
any other reader) invests himself in the book he is reading. The self becomes the text and 
the text becomes the self in mutually reinforcing ways. 
It is noteworthy that Filthy Rich immediately begins by admitting that the idea of 
the self is very difficult to locate, labeling it “a slippery one” (3). It is slippery because 
You’s continued reliance on a self-help book directly highlights the limits of the self and 
individualism. By turning to a self-help book, You’s actions proclaim how the—or his—
self is insufficient, he needs help, and there is a certain communal requirement that must 
be met if he is to advance to a higher net worth. This insufficiency provides the nexus 
point for the narrator to explore how literary production can meet and expand these very 
communal possibilities that You requires. This is evident at the beginning of chapter five 
when there is a breakdown in the narrative voice. For the first time in the self-help novel, 
the use of the second-person voice disappears. The narrator begins to discuss what is 




preconceived notions of the self-made man that Filthy Rich may have been pretending is 
even a possibility. Books, such as the narrator’s, “are two-way streets, after all. 
Relationships” (77). In an ironic twist, relationships are suddenly not a sign of weakness 
or detriment to ambition. While the writer-reader interaction of the narrator and You 
carries no amorous possibilities, the issue of dependence is still here, which was the 
narrator’s earlier concern in relation to love, since dependence on another person could 
hamper one’s “ambition,” that drive necessary for “achieving a massive bank balance” 
(37). But the implications for literature or a writer are just as significant as they are for 
You’s self. If literary production is a relationship, a two-way street, then the notion of 
the auteur disappears, obliterating the “illusion of full agency on the writer’s part” (Poon 
144). The narrator argues that relationships are what help to make the “successful 
entrepreneur” (Hamid 78), and the notion here for literature, self-help or otherwise, is 
worth stressing—it is communal. Brown would argue this does nothing to thwart the 
commodifying force of the market. The connection between artist and audience is not 
relational; rather, the artist merely faces a formalist problem where “the reaction of the 
spectator, or customer, assumes importance in precise correlation” to the entanglement 
of art in the market (Brown 14). Hamid disagrees, though, making a point to describe the 
writer/reader connection as relational, not merely transactional. That is to say, literature 
is not autonomous not only because it is commodified, but also because it is inherently 
collaborative. 
This is because, for Hamid, the processes of literary production do not stop with 
the writer, a case made by the narrator in one of the novel’s most important passages at 




Like all books, this self-help book is a co-creative project. … [W]hen you 
read a book, what you see are black squiggles on pulped wood or, 
increasingly, dark pixels on a pale screen. To transform these icons into 
characters and events, you must imagine. And when you imagine, you 
create. It’s in being read that a book becomes a book, and in each of a 
million different readings a book becomes one of a million different 
books… (97) 
Shortly after this observation, the narrator tries to return to the idea of an independent, 
enterprising self, claiming, “Readers don’t work for writers. They work for themselves,” 
and that if You is going to continue to increase his wealth, he will eventually have to 
work for himself (98). In other words, You should take a cue from his reading 
experiences as inspiration for how he should conduct himself as a businessman—with a 
lone-wolf mentality. The problem, of course, is that just moments ago the narrator 
established there are limits to these individualistic efforts, and if You were to truly 
transfer his reading practices to his business dealings, he would have to surround himself 
with others in a collaborative, not competitive, way. He would need to regard becoming 
filthy rich as a “co-creative project.” Angelia Poon agrees, noting that Filthy Rich shows 
how the self is “always already plugged into multiple communities,” a point that 
constitutes You’s “moral transformation” (140, 147). Indeed, the “relational ethic [is] the 
catalyst for flourishing” in this novel (Walker 193, emphasis in original). 
So while Brown claims that the option for writers within late capitalism is to 
recycle and repurpose dead forms, Hamid suggests there is more that happens when the 




“manipulations of a formal problem” (Brown 19-20), Hamid asserts that something new 
is created, that the reader’s imagination extends and fulfills part of the production 
process of literature.35 Because of this, literature has the potential to be preserved from 
being confused as an absolute commodity, for if the reader is also actively part of the 
process of production, the possibility exists that he is privy to the means of production—
the social and material context in which it is put together. This is where we can make 
sense of Hamid’s claim that reading is another form or continuation of writing, of the 
production process. The reader very likely does not occupy the same social and material 
context as the writer, and this is especially true of You if he is keen on reading the 
Western “greats” like the narrator suggests he is. If You were to take, for instance, Great 
Expectations into his South Asian context, a new form of Dickens would be produced.36 
On the one hand, this further Westernizes You and places a premium on the already self-
aggrandized importance of Western literature; on the other hand, Hamid suggests that a 
new copy of the text is produced, a new take on it. This, Poon argues, points to the 
“ethical role” the novel genre can play within global capitalism: its “narrative energies 
and temporal possibilities” can highlight the “historical contingenc[ies]” of capitalism’s 
work (140). That is to say, books are active and agential things—as the narrator suggests 
they are at the start of Filthy Rich, when he notes the self-help book “has to find you” to 
 
35 Here, Hamid’s view of literature aligns with Roland Barthes’ in “The Death of the Author”—that to 
reduce a literary work to a concrete, ultimate meaning would further commodify it, make it more 
consumable, and thereby better package it for the market. 
36 This also recalls Jorge Luis Borges’ short story “Pierre Menard, Author of Don Quixote,” where Menard 
re-creates Don Quixote line for line, yet the narrator of Borges’ story who is reviewing the work credits 
Menard with writing something that is new or, at the very least, a fresh take on a classic. On a further and 
related note, we can consider this ironic praise of Filthy Rich from Alan Cheuse’s 2013 review for NPR 
(despite its baldly Eurocentric predilections): “[T]his tale of an unscrupulous striver may bring to mind a 
globalized version of The Great Gatsby.” It is as if Hamid is merely re-presenting Western classics in a 




fulfill its objective (4)—but so are readers, what with their participation in the 
production process. 
It is worth nothing, though, that the narrator overstates the success or actuality of 
this collaborative production. For example, at no point does the specific character named 
You seize upon the communal and productive work that the narrator describes. The 
narrator’s claims remain purely theoretical. That is not to say it is impossible; the 
opportunity is certainly there. But at least within the narrative context of Filthy Rich, it 
remains a missed opportunity. Hamid identifies at least two of the options literature 
offers: It encourages us to see beyond ourselves, understand our dependence on other 
people, and choose the socially progressive option of deferring individualistic gain and 
pursuing relational intimacy; or, we can just as likely pick up a book and read it with the 
intent of advancing our own betterment, whether that results in increasing our cultural 
capital or actual finances. What is more, since the narrator suggests the actual type of 
book is rather unimportant, any reader could approach and engage with a text with a 
selfless or selfish agenda, and the book would lend itself to either form of reading. 
Thus, the selfless and selfish approaches to engaging with a book are not so 
distinct from each other. A certain level of social capital in the form of liberal self-
righteousness quickly attends the first option when we consider how literacy has long 
been placed on a pedestal of respect within the history of liberalism. The point here is 
not that our interaction with books and the productive work it creates is somehow ever 
divorced from capitalist considerations; rather, Hamid shows how the collaborative 
production generated by books will offer readers an opportunity to see beyond 




a thing, so a novel such as Filthy Rich strongly qualifies a claim like Kornbluh’s, that 
novels are immanently a form of critique. While the novel may be critique or inherently 
possess critical capacity, our engagement with a text can continue and extend that text’s 
production in such a way that critique is either entirely missed or altogether ignored. 
Hamid’s novel makes for compelling reading precisely because it exists between the two 
options that Brown and Martin theorize. Brown’s claim that we would be wiser to attend 
to audiences’ desires and market preferences makes sense, for Filthy Rich is imminently 
taken up with the idea that books are written for readers with their consumerist desires in 
mind. After all, financial self-help books target their readers’ intent to accumulate more 
capital. Yet, at the same time, Martin’s contention that we need to study how artworks 
create a “subversive mimesis” of their own commodification still stands, and this 
remains true of Filthy Rich. Hamid’s co-opting of the style and aesthetic of the self-help 
book is done as a mimetic critique that calls our attention to the commodification of 
literature and how that critique can fail if we are not reading carefully for it. Kornbluh 
argues the novel has always already been critique; Filthy Rich asserts that to assume it 
no longer is risks turning any text into a fetishized commodity. 
The excerpt at the start of chapter six contains one such careful form of 
attendance to the language of a text so as not to fetishize and obscure its production. The 
narrator ruminates on literature’s ability to represent reality and admits to the 
arbitrariness of language; what is on the page is, after all, merely “black squiggles.” But 
that does not amount to meaninglessness. If anything, those squiggles and pixels provide 
an opportunity for the exercise of agency in the production process. Both writer and 




because when “we imagine, we create” (97). This reference to arbitrary signifiers within 
neoliberal literary production recalls Brett Levinson’s arguments on the intersection of 
representation, deconstruction, and neoliberalism. While Hamid envisions new forms of 
possibility and meaning, Levinson claims the market has become a way of “knowing the 
globe” such that it brings knowledge to an end (Market 1). Rather than it being the end 
of history, it would be “the culmination of history” precisely because neoliberalism has 
become so common sensical as to end thought (Market 2). Levinson argues that the 
rigorous linguistic criticism deconstructionism purports to achieve has neither happened 
to its fullest extent nor fully identified the arbitrariness and alternative truths within 
neoliberal discourse. Neoliberalism has, after all, expertly subsumed the word “freedom” 
for its various purposes. Levinson attempts to imagine a linguistic criticism that a 
neoliberal consensus cannot claim by speaking in a language it cannot replicate. He 
stresses the urgency of this by noting that 
if the completion of the market turns on a consensus that “goes without 
saying,” then the amplification of the “saying,” attention to the “fact that 
there is language,” is fundamental to any disruption of that totality. 
Conversely, the “sweeping by” of the “saying,” its avoidance, cannot but 
feed consensus and neoliberalism, the “it goes without saying” itself. 
(Market 8) 
Levinson means that a greater attention to the constructed nature of language will 
provide a needed complication of neoliberalism’s hegemonic strength. It is crucial, then, 
linguistically or otherwise, to narrate the limits of the market. While language-based 




failure, which is precisely what the authors considered in this chapter do. Hamid, 
however, does not envision the possibility that neoliberalism has fully subsumed 
language. If anything, it is the linguistically-based process of producing literature that 
promises opportunities for new, alternative meanings to arise from texts. To be clear, 
Hamid is not calling for a representation of neoliberalism’s limits. Like Huehls, he 
regards the effectiveness of representation dubiously. For instance, the narrator mentions 
repeatedly throughout Filthy Rich that You’s “image of [the pretty girl] is not entirely 
determined by her physical reality” (107). You goes years and even decades at a time 
without seeing the pretty girl, though he does occasionally catch glimpses of her on 
billboards or on television. Thus, in this frequently reiterated line, the narrator comments 
on the limits of reality but also of representation. The way You remembers the pretty girl 
is all that really matters, which is another way of saying that You’s imagination and its 
ability to create and sustain illusions is what is most important, not any referent. You 
holds the reins of representation, both in terms of how he thinks of and remembers the 
pretty girl and also in regard to his ability to take a text—such as a self-help book—and 
transform it into something completely new. 
Though literary representations can only signify actuality in the abstract form of 
squiggles and pixels, Filthy Rich still theorizes how this illusoriness can be overcome or, 
at the very least, seen through for what it truly is. For example, You’s father is a kind of 
character that recalls Adorno’s aforementioned ideal critic, the kind of person who can 
see past the world of commodities and production to the true political implications of the 
world around him. When You’s father looks at the rural countryside, he does not see 




effervescent salad” or “a heavenly balloon of stone-ground, stove-top-baked flatbread”; 
instead, he sees the years of “labor by which a farmer exchanges his allocation of time in 
this world for an allocation of time in this world. Here, in the heady bouquet of nature’s 
pantry, [he] sniffs mortality” (7). If the narrator initially labels the self as “slippery” and 
difficult to place, this excerpt suggests that You’s father locates some kind of unfiltered 
reality of the self in the place where labor works to initiate the production process of 
commodities. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the chapter housing this excerpt is titled “Move to 
the City,” a mandate that the narrator says is step one if You’s financial situation is 
going to improve. The self-help book, then, is intent on ushering You away from a place 
where political and existential actuality is clearest, which is another way to say that the 
self-help book possesses the potential to only further occlude reality through its 
representations. This, according to Poon, is why the novel genre is so important: “it 
foregrounds a blind spot of the self-help book—that not everyone can possibly succeed 
in life and that many will be left behind” (143). Thus, You’s dedication to self-help 
books may only further hide the kind of clarity that his father has when gazing at the 
field of crops: Everyone is just buying time. 
Death, however, does not impede the narrator’s arguments. In the tenth chapter, 
when “we are nearing our end, you and I, and this self-help book too,” the narrator 
makes it clear that the book has the potential to persevere far longer than the life or 
memory of You will (177). The narrator notes how neither the book nor You can 
continue forever by asserting that “fate, or narrative trajectory,” must eventually run its 
course (181). But since another reader can come along and continue the process of 




commodity will likely outlive the labor, the narrator further complicates what sort of 
status we should ascribe to literature. As we have already seen, literature exists in the 
economy, reading can be undertaken for economic reasons, and if the text far outlasts the 
reader (who has also helped further produce it), what is exactly the point of literature? 
The narrator posits that stories are told and written with the intent of escaping by 
belonging. To participate in the production of stories is to “be a refugee from the state of 
refugees,” is to “seek a solution to the problem that time passes” (213). If the movement 
from rural to urban, from pre-capitalism to global capitalism is like jumping millennia; if 
labor is just an “allocation of time in this world for an allocation of time in this world”; 
if artists and audiences try to address the conflict presented by the passage of time—the 
narrator boils much of existence down to the effort to match the speed of modernity, an 
effort that only briefly distracts from mortality. In between birth and death, “we can 
create” (213). Those creations can, of course, become monetized, assigned a worth, 
distributed, sold, and bought. But if, as the narrator claims, artistic creativity is an effort 
to belong in a world that is largely inhospitable, how much of the world’s unwelcoming 
aspects dictate the content of the art? 
In other words, we can understand this passage about arts-as-belonging within 
the broader aforementioned conversation about global literature and the disdain some 
have for the delocalized texts that are being produced. Filthy Rich addresses this issue by 
showing how, if stories are a way to try to belong to the world, the changing world 
necessitates a shift in the way the stories are written. Here, then, we can understand 
global literature and its structure as an aspect of neoliberal capitalism’s influence, as 




literature may mean delocalized literature to some, and it is true that Hamid’s novel is 
not the most specific kind of text; after all, we are never told what nation or city the 
events of Filthy Rich take place in. Some would argue, like Casanova and Apter do, that 
something is lost because of that, a lexical or cultural specificity that lends literature a 
certain richness. Gone, for example, is the meticulously laid-out depiction of Cairo that 
we find in Naguib Mahfouz’s works. But even that loss of exactitude is essentially a 
story of what it would take to belong in a neoliberal world, to Westernize, to 
commodify, to become marketable. Filthy Rich, then, tells a story of the limitations that 
pursuing economic success allows You to belong in this world; therefore, stories would 
be the next option, and maybe that leaves a story that is less local, one that is more 
accessible to a global reading audience. Whether or not it is “good” literature is a fairly 
inconsequential debate, since only time, that thing the narrator says we keep trying to 
avoid, will tell what stands from the twenty-first century as the great works of literature. 
It very well may not be Filthy Rich. What we can at least identify for the moment is 
Hamid’s exploration of the market’s influence on literary production and vis-a-versa. As 
Ashcroft et al. famously postulated, there was a noticeable period of mid- and late-
twentieth century postcolonial fiction where the empire wrote back in the English 
language of its oppressor, with Salman Rushdie being perhaps the writer par excellence 
with novels such as Midnight’s Children. Today, we may be seeing an example of 
commodities writing back in the languages of the market—specifically, with Hamid, in 
the lingo of the self-help genre. 
Hamid concludes his novel with an image of subsumption, but it is a markedly 




with the pretty girl when they are both well into their eighties. Due to different 
circumstances, each of them has also lost most of their wealth they spent their lives 
accumulating. As You passes away, his story is not absorbed into capital; rather, the 
narrator observes, “[Y]ou contain her, and this book, and me writing it, and I too contain 
you, who may not yet even be born … and so may you, may I, may we, so may all of us 
confront the end” (222). The book that You—character and/or reader—hold(s) is 
certainly a commodity, but it is not only a commodity. Its language, for both the writer 
and reader, is malleable, an opportunity for meaning and belonging to be created, much 
like Akiko’s reception of Jane’s documentary. The language is certainly driven by 
neoliberal values and practices (this is, after all, still a book about getting filthy rich), but 
the possibilities of language are not fully foreclosed, either. Indeed, Filthy Rich ends by 
positing that the true subsumption, the one of lasting significance, is a relational one. 
Ozeki shares that same conviction at the end of My Year of Meats, where Akiko sits in 
the home of her new friends, Lara and Dyann, calmly awaiting the birth of her daughter. 
Sentimental though this ending of Filthy Rich is, it provides an alternative to an 
economic connectedness that leads to competition; this, instead, is connectedness that is 
equalizing (Poon 148). 
To close, one thing that stands out from reading Ozeki and Hamid is their 
consideration of the different ways that language is productively co-opted by 
neoliberalism, what that means for artistic production, and how neoliberalism both 
activates and limits the work of art. Despite this simultaneously promising and dour 
outlook, both novelists also envision what a loss of language is like and how it has 




comments that are not her own while on the train in the Deep South, as if the 
romanticized narrative of the US tells her what to think as it subsumes her. In Filthy Rich 
You is incapable of thinking of love in terms that are not provided by his understanding 
of commodities, sales, and profits, and this unavoidably affects how he lives. Neoliberal 
values seemingly take over his life. Such passages correspond with Huehls’ conviction 
that we should view neoliberalism as post-normative and, therefore, something that 
registers on an ontological level. But, as the next chapter will consider, neoliberal 
ideology affects language, and language is still very much normative. Further, because 
of language’s performative properties, it actively shapes and stabilizes social norms. If 
language is not outside neoliberalism’s purview, as Ozeki and Hamid suggest it is not, 
then we should also question what the literary implications are for neoliberalism’s 















NEOLIBERAL PERFORMATIVITY IN GILLIAN FLYNN’S GONE GIRL AND 
ARUNDHATI ROY’S THE GOD OF SMALL THINGS 
 
The economizing influence of neoliberal ideology affects language itself, as 
scholars across disciplines have noted.1 Everyday examples of the neoliberalization of 
language are numerous: The individualistic emphasis on “self-care” has created its own 
lucrative industry, and it is commonplace to ask about an individual’s unique “brand” or 
how people are “branding” themselves. Such developments and questions point to the 
commodification of identity and personhood across a variety of professional sectors.2 
The emphasis on branding is particularly interesting because it reveals how the act of 
naming has rapidly become its own marketization tactic—naming, that is, in the sense of 
saying or writing something into being or naming something with the intent of triggering 
a certain outcome. There are literal implications of these shifts, such as the way names 
can be tied to capital. For example, the developers of the job search engine Adzuna 
recently compiled data from more than a half million CVs to determine which names 
have the highest (and lowest) average salaries. Interested individuals can then search 
 
1 In “The Linguistic Imperialism of Neoliberal Empire,” Robert Phillipson shows how the dissemination 
of an American model of neoliberalism across the globe has further facilitated the spread of the English 
language. Others contend that the central values of neoliberal ideology work their way into language and 
that such parlance changes how we refer to the world around us; see Marnie Holborow, “Language, 
Ideology and Neoliberalism” and Gerlinde Mautner, Language and Market Society: Critical Reflections 
on Discourse and Dominance. 
2 For arguments about how the logic of self-care constitutes a neoliberal withering of feminism, see 
Catherine Rottenberg, “The Rise of Neoliberal Feminism.” For a study of how personal “branding” in the 
professional world both limits and activates forms of agency, see Steven P. Vallas and Angèle Christin, 





their name across that bank of résumés.3 Furthermore, middle names carry their own 
importance. Simply the inclusion of a middle initial on application documents “increases 
positive evaluations of people’s intellectual capacities and achievements” in a variety of 
professional situations (Van Tilburg and Igou 400). 
The existence of specialized search engines such as Adzuna or the research on 
middle names is not surprising given the growing neoliberal tendency over the last 40 
years to economize nearly everything in day-to-day life by establishing how it connects 
to or influences one’s earning potential.4 What is intriguing within these examples, 
however, is the effort put into determining how the act of naming can be tied to a future 
monetary outcome. These studies speak to an underlying anxiety or pressure to use 
language carefully, whether in service of naming or constituting a brand that can place 
an individual on the path to economic success. Here we get a glimpse into one of the 
ways neoliberal values can dictate or demand a certain standard for language in its 
performative function—that is, when language names things into being either through 
the literal act of naming or through the ways the words we speak and write can generate 
certain actions or processes. I emphasize the act of naming here because it is just one—if 
also the most dramatic—example of what J. L. Austin describes as the performative 
mode of language, and I turn to theories of language’s performativity in this chapter 
because they make a necessary contribution to the study of neoliberalism in light of 
economists’ recent move to describe economics as performative. I intentionally cover a 
 
3 The blunt rhetoric of Adzuna’s site is worth noting. Typing in your own name will not just reveal what 
the average annual earnings are for people who share your name; you are specifically told, “People called 
[your name] are worth an average of [monetary amount].” The name, in other words, is not worth that 
amount; the persons themselves are. 
4 As just one case in point, there are studies that examine the “long-term consequences on human capital” 




swath of theory across disciplines in the humanities and economics in order to show how 
a conceptualization of economics as performative has significant social and cultural 
consequences, for the performativity of economics does not stay within the economy, 
especially when we consider the neoliberal stance that social and political spheres can 
and should be adjusted via the work of the market.5 Theorists from Austin to Judith 
Butler help us understand what the cultural ramifications are of treating the economy as 
a performative entity that names and activates certain realities into existence. 
In the time since Austin’s arguments, scholars across disciplines have refined and 
expanded his ideas to critique the linguistically-driven normative power of social 
structures and further clarify what language “does” as it creates, reshapes, or activates 
specific realities. Additionally, since literature is narratively driven by linguistics, 
understanding what language “does” is equally important to any study of neoliberalism 
and literature. To do so, this chapter reads two very different novels, Gillian Flynn’s 
Gone Girl and Arundhati Roy’s The God of Small Things, to explore a uniquely 
neoliberal type of performativity. I argue that neoliberal performativity is defined by the 
social pressure to shape oneself as, first and foremost, an economic individual whose 
self-worth and sense of agency is either tied to or determined by their financial success. 
This pressure is performative not only in the sense that one must play their social role 
correctly, but it is also performative in the linguistic sense because Flynn and Roy show 
how embracing one’s economic potential requires the spoken, written, and/or 
narrativized shaping (i.e., marketing) of the self in a way that corresponds to the 
 
5 Michel Foucault extensively covers in the tenth and eleventh lectures of The Birth of Biopolitics how 
social factors come to be understood through economic analyses and altered through the application of 




common-sensibility of neoliberal values and practices. Both of these novels emphasize 
how this performativity is inherently textual, narrativized, or artistic and how this also 
means the words we say, write, and embody provide opportunities to engage 
neoliberalism and its effects. 
The performativity of language is a necessary follow-up consideration to the 
previous chapter on the production of literature within neoliberalism. If the arts or 
literature cannot be wholly reduced to a commodity form whose exchange value is all 
that matters, as Ruth L. Ozeki and Mohsin Hamid suggest it cannot be, what then of 
language? Neoliberal performative pressures do change or influence language and 
behavior, but whether or not language can produce a discourse that does not somehow 
copy or reinforce the common-sense rhetoric of neoliberalism is another issue. Both 
Flynn and Roy’s novels underscore how the performative modes of language, writing, 
and narrative construction are driven by neoliberal ideology. It is a performativity 
influenced by the transnational breadth of neoliberalism in that these novels’ characters 
become economic subjects who live in environments shaped by the globalized 
movement of finance and corporate capital. Flynn and Roy, however, provide two 
different visions of what performativity is capable of. Gone Girl situates performativity 
as an agential space, one that can subvert the confines of a neoliberal common sense, 
albeit with monstrous, terrifying results. Neoliberal performativity in Flynn’s novel is 
driven by narrative and becomes a performative utterance that renames and restructures 
aspects of reality via the performer. But even though Gone Girl shows how neoliberal 
performativity can be navigated and wielded to buoy an individual’s agency, the novel 




neoliberal ideology. That is to say, an individual may be free to manipulate and navigate 
certain neoliberal structures to his/her advantage, but Flynn positions the individual as 
fully subsumed into neoliberal capital. To a very different extent, The God of Small 
Things explores how everyday life in developing India is made subject to “the economic 
imperatives of capitalism” (Lutz 58), and Roy suggests that development investment in 
India produces a performative pressure to continually defer to Western capital. It is a 
transactional relationship that continues to place developing countries in subservience to 
their former colonizer. She traces how this negatively affects indigenous forms of art and 
local economies, to the point that any sense of agency within or escape out of 
neoliberalism is rendered impossible. 
These novels narrate how the use of language becomes a space of agency and 
subjugation within neoliberalism, and in doing so they add another dimension to earlier 
discussions of performativity. Austin’s theories have generated varied responses over the 
last 50 years, but I add the often-overlooked semiotic work of American novelist Walker 
Percy to that conversation. Percy provides a necessary bridge between cultural theorists 
and economists who conceptualize the causes and effects of performativity because he 
situates how the common-sense rationales of performativity are driven by the effects of 
late capitalism. As I will discuss later, economists have begun to theorize over the past 
two decades how economics and the economy function in a performative manner 
because of how it creates and animates the economic individual, homo oeconomicus. 
Percy specifically clarifies how neoliberal performative pressures generate a culture of 




consent that the often-accepted narrative of neoliberalism-as-common-sense grows, and 
for Percy this common sense is rooted in language. 
Theories of performativity contain a range of perspectives on the social effects of 
performative pressures, and Flynn and Roy’s novels specifically explore how language 
has become burdened with specifically neoliberal performative expectations.6 Since the 
health, preservation, and growth of the “free” market is the driving force that creates 
governing rationalities in neoliberal societies, it is imperative to understand how 
neoliberalism affects language as well as how its effects are limited. That is to say, if 
neoliberal values circulate as common sense, neoliberalism already possesses a 
normative and punitive power that constructs societies in which the preservation of the 
market, as well as individuals’ ability to enter it, is the primary concern. This market-
driven ethics with its dominant status also unavoidably trickles down to affect something 
as foundational as language and individual subjectivities. 
 
Neoliberal Performativity 
When economist Michel Callon contended in 1998 that economics and the economy 
could be understood as performative in structure and execution, his arguments placed the 
work of the market alongside an already substantial body of critical work on 
performativity. Notably, the way Callon describes economics as performative mirrors 
 
6 Due to Butler’s work in the 1990s, it is common to think of performativity in a gendered manner. This 
has enabled critics across academic disciplines to consider how language is subsumed and utilized in the 
construction of powerful social norms. Rather than cover the well-trod grounds of that debate again, I 
specifically consider the different ways economic imperatives drive a more neoliberal kind of 
performativity, though neoliberalism certainly also intersects with oppressive paradigms of gender 
normativity. For example, Siri Øyslebø Sørensen examines the role of “choice” within feminism through a 
performative lens, considering how choice “construes subject positions that structure social categories, 
such as gender and class” (298). For further arguments on the gendered aspects of neoliberalism, see 




the way Austin explains how language functions in a performative mode—that is, they 
name an actuality into existence. Austin explains that when language functions in a 
performative manner, what is said or written cannot be labeled true or false, even though 
it may resemble a statement. Instead, the act of saying what one does is also to perform 
or fulfill its very action (Austin 235).7 Austin qualifies how something is constituted as 
performative: The convention spoken of must actually exist, and the utterance has to fit 
the occasion (237). This means, then, there are any number of ways a performative 
utterance could go wrong, one being that you could say something “when you do not 
have the requisite thoughts or feelings or intentions,” which amounts to “insincerity” 
(Austin 239). There is also the possibility that we can utter something performatively 
“under duress or in some other circumstances which make us not entirely responsible for 
doing what we are doing” (Austin 240). Austin also observes that what is considered 
socially acceptable in terms of performative pronouncements will change from culture to 
culture and as language evolves (245), meaning that performative utterances are 
significantly shaped by specific cultural practices.8 Therefore, we cannot map—across 
time or space—a stable conceptualization of performativity. 
 
7 Austin’s examples are wedding vows (“I do”), making amends (“I apologize”), and the christening of a 
ship (“I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth”) (235). 
8 Austin’s arguments carry two other key implications in addition to the cultural nuance of performative 
utterances. First, the performative function of language corresponds with postcolonial theories of mimicry. 
If the “insincerity” of an utterance is tantamount to “an abuse of the procedure,” that abuse can go two 
ways. On the one hand, a nation’s declaration of independence from its oppressor is a performative 
utterance; however, the efficacy of that declaration will certainly be undone by the insincerity of the 
speakers if, for example, they continue to funnel their nation’s exports and surplus value back to their 
former oppressor. On the other hand, the insincerity of a performative utterance can also be a productive 
tool of resistance for the oppressed, a subversive form of mimicry (see Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White 
Masks and Homi Bhabha’s The Location of Culture). Second, Austin suggests that linguistic 
performativity is not necessarily produced only internally but also externally. If a performative statement 
can be elicited from someone “under duress” to the point they would be “not entirely responsible” for their 
words and actions, then the performative mode of language is also an avenue for the punitive manipulation 




Understanding the manipulative potential within performative utterances has 
enabled broader theoretical work on performativity from literary theory, cultural studies, 
and on up to economics. Mary Louise Pratt includes literary texts within her 
understanding of the performative work of language, reminding us that, contrary to long-
held opinions, literature is not “linguistically autonomous” from everyday speech 
utterances (xii). Instead, all literature is like linguistic utterances because of its reliance 
on everyday speech; hence, the difficulty in separating out constructed narratives from 
actuality as if they possess some kind of performative difference (Pratt 89-92). 
Therefore, if Austin claims performative utterances have significant cultural effects due 
to their actionable power—sincere or insincere—Pratt states that literature carries a 
comparable level of influence. Likewise, Barbara Johnson identifies significant 
performative power within fiction. She argues we should understand Austin as asking, 
“What kinds of things are we really doing when we speak?” (57, emphasis in original). 
This is a central question to pursue, since Johnson asserts that Austin mistakenly rules 
out “equivocation” as a part of performative utterances (59). But literature can be and 
surely is performative for the writer of the text and, thereby, effectual in its engagement 
with the world—but more than that: An utterance “automatically fictionalizes its utterer 
when it makes him the mouthpiece of a conventionalized authority” (Johnson 60). 
This means that speaking on behalf of another may be a fictional move, but it 
does not make the act of speech false or ineffectual. Thus, Austin’s qualifier of felicity 
still remains in place even upon shifting our attention to literature. This is because the 
                                                                                                                                           
developmental loan from the World Bank,” is a performative utterance, but as shown by Rosa Luxemburg 




“nonseriousness of a performative utterance … results, then, not from [an actor’s] 
fictional status but from his duality,” and Johnson reminds us that “the question of 
seriousness attends the act of interpretation of any performative utterance” (60, emphasis 
in original). Shoshana Felman similarly emphasizes the dual nature of performative 
utterances, arguing against Austin’s suggestion that the truth or falsity of linguistic acts 
is unimportant. Instead, she suggests that what matters is whether a performative 
utterance is “successful or unsuccessful, felicitous or infelicitous” (17). With that 
qualification in mind, there are very few utterances that cannot become implicitly 
performative. 
The pervasiveness of performative language and its potential power within 
cultural practices are joined together in Butler’s influential work on the social effects of 
performativity and how language generates social performative pressures. Butler calls 
the performative “a dramatic and contingent construction of meaning” (Gender 139), 
contingent because it relies on certain culturally-established truths, assumptions, or 
notions. Butler notes that a construction “regularly conceals its genesis,” and to question 
it or refuse to participate in its performance can trigger punitive measures, so “the 
construction ‘compels’ our belief in its necessity and naturalness” (Gender 140). The 
repetition of socially-constructed norms is vital to their growth, since that repetitiveness 
constitutes the “ritualized form of their legitimation” (Gender 140). A construction, 
however, does not amount to “illusoriness or artificiality”; instead, “cultural 
configurations” can “take the place of ‘the real’ and consolidate and augment their 
hegemony through that felicitous self-naturalization” (Gender 32-33). This repeated 




appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being” (Gender 33). Here we can begin to 
understand performativity’s connections to cultural forms of common sense. If the 
frequent, lengthy repetition of certain norms, mores, or values helps to solidify social 
constructions to the extent they no longer seem constructed but, rather, natural, then 
those norms will become set in their ostensible actuality. 
However, even the rigidity of linguistically-based norms can begin to show 
cracks that provide opportunities for resistance against oppressive social paradigms, 
resistance that Butler argues can be narratological in form. Butler, like Johnson, 
carefully considers the role of ambiguity within performance by noting how the stability 
of performative utterances is shown to be problematic when lived experience does not fit 
into “culturally established lines of coherence” (Gender 24). The “fictive production” of 
social norms can be exposed when “attributes … resist assimilation into the ready made 
framework of primary nouns and subordinate adjectives” (Gender 24). In other words, 
resistance can take a specifically linguistic form. Indeed, Butler further suggests that this 
exposure also reveals how “the ontology of substances” is “essentially superfluous” 
(Gender 24). Butler is not discounting the power of performance; it does, after all, have 
a “substantive effect” by “constituting the identity it is purported to be” (Gender 24, 25). 
But it does have its limits.9 While “reiterative or ritual practice” helps to seemingly 
naturalize a social norm, this repetition can also be its undoing, for it unavoidably 
creates “gaps and fissures … as the constitutive instabilities in such constructions” make 
exceptions or limits to social norms visible (Bodies 10). This happens because the 
 
9 This is why something like drag, for Butler, is so productive in its signifying performance. It does not 
simply parody an original core; it parodies “the very notion of an original” by amounting to “a production 
which, in effect—that is, in its effect—postures as an imitation” (Gender 138). These forms of resistance 




repetitive actions and utterances needed to create social norms requires a “constitutive 
outside,” its Other, but the very presence of this Other simultaneously “secures and … 
fails to secure the very borders of materiality”; therefore, performative language’s ability 
to establish seemingly naturalized norms “works not only through reiteration, but 
through exclusion as well” (Bodies 188). This means that the authoritative ability for 
performative language to name or solidify a norm always stands on an unstable 
foundation of cultural signification. That is because the performative utterances of 
discursive power are continuously haunted by what it labels as aberrant before 
bracketing it to the margins of society. Along the space of these “abject borders,” Butler 
locates “the unlivable, the nonnarrativizable, the traumatic” (Bodies 188). 
It is precisely the effort to narrate stories from these “abject borders” that can 
formulate powerful resistance. If narrated successfully, then “the very meaning of 
‘referentiality’ is altered” in the normative, hegemonic space (Bodies 11). Since 
performative utterances are an essentializing force that aims “to preclude the possibility 
of a future for the signifier,” the new goal should be to change “the signifier into a site 
for a set of rearticulations that cannot be predicted or controlled” (Bodies 219). There 
are, however, limits to this agential pursuit of rearticulation. Attempts to performatively 
redefine the political meaning of different signifiers can be extremely difficult, since that 
would require an engagement with a system of signification that always already 
constructs and activates different subjectivities. Therefore, any resistance to discursive 
oppression requires entering “a chain of prior usages, to be installed in the midst of 
significations that cannot be situated in terms of clear origins or ultimate goals” (Bodies 




can never become “a controlling or original authorship over that signifying chain, and it 
cannot be power, once installed and constituted in and by that chain, to set a sure course 
for its future” (Bodies 219). Butler reminds us here that any central cultural or social 
signifier has such a long textual and enunciatory history, that any attempt to rewrite its 
meaning runs the risk of being quickly eliminated by either cultural common sense or by 
punitive social measures. 
A key part of the conflict Butler describes is further clarified by Percy’s semiotic 
arguments—namely, that many individuals are simply not interested in considering just 
how much of their day-to-day lives are predicated on social constructions. Percy’s 
critical work provides an intervention in understanding how a uniquely neoliberal 
performativity is generated. This is because his assertions track how a common sense 
that preserves neoliberal values is created in a specifically language-driven manner and 
also supported by different capitalist apparatuses that regard and target the individual 
primarily as a consumer. This clarifies how neoliberalism—often equated to a form of 
natural common sense—attains its normative power.10 To explain how a form of cultural 
common sense is created, Percy uses a sightseer’s dissatisfied encounter with the Grand 
Canyon as a representative example. He argues that before the sightseer ever reaches the 
 
10 While “common sense” as a topic has been widely studied long before neoliberalism, contemporary 
theorists understand that neoliberalism’s hegemonic hold is facilitated by the way many of its values and 
ethics have been elevated to a level of common sense. Stuart Hall and Alan O’Shea argue that social and 
collective attachments to the welfare state have largely given way to a “more competitive, individualistic 
market-driven, entrepreneurial, profit-oriented outlook” (11). The “structural consequences” of this 
common sense are a heightened individualism, privatized responses to public problems, and the general 
lauding of competition (12). As noted earlier, Holborow examines ways that language itself is being 
neoliberalized. On the one hand, financial or economic metaphors are stretched to extents that do not 
entirely fit their situation, in which case neoliberalism’s common-sensibility experiences a breakdown. On 
the other hand, she also considers how neoliberalism has successfully co-opted language (59-60). Jim 
McGuigan also identifies how neoliberal values enter everyday speech with “the language of branding, 





canyon, an expected set of outcomes has already been created for him that is textually 
driven—“by picture postcard, geography book, tourist folders, and the words Grand 
Canyon” (47, emphasis in original). These texts produce the cumulative work of the 
“symbolic complex” of “performulation” where “the sightseer measures his satisfaction 
by the degree to which the canyon conforms to the performed complex” (Percy 47, 
emphasis in original). This is the ostensible “highest point” of consumer satisfaction, 
replacing a sightseer’s desire for “sovereign discovery” (Percy 47).11 Percy’s descriptive 
example alludes to postmodern theorists’ conceptualizations of simulacra, how the 
repetitive copying of an original eventually comes to replace the original. It is, as Jean 
Baudrillard puts it, the “liquidation of all referentials” (4), and Frederic Jameson argues 
that the hyperreality of simulacra amounts to a “weakening of historicity” 
(Postmodernism 6), where any sort of actuality has been effaced. These simulacra are 
able to grow in a social space where exchange value has obliterated use value 
(Postmodernism 18); therefore, with Percy’s example, no longer does one visit the 
Grand Canyon for reasons of usefulness—camping, discovering new geological sights, 
etc. Instead, one goes for the immaterial exchange of it, to simply be able to say in 
conversation, “I’ve been there, I’ve seen it.” However, “it is more likely that what he has 
done is the one sure way not to see the canyon” (Percy 47). Simulacrum, then, only 
“reinforces and intensifies” the logic of late capitalism that would commodify all 
 
11 Percy also notes that the sightseer refuses to confront the Grand Canyon as something to be known by 
taking a photograph of it, further distancing himself from a true encounter with the thing. Here, Percy’s 
disdain for this practice of increasing distance between oneself and the site, thing, or event stands in direct 
contrast to John Berger and Walter Benjamin’s arguments about photography. Taking a photograph, in 
Percy’s example, does not increase the agency of the photographer or produce increased access to the 
photographed subject—a painting, a natural landmark, etc.; rather, it increases the power of the symbolic 
complex over individuals by augmenting their separation from the subject at hand. See Benjamin’s “The 
Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” and the first chapter of Berger’s Ways of Seeing for 




experience (Jameson, Postmodernism 46).12 Individuals dissatisfied with this 
experiential prepackaging may try to find an “unspoiled” place in order to have a truly 
authentic experience (Percy 51). These efforts will ultimately fail, though, since all they 
will find is a “desperate impersonation” instead (Percy 52). The symbolic complex, 
saturated as it is in the commodifying work of capitalism, is ubiquitous to the point it is 
impossible to approach events and situations without a “standard of performance in 
mind” ahead of time (Percy 52). Though people desire authentic experiences, they 
willfully (albeit ignorantly) surrender their experiences to be “measured by a prototype” 
(Percy 53). Percy asserts that this loss of agency is when the individual ceases to be a 
“person” and becomes solely a “consumer” (54). 
The specific moment a cultural common sense is created is when the “consumer 
is content to receive an experience just as it has been presented to him by theorists and 
planners” (Percy 54-55). If the experience does not conform to those expectations, he 
will be disappointed. But “the danger of theory and consumption is a seduction and 
deprivation of the consumer,” for the consumer is marked by a loss of curiosity as things 
and experiences are placed in a “symbolic package” (Percy 55, 57). Over time, the 
consumer will come to confuse the abstract for the concrete or natural, as Butler argues. 
Stephen J. Ball and Antonio Olmedo note that this “rationality of performativity” within 
neoliberal governmentalities—this socially-constructed conviction that certain 
experiences should meet certain standards—“is presented as the new common sense, as 
something logical and desirable” (89). While it may be viewed or encouraged as a form 
 
12 Jean-François Lyotard describes the problem as “capitalism inherently possesses[ing] the power to 
derealize familiar objects, social roles, and institutions to such a degree that the so-called realistic 
representations can no longer evoke reality except as nostalgia or mockery, as an occasion for suffering 




of common sense, Percy sees it as a debilitating loss of sovereignty within the 
individual, an argument not without its irony, given both liberalism’s privileging of 
personal sovereignty and the fetishization of individual freedom within neoliberal 
ideology. Even so, Percy sees common sense within late capitalism as tantamount to a 
refusal to make any effort to see what sort of processes of production are lying beneath 
the surface, processes that tell people in advance how to view or experience something.13 
Indeed, the theories discussed in the previous chapter help illuminate Percy’s concerns. 
What Percy is describing is a mid-twentieth-century malaise of passively accepting 
commodities as fetishized. That the social, political, and material production of things 
and experiences is obscured never registers for the person-as-consumer in Percy’s 
examples. It is not that people are incapable of seeing through the smoke and mirrors; 
rather, they simply have no interest in doing so, which for Percy is the truly devastating 
aspect of what common sense has become. Under late capitalism, people consign 
themselves willingly to the role of the passive consumer. This turn of events is 
performative because it accepts at face value what the linguistic apparatuses of late 
capitalism advertise and name into existence; this lack of discourse falls into what Brett 
Levinson describes as the “goes without saying” aspect of a neoliberal common sense, 
 
13 Percy’s work additionally complements the aforementioned theorists because he contributes to a more 
holistic picture of performativity. Because of her dependence on the work of Michel Foucault and Jacques 
Derrida, Butler’s approach to performativity is chiefly epistemological. Percy, however, because of his 
reliance on the philosophical traditions of existentialism and phenomenology, regards linguistic 
performance through an ontological lens. While Butler’s arguments occasionally reference the ontological 
significance of performativity’s hegemony, her comments on the nature of being are usually bracketed 
within the framework of understanding how performative pressures create social structures and norms—
our ways of knowing. Percy, on the other hand, remains primarily focused on how performative pressures 
affect individual lives and how people think of and conduct themselves in regards to the performulated 




which amounts to a “reduction of Being” that makes the market “the destiny of man” 
(Market 2). 
Percy provides myriad examples of ways the symbolic complex preserves 
fetishized commodities by placing greater distance between individuals and the thing 
they are trying to encounter, and his claim that the symbolic complex generates a 
performative impulse in the consumer is key to any understanding of how performativity 
carries economic significance today. Since 1998 and the publication of Callon’s 
arguments in The Laws of the Market, economic theorists have joined the academic 
conversation on performativity. Callon argues that we should stop thinking of 
economics-as-discipline and economy-as-practice as mutually exclusive entities and 
instead begin to understand that economics functions performatively because of its 
ability to actively name, shape, and remake reality via the work of the market. The 
debate over whether or not economics is performative has continued ever since and was 
cohesively revisited in Do Economists Make Markets? On the Performativity of 
Economics, in which Callon adds to his initial arguments.14 Those reflections are 
decidedly more neoliberal and share similarities with Percy’s view of the market’s work 
on cultural practices and consumers. 
 
14 Do Economists Make Markets? contains many noteworthy pieces that expand upon and challenge 
Callon’s theses while also describing how the performative work of economics creates neoliberal subjects. 
See Francesco Guala, “How to Do Things with Experimental Economics”; Petter Holm, “Which Way Is 
Up on Callon?”; Donald MacKenzie, “Is Economics Performative? Option Theory and the Construction of 
Derivatives Markets”; Philip Mirowski and Edward Nik-Khah, “Markets Made Flesh: Performativity, and 
a Problem in Science Studies, Augmented with Consideration of the FCC Auctions”; and Fabian Muniesa 
and Michel Callon, “Economic Experiments and the Construction of Markets.” In the years since this 
edited collection, Ivan Boldyrev and Ekaterina Svetlova note the troublesome tendency where “scholars 
use the notion of performativity that suits them more” (6). They trace some of the interdisciplinary 
approaches being taken up with performative economics in the past decade in their recent edited collection 




For example, Callon argues that there is not necessarily opposition between 
“those who articulate statements to those who make them function” in the market, and 
this makes the economy a site of “co-performation” (“What” 335). Economic theories 
alone are not enough, since active participation will always be required. What is key, 
then, for Callon is how the performative work of the market is a “shared anthropological 
program” that encourages a “common sense [that] refers to ‘the market economy’ to talk 
about the economy,” which helps to establish neoliberalism as “an overall logic” 
(“What” 343). Callon observes that one of the crucial components of this converging 
neoliberal common sense is “the disentanglement of things and humans” (“What” 343), 
the continued support of the fiction of the fetishized commodity. Callon also makes 
claims that recall Felman’s dismissal of true/false statements and Percy’s description of 
the power of the symbolic complex. For instance, he does not say that economic theories 
are “true” simply because they reshape the world when acted upon; instead, “it is 
preferable to say that the world it supposes has become actual” (“What” 320). Therefore, 
the issue at hand is no longer one of “truth as reference” but, rather, “truth as success or 
failure” (“What” 321). Here Callon notes how performative economics, similar to other 
performative modes, amounts to social construction: “To predict economic agents’ 
behaviors an economic theory does not have to be true; it simply needs to be believed by 
everyone” (322).15 When that kind of socially-determined common sense comes about, 
 
15 Callon appears to conflate performativity and social construction, which is a frequent methodological 
move of economists. While theorists like Butler or Johnson would take issue with this muddling, this 
collapsing of terms makes sense from an economic perspective. When economics functions 
performatively, there is little distance between the utterance of an economic theory and its socially-
constitutive performance. In other words, the very performative utterance of an economic theory or 
decision often immediately shapes the market according to the utterance. (Think, for example, of the 




the performative pressure of the symbolic complex gains strength with every reiteration. 
This further entrenches the seemingly sensible conclusions that neoliberal values and 
ethics are natural, especially when it so expertly hides the “the uneven distribution” of 
economic tools and information (“What” 343).16 
Thus, the work of performativity, as conceptualized from Austin to Callon, is 
multifaceted. It is, on the one hand, active and agential, a form of willfully naming 
things and executing tasks by the words one speaks. On the other hand, it is also an 
avenue for the construction of powerful social norms, values, and ethics, which can be 
legitimated in a way that makes them appear natural so as to discourage critique. This 
latter facet dovetails with neoliberal discourses of common sense, where the laws of the 
free market are accepted as natural and actual, even the very model for existence. 
Though the aforementioned critics helpfully conceptualize the neoliberal extent of a 
performative economics, Gillian Flynn’s Gone Girl and Arundhati Roy’s The God of 
Small Things further address the transnational and subjective qualities of such a 
performativity. Both novels target the performative impulses that are inherently part of 
the political pressure created by neoliberal systems of governance to become homo 
                                                                                                                                           
nearly simultaneously adjusts the social landscape via market response.) Though theorists like Butler or 
Percy would argue that there is a space, either temporal or physical, between performative utterances and 
normative social construction—that gap being the very site where resistance can happen—the simultaneity 
of economic performative utterances forecloses that space somewhat. It is in this space of foreclosure that 
we can begin to understand the performative power that economics and economies hold. 
16 Callon’s theories also carry within them a description of how the performative work of neoliberalism 
generates its key representative figure, homo oeconomicus. Foucault reminds us that viewing any person 
as homo oeconomicus does not mean they become or are anthropologically economic; it simply means that 
their behavior is viewed and read through an economic lens, which is also when homo oeconomicus 
“becomes governmentalizable” (252). For Foucault, this means that homo oeconomicus is “the basic 
element of the new governmental reason formulated” (271). According to Wendy Brown, the common 
sense governing this individual is that “well-being is easily sacrificed” for “macroeconomic growth” (82-
83). Percy similarly identifies this willful sacrifice under the hypnotic power of the symbolic complex—a 




oeconomicus, put the market first in all things, view oneself as a unit of earning 
potential, and act accordingly, but they do so in a way that emphasizes the transnational 
scope of a free-market ideology. Gone Girl addresses how a textually-driven neoliberal 
performance unavoidably becomes entangled with the transnational work of multiple 
privatized entities. The God of Small Things explores how the financial flows of Western 
investment into developing nations initiates an embodied performativity in deference to 
the power of the market, which simultaneously destroys indigenous cultural practices by 
further subjugating these countries to their former colonizer. These two novels narrate 
the different ways performativity either affords or denies opportunities to circumvent 
neoliberalism’s violence. 
 
Gone Girl and Performativity as Escape 
Flynn situates her novel squarely within a neoliberal discourse of common sense, 
performativity, and agency, where performance requires a rendering of the self in 
deference to the cultural common sense of the free market. This financialization of the 
self affects how one regards, understands, moves within, and works against reality. 
Agency in this novel is available within neoliberalism, but it must take on deceptive and 
murderous qualities. Through the character of Amy Dunne, Flynn shows how this form 
of agential decision-making is specifically neoliberal in its performance. Gone Girl 
explores neoliberal performativity and its transnational aspects in several ways. First, 
while the novel does envision the performative-as-performance, it also spotlights the 
performative-as-language or, rather, writing-as-performance. Flynn situates the act of 




to freedom. Yet, at the same time, writing in Gone Girl is frequently presented as a 
performative space that further ensconces the writer within the neoliberal ideal of 
personal responsibility. Second, the novel carefully catalogues how the performative 
agency Amy seizes is dependent on transnational structures that facilitate neoliberal 
financial transactions. Though Amy never seems aware of it, her ability to stage her own 
murder depends on privatized financial ventures like plasmapheresis and the mortgage-
lending industry, where the latter enhanced market liquidity and the ability to the US to 
invest surplus capital abroad. Third, because of its interest in writing-as-performance and 
the transnational scope of neoliberal networks, Gone Girl productively connects with 
much of the aforementioned scholarly conversations on performativity, albeit with one 
significant alteration: Flynn’s novel shows that if neoliberal performativity is to 
successfully become an agential tool, it will require completely subverting and 
recreating what we consider to be common sense to the point that it is unrecognizable as 
reality—but even that subversion is quickly co-opted once again by neoliberal values. In 
this way, Gone Girl emphasizes how neoliberal performativity is itself a form of 
capitalist production and that the kind of normative reasoning neoliberalism propagates 
ultimately diminishes agency. 
Gone Girl persistently refers to the performative impulses of contemporary life. 
One of the central concerns of the text is how saturated everyday experience is by 
external media, so much so that instances and references are too numerous to catalogue 
in the space allowed here. Characters repeatedly acknowledge their tendency to view and 
understand the world through narrative tropes provided by television, film, and 




responses to various events. For example, when Nick is unsure how to answer some of 
the police detectives’ questions about Amy’s disappearance, he grows frustrated over his 
inability to come up with the right “lines,” but eventually does express his exasperation 
in “the way it should have been said,” even if these “usual husband phrases” ultimately 
seem and feel disingenuous (Flynn 48). Nick believes that somewhere out there the 
perfect intangible script exists for him to tap into. 
Flynn creates a setting for this performative landscape that is specifically tied to 
the turbulent effects of neoliberalism. Nick and Amy rent a large house in a “failed 
development” in North Carthage, Missouri, that “screams Suburban Nouveau Riche”; 
the entire development is “a miniature ghost town of bank-owned, recession-busted, 
price-reduced mansions, a neighborhood that closed before it ever opened” because of 
the housing crash of the late 2000s (Flynn 4). The town is home to a shuttered mall 
killed by the recession that now remains “two million square feet of echo” (Flynn 72). 
Additionally, Desi Collings, Amy’s now-wealthy childhood friend, lives on Lake 
Hannafan, which he likes to think of as possessing a rich history. But the lake is nothing 
more than a privatized venture, recently manmade by an oil developer, and it becomes a 
place to dump hazardous waste, a burial site for the excesses of capitalist accumulation 
(Flynn 339).17 Flynn constructs an environment for her narrative that Emily Johansen 
has identified as the “neoliberal gothic,” where “everyday life under neoliberalism might 
itself properly be understood as gothic,” which “points to the instabilities at the heart of 
 
17 Similarly, Desi builds a “Swiss château,” but “on an American scale,” which Amy thinks he does to try 
to pretend he is at Lake Como. Desi continues to imitate tropes, building an odd simulacrum. He 
(re)models his house on past experiences of visiting the Swiss Alps, but the one key thing it is missing is 
that which cannot be copied—the mountains, the natural realm. It is certainly not for lack of trying, 
though. Desi has, on a smaller scale, manipulated nature with his glass greenhouse that is carefully 




neoliberal … practices” (“Neoliberal” 31, 33). It is a world of collapse, not prosperity; 
decay, not progress. 
Within this setting, Flynn foregrounds the dominance of a common sense that 
takes its cues from the effects and values of late capitalism, a rendering that recalls 
Percy’s symbolic complex. Nick observes how he has come to depend on everyday 
simulacra and admits he prefers pre-packaged experiences: 
It seemed to me that there was nothing new to be discovered ever again. 
Our society was utterly, ruinously derivative … We were the first human 
beings who would never see anything for the first time. We stare at the 
wonders of the world, dull-eyed, underwhelmed. … I can’t recall a single 
amazing thing I have seen firsthand that I didn’t immediately reference to 
a movie or a TV show. … I’ve literally seen it all, and the worst thing, the 
thing that makes me want to blow my brains out, is: The secondhand 
experience is always better. The image is crisper, the view is keener, the 
camera angle and the soundtrack manipulate my emotions in a way reality 
can’t anymore. I don’t know that we are actually human at this point, 
those of us who are like most of us, who grew up with TV and movies 
and now the Internet. … We are all working from the same dog-eared 
script. (Flynn 72-73) 
While Nick’s observation recalls Percy—that “wonders of the world,” such as the Grand 
Canyon, are impossible to truly behold as if seeing them for the first time—Nick is 
markedly different than Percy’s clueless consumer because Nick fully understands that 




that Percy does. If anything, it is preferable, since unfiltered reality would do little to stir 
Nick’s emotions. A byproduct of this form of common sense is that reproductions 
become the standard against which reality is judged, for the “wonders of the world” are 
“immediately reference[d] to a movie or a TV show.” (This, of course, implies that Nick 
knows reality when he sees it, a claim that Amy certainly challenges throughout the 
novel with her actions that call attention to just how poorly he understands her.) Pratt 
reminds us that these tropes, genres, and other mediated forms have this kind of power 
because fictive texts possess a performative, generative strength similar to everyday 
utterances (89-92). Nick’s attitude, then, contains a passivity where there is little 
exchange or even competition for reclaiming authentic experiences that Percy claims we 
lose in the face of prepackaged experiences. 
Nick’s description of society’s mediated and secondhand structure as 
“derivative” further alludes to an underlying economic cause of these effects, what with 
the dual meaning of that word. Derivatives are a key practice in the economic present, 
where they offer protection against credit risks associated with securitized assets. These 
financial instruments provide insurance to buyers against credit defaults and increase 
consumer confidence in mortgage-backed securities (MBS), what is already an 
incredibly risky form of capital investment. Derivatives, however, ballooned into their 
own profitable, unregulated industry leading up to the financial collapse, worth an 
estimated $26 trillion in 2006 (Unterman 89).18 Nick’s use of the term “derivative” takes 
on a greater significance with this financial parallel in mind. Just as derivatives enable 
 
18 Edward LiPuma and Benjamin Lee extensively cover in Financial Derivatives and the Globalization of 
Risk how the reliance on derivatives has dramatically changed the global work of capitalism, as well as our 




investors and institutions “to balance credits risks and protect themselves against 
negative credit events” (Unterman 90), the derivative structure of society that Nick 
describes in the above excerpt helps him become inured to reality. Secondhand 
experience is a form of insurance, a safety net that shelters him from what is actually 
happening. In this sense, Flynn articulates yet another way we can understand how late 
capitalism affects not just economic processes but also our forms of cultural production 
and preferences of reception. If the goal or desire is to have this derivative lifestyle 
“manipulate [our] emotions,” as Nick puts it, its attainment would mean the removal of 
any risk or surprises. 
Amy, however, does not share Nick’s penchant for predictability or passivity, 
acting instead on the neoliberal ethic of self-investment and self-promotion that was part 
of her childhood. If Nick is a passive consumer, Amy is a competitive producer—with a 
little help from her parents. Her competitiveness specifically stems from being the living 
inspiration for her parents’ best-selling children’s book series Amazing Amy that 
generated their wealth. Amy “need[s] to be Amazing Amy, all the time” (Flynn 45), a 
commodification of the self that Amy herself describes as a late-capitalist form of 
production that endlessly reproduces her until any original sense of self disappears. 
Reflecting on her childhood, Amy claims, “I was always a product,” forced to fit the 
mold of Amazing Amy, who “has to be brilliant, creative, kind, thoughtful, witty, and 
happy” (Flynn 224). Because of this, Amy knows she has “never been more to [her 
parents] than a symbol,” a loaded signifier, one that cannot step out of character, lest she 




Amy’s parents have turned her into a brand, making her at once “Amy and Amy,” both 
human being and lucrative narrative character (Flynn 245). 
The Amazing Amy books play a key (per)formative role for Amy because they 
impart a facet of neoliberal common sense onto her life by responsibilizing her. Wendy 
Brown identifies how one of the hallmarks of neoliberalism is, as a form of governance, 
its replacement of hierarchies with systems of management and administration where 
market logic presides over all decision making (127). One of the results of this political 
shift is the greater emphasis on responsibilization, where the individual, as self-unit of 
human capital, is accountable for her own ability to thrive or survive. That does not 
mean individuals are responsible for bearing that burden as much as they are “being 
responsibilized” or made responsible (Brown 133, emphasis in original). Part of the goal 
within a neoliberal ethic of responsibility (or responsibility for the self) is that it 
outsources the state’s burden of governance. Indeed, the idea of responsibilization makes 
it “increasingly unfeasible”—i.e., the opposite of common sense—for an individual to 
blame the market or the economy for any undesirable turn of events (Biebricher and 
Johnson 205). This is because the individual’s responsibility extends not just to her 
actions, but also “the respective outcomes”; thus, technologies of subjectification 
encourage individuals “to think of themselves and act responsibly” (Biebricher and 
Johnson 205). Alison Howell argues that responsibilization is not just about “bouncing 
back,” but about “bouncing forward” in the sense that subjects become more and more 
prepared for “emergency preparedness and disaster response” (69). Rhetorically, people 
have been responsibilized in neoliberal governmentalities through the “appeal to 




of quality of life”—as well as “responsibilization through threat to personal control,” 
where uncertainty is productively used to influence behavior (Pyysiäinen et al 217). The 
idea here is that responsibilization is not just about acting peaceably, being financially 
conscientious, and morally upright; it is also about being prepared for the worst and 
knowing how to navigate traumatic situations when they occur.19 Notably, Amy 
criticizes the childhood pressures Amazing Amy placed on her as “an unfair 
responsibility,” the likes of which meant “knowing you aren’t allowed to disappoint” 
(Flynn 259). This responsibilization, though, along with preserving the success of her 
parents’ book series, also encourages Amy to don a specific kind of textually-rooted 
performance that aligns with what readers know and expect Amazing Amy to be. 
The responsibilizing work of Amazing Amy also encourages Amy’s development 
as an economic individual, which signifies an increased value of competitiveness within 
neoliberalism. Early theorizations of neoliberalism no longer viewed exchange as the 
most important aspect of the market; instead, it became competition, which needed to be 
preserved and protected from governmental intervention (Foucault 119, 147). Early 
neoliberal theorists also encouraged the idea that individuals should view themselves as 
enterprises to help the market become “the formative power of society” (Foucault 148). 
American neoliberals took this idea and developed it even further, regarding all 
“behavior as economic behavior,” to the point that homo oeconomicus becomes an 
“entrepreneur of himself” and pursues competition above all else (Foucault 252, 226). 
 
19 Susanna Trnka and Catherine Trundle also examine numerous social and communal forms of 
responsibility that “effectively [counter] the increasingly prevalent tendency of public and political figures 
to define and discuss responsibility in largely neoliberal terms” (137). For more on the responsibilizing 
methods of neoliberal states, see Mitchell Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society and 




Amy brings a sense of competition to her relationship with Nick, gladly putting on a 
performance to get what she wants. “For someone like me,” she says, “who likes to win, 
it’s tempting to want to be the girl every guy wants,” and when she first met Nick, she 
“was willing to try” different personalities (Flynn 223). Here, love is first and foremost a 
competition for Amy, something to dominate. However, moments later, she contradicts 
herself, saying, “I thought we would be the most perfect union: the happiest couple 
around. Not that love is a competition” (Flynn 224)—except that for her, it is. Raised to 
entrepreneurialize her self by blurring the lines between Amy Dunne and Amazing Amy, 
she has no qualms about enlisting another performance to woo Nick. 
The pièce de résistance of Amy’s neoliberal performances is the fake diary she 
writes to frame Nick for her “murder.” Like her connection to Amazing Amy, the diary is 
a vehicle of neoliberal performativity because, as a site of enunciation, it initiates real-
world consequences for Nick by naming things into reality. Additionally, it 
responsibilizes him and creates a stock-character role for him to fill—the jealous, 
abusive, murderous husband.20 Through these efforts, Amy executes what Butler 
describes as a type of performative resistance in that Amy reorders seemingly stable 
cultural signifiers and rearticulates what “cannot be predicted or controlled” (Bodies 
219). In the end, the diary creates an alternative form of common sense because it pushes 
the limits of believability, successfully subverting normative expectations of human 
behavior.21 The diary also continues the thread of competitiveness in Amy’s life, and she 
 
20 The diary, though meant for the police to find, is also written to manipulate and manage the reader, 
since the plot twist midway through Gone Girl is that the diary entries one has been reading have been 
fabrications all along. 
21 Amy’s escalating competitiveness is reminiscent of Jeffrey Nealon’s description of neoliberalism as not 




embarks on constructing the alternate story precisely because her and Nick’s lived 
narrative is too “predictable … perfectly average … amusing,” the wife to a cheating 
husband who picked a younger woman over her (Flynn 234). The problem with this 
narrative is not just its banality, but also that in the end, if she does nothing, Nick wins. 
“So I began to think of a different story,” she says, “a better story … that would restore 
my perfection” (Flynn 234). The diary is recuperative in its goal of eliminating the tired 
trope that her life with Nick has become.22 
The diary also depends on various larger transnational neoliberal structures and 
enterprises as Amy constructs it to her advantage, a dependence that reveals the 
neoliberal extent of her performativity. In order for the diary to be believable, Amy has 
to painstakingly recount past events and even create new ones for the later entries that 
take place after she and Nick move from Brooklyn to North Carthage. These later entries 
after the 2008 financial collapse and their move to the Midwest connect to various 
                                                                                                                                           
the 2008 financial collapse was not “the abandonment of free-market ideology”; instead, the economic 
crisis and the attendant response to it were simply the latest extensions of rampant economic privatization 
(2). Accordingly, older methodological approaches to capitalism will likely fail to account for the chaos of 
neoliberalism. Such nostalgic methods cannot be a sufficient critical tool; instead, theorists need “to 
construct a vocabulary to talk about the ‘new economics’ … and their complex relations to cultural 
production” (Nealon 14-15). Nealon’s description of how a new vocabulary is required to make sense of 
the effect of the free-market economy on contemporary culture echoes the very problems that Amy’s 
actions pose in the novel. Specifically, the notion that she would write a fake diary to frame Nick for her 
“murder” presents a new vocabulary because it is such an outlandish idea that defies common sense. 
Indeed, few characters in the novel are able to accept the idea that she falsified her murder. Or, if they 
make an attempt to understand it, they do so by trying to fit Amy’s actions into their own preconceived 
notions of what does and does not make sense. These attempts to make sense of Amy’s actions rely on 
established forms of knowledge, the kind reminiscent of Percy’s symbolic complex. The desire for and 
dependence on stable ways of understanding the world is the exact obstacle in the way of people’s ability 
to understand that Amy is in fact not dead but, rather, spent years methodically planning her revenge on 
Nick for cheating on her. They have insufficient critical tools for demystifying Amy’s myriad 
performative impulses. 
22 Amy’s fake diary functions in similar ways to the documentary in Ozeki’s My Year of Meats and 
Hamid’s How to Get Filthy Rich in Rising Asia in that it is a form of media that seems to try to work 
outside neoliberal values even as it helps to reproduce them. Not that Flynn positions Amy’s diary as a 
vehicle of critique against neoliberalism; rather, it is another example of a narrative form that can easily fit 




neoliberal enterprises. First, the Dunnes’ housing situation cannot be divorced from 
larger transnational concerns. Though terms like “the Great Recession” or “the financial 
crisis” have become shorthand for the housing collapse in the US, its scope is certainly 
global, for the movement of capital “transcends national borders and creates strong 
interdependence of world markets” that depend on vast amounts of money available in 
investments from asset securitization (Unterman 102). Annie McClanahan notes that the 
securitization of mortgages “greatly increased market liquidity,” which enabled investors 
to use the value of a mortgage as liquid assets that could “flow across the country”—or 
“across the globe”—“in a single keystroke” (Dead 7). One result of this securitization 
was that Middle Eastern oil money could flow back into the US to help pay for new 
housing developments, especially in the Midwest where the Dunnes are (McClanahan, 
Dead 7).23 Indeed, the questionable lending practices and global movement of liquid 
assets out of the US has helped to balloon an international marketplace that no amount of 
US oversight and regulation (or lack thereof) could properly account for, so much so that 
the “international debt market has outgrown the national approach to governing 
securities transactions” (Unterman 78). An American worker, for example, may choose 
to allocate a portion of her paycheck to a pension fund. Those contributions could be 
invested in the MBS market without her knowledge, capital that would then go on to 
help develop any number of other financial products and markets around the globe 
(Unterman 92).24 So while the Dunnes move to North Carthage after losing their jobs 
 
23 See also Louis Hyman, Borrow: The American Way of Debt. 
24 The MBS market is a massive source of capital for investors. In 2006, the US Federal Reserve Board 
estimated it reached $5.139 trillion (Unterman 93). Investors initially believed that these securities 




and rent a house in a failed development, their move from Brooklyn is not just an ironic 
American journey westward. The availability of their rental home—and many of the 
houses on their street—can be understood as having been built precisely because of the 
transnational movement of liquid assets beyond US borders. It is a house comprised by 
oil-backed, mortgage-supported investment, a home that ties the Dunnes’ “McMansion” 
(Flynn 8) to other parts of the globe entangled in the financial crisis. 
Additionally, other emblems of the housing market assist Amy’s efforts to gather 
incriminating information on Nick that can contribute to her diary’s creation. Amy 
deceives Andie, Nick’s mistress, into accepting her Facebook friend request sent from a 
fake profile. She takes her profile photo from “a popup ad for mortgages (blond, smiling, 
benefiting from historically low interest rates)” (Flynn 248). Just as the image tricks 
Andie into unquestioningly accepting Amy’s friend request, its connection to 
“historically low interest rates” recalls the predatory work of the housing market. 
Adjustable-rate mortgages, where borrowers’ monthly payments increase to often 
unsustainable amounts, and loose lending requirements for mortgage credit became 
commonplace in the early 2000s (McClanahan, Dead 6). That Flynn has Amy select a 
photo from an advertisement peddling mortgages is telling because just as the 
questionable lending practices of the housing market preyed upon and ruined millions of 
people’s finances, Amy uses materials from the world of real estate to monitor Nick and 
formulate ways to destroy his life. 
                                                                                                                                           
came to prove that a large collection of high-quality mortgages would promise low risk, while a massive 




Amy also relies on the privatized pharmaceutical world surrounding plasma 
donation to write her diary entries. Nick’s mother, Maureen, and her friends donate 
biweekly, and she suggests donating plasma is an agential choice, something Amy 
should consider trying if money is tight: “It might be a nice way for you to get some pin 
money—it’s good for a girl to have a little cash of her own” (Flynn 155). Maureen 
believes there is a level of individual responsibility tied to donating, almost a kind of 
self-investment. But Amy sees something else: A room of donors of low socio-economic 
status turning part of their bodies into money to partially mitigate their poverty. Amy 
describes the scene as less than human, where the donors are “strapped to churning 
machines” as if “they are being harvested” or “being farmed” (Flynn 156, emphasis in 
original). Flynn’s inclusion of the plasma bank in Gone Girl is a careful one, as 
plasmapheresis is a massively profitable privatized enterprise. As of 2014, plasma 
pharmaceuticals were more than an $11 billion annual market, and not coincidentally 
hundreds of new plasma centers opened during the Great Recession, with donations 
skyrocketing from 12.5 million in 2006 to 23 million in 2011 (Wellington). The US and 
a handful of other countries are the only ones that compensate plasma donors, and as a 
result, they obtain more donations, which enables them to provide most of the global 
supply of plasma-derived medical products (PDMPs) (Grabowski and Manning 151). 
The US currently leads the world in plasma procured from donors—roughly 70% of the 
world’s supply—and there is great economic incentive to have such high numbers 
(Wellington). The protein in donated plasma is necessary for the creation of various 
pharmaceuticals manufactured by for-profit corporations, and the larger the amount of 




that process will be, which means that “[l]arge pools [of plasma] maximize profits” 
(Wellington).25 Since most countries place tighter restrictions on donation frequency and 
volume compared to the US, there are substantially “lower per capita plasma levels 
observed outside the United States” (Grabowski and Manning 157).26 As a result, the US 
is able to dominate global trade of PDMPs, since many countries lack a domestic reserve 
to draw from and have to buy from the US (Grabowski and Manning 158). Though 
plasma is a crucial necessity for a wide range of patient-care procedures, it is also a 
tremendous generator of wealth for Western pharmaceutical corporations, and donors are 
not compensated on a fair comparative scale.27 It is an international market the US 
continues to conquer. 
Amy’s utilization of plasmapheresis as she constructs her diary persona has 
significant implications for how we understand neoliberal performativity, for this brief 
episode in the novel skews the notion of individual responsibility. As noted earlier, 
plasma donation is presented two ways in Gone Girl: It could be viewed positively, a 
kind of agential self-investment that procures funds for personal use, therefore 
increasing one’s capital and mobility. Or, it can be viewed negatively, as Amy does, by 
regarding plasmapheresis as an end-of-one’s-rope decision made when encountering 
 
25 For a breakdown of the attendant costs related to producing PDMPs, see Victor Grifols, “Financing 
Plasma Proteins: Unique Challenges.” 
26 The ethics and safety of US plasma donation is highly questionable for myriad reasons. See Darryl 
Lorenzo Wellington, “The Twisted Business of Donating Plasma” and Lucy Reynolds, “Selling Our 
Safety to the Highest Bidder: The Privatisation of Plasma Resources UK.” 
27 Because of the questionable ethics surrounding US plasmapheresis, other nations have attempted to limit 
the amount of commercial plasma they import from the US, though to various degrees of success. See Paul 
Gallagher, “‘Is There No Limit to What This Government Will Privatise?’: UK Plasma Supplier Sold to 





financial constraints for any number of reasons.28 But this negative view of 
plasmapheresis comes from “Diary Amy,” the novel’s most unreliable narrator. Left 
unwritten in the diary is Amy’s actual utilitarian purpose behind including the 
plasmapheresis episode, a purpose that offers a third way of viewing plasma donation 
and its connections to individual responsibility: The financial aspect of donating plasma 
is unimportant to Amy, but what she does need is a way to manage Nick’s future 
decision-making abilities after the authorities discover she is missing and investigate her 
possible murder. By pretending to faint at the sight of blood and needles at the plasma 
bank, Amy insures that Nick’s eventual theory of how she faked her murder by cutting 
herself won’t stand up to scrutiny when compared against this event in the diary. Which 
is all to say that Amy’s exercise of individual responsibility in the performative 
construction of her diary is specifically aimed at removing Nick’s agency or, rather, his 
ability to respond substantively to her individual decisions and manipulations. 
Amy’s performance here is neoliberal in two specific ways. First, she accepts her 
own responsibilization by planning ahead with future disasters in mind—that is, she 
works to create a narrative that could free her from Nick and any other future financial 
disappointments. She and Nick lose nearly everything because of the recession, and 
rather than lament the existence of systemic injustice and greed, Amy does what 
neoliberal ideology positions as the appropriate response of enterprising individuals: stay 
competitive and prepare for the worst. Second, Amy’s performance is also chiefly aimed 
at responsibilizing Nick in a way that will exculpate herself and place all the blame for 
 
28 Wellington lists numerous motivations in his article that drive people to donate plasma: to make ends 





their unhealthy marriage and her “death” on him. It is, thus, a responsibilization of Nick 
that seeks to take away his individual freedom, all while she initially leads him to think 
that he is the one in control. By starting the day of their anniversary with her usual 
scavenger hunt of poems-as-clues that lead Nick to his gift from her, Amy allows Nick 
the illusion of being the clue finder, the investigator in charge, when in reality she is 
leading him from one prearranged spot to the next, every one of them stocked with 
incriminating evidence against him. 
All of this is for Amy’s benefit and for Nick’s detriment, a move that notably 
echoes the responsibilized structure of plasma collection. Plasmapheresis is a for-profit 
venture in the US, but the rhetoric surrounding it constructs an image of the responsible, 
beneficent donor, as if there are not larger social structures generating economic 
inequality that drive someone to consider donating. Those who donate are assured of 
their own altruism and forthrightness in choosing to extend life to patients critically in 
need of plasma.29 Wellington argues that such rhetoric obfuscates what is really taking 
place—that donors become “like cows milking [their] own udders”—but he misses the 
point here. The image of an individual milking oneself does not disguise what is taking 
 
29 To use a personal example, one of the plasma banks in my locale (College Station, Texas) is part of UK-
based Bio Products Laboratory, which places significant emphasis on the heroic qualities of the donor on 
its website: 
By donating plasma, donors are offering a lifeline to someone in need. Whether it’s a 
wounded veteran who served our country overseas, an expectant mother anxiously 
awaiting her new arrival, or a young child trying to live a healthy and normal life, your 
donation makes a huge difference. … Consistent donation is critical to maintaining an 
adequate supply of plasma—that’s why we view regular donors as big heroes. And we 
believe if you do good, you should be rewarded, so our donors are compensated for their 
time and efforts. (“Why Donate”, emphasis in original) 
It is worth noting here the patriotic and heteronormative language that places the donor within the larger 
picture of the nation-state’s progress and hopeful future. On the one hand, donors are lauded for their 
willful donation, but on the other hand, they are simultaneously responsibilized with certain expectations 




place; instead, it clarifies the neoliberal concept of responsibilization at work. There is 
never any confusion as to why people donate plasma: They are short on money, they 
need some quickly, and a market has been created with a demand for a supply that they 
can immediately provide with their bodies. Donors are informed that they are doing 
something good and selfless for humanity, and while that may be true in some measure, 
they are also helping support a multi-billion-dollar privatized industry. In the neoliberal 
paradigm, it is not important that plasma banks exist and are growing because of 
economic inequality; what matters is that the opportunity for making money through 
them is there, and the onus of not taking advantage of their existence to earn some extra 
capital is on the individual. Similarly, Nick does not really have a choice when it comes 
to playing the game Amy creates for him, for he must try to locate the clues and 
evidence Amy plants against him before the police do. This, as Amy has fashioned it, is 
his responsibility, whether he wants it or not. 
The various privatized sectors Amy utilizes to strengthen the seeming factuality 
of her diary’s narrative help her construct a false tale, albeit one that is recognizable. 
Because the diary creates and then plays upon certain familiar tropes—the unhappy 
marriage, the philandering husband, the midlife crisis—Amy’s constructed narrative fits 
within a shared cultural lexicon that can continue to “stage-manage” Nick’s life (Flynn 
47). In reality, though, she is constructing an alternative common sense, one that Nick 
eventually deciphers but knows no one else would believe. By reaching such a space of 
agential control, Amy knows that she has essentially won because nobody can contradict 
the narrative she has performed and established around her and Nick. Upon resurfacing 




enforcement official, who shares Nick’s theory that Amy falsified her own murder, 
observes that any other narrative is “less credible than Amy” because she has “pure 
public opinion” on her side (403), meaning that common sense, or the version of it that 
Amy has tapped into and constructed, is more powerful than actuality. People in North 
Carthage accept this fetishized production of Nick as authentic—fetishized because it 
obscures what is actually going on—because they fail to recognize the existence of 
performative realities. Amy’s use of a neoliberal common sense to manipulate familiar 
cultural and artistic forms helps obscure the ethical and moral problems of what she 
actually is doing. The diary activates a new social reality by producing Nick’s world, 
and while it is easy to read Amy as psychopathic here, Johansen reminds us that Amy’s 
actions “follow the logic of normal neoliberal subject formation” (“Neoliberal” 42). That 
is, she has done everything to fashion and preserve herself in an entrepreneurial way. 
Amy’s parents’ creation of her self has already been described as a capitalist form of 
production thanks to Amazing Amy. That upbringing, however, becomes the model for 
her performative control of Nick, for the diary casts him in the easily-recognizable role 
from daytime movies of the estranged wife-killer, a familiar motif that ignites people’s 
hatred toward Nick and clouds their ability to think outside this commonly-sensible 
image. 
Amy’s own troubles are noteworthy, though. Her diary’s performance may 
liberate her from her marital and financial situation toward that hallmark of neoliberal 
values—individual freedom—but her encounter with freedom is terrifying. Upon 
successfully staging her kidnapping and murder and leaving North Carthage, Amy’s 




Her cash will eventually run out, leaving her the two options of “die” or “get money” 
(Flynn 280), which is to say that to not die is to have money or, rather, that access to 
capital is on par with life itself. Then, for a brief moment, Amy experiences true freedom 
when she is robbed of all her cash and feels “the pure wildness of being on [her] own for 
the first time in [her] life” (Flynn 325); however, all she encounters in the face of that 
prospect is horror. She hates it and realizes she has no idea how to survive. Amy’s 
perspective that her options are not between life and death but, rather, between death and 
money provides a dark comment on what constitutes livable, meaningful life within 
neoliberalism. In the setting of Gone Girl, predicated as it is on financial competition, to 
exit the market and its dynamics of financial exchange is tantamount to death. Without 
money, Amy has few options for survival in the world, let alone mobility. In a sense, she 
has stumbled upon true freedom after being robbed, but it is not the kind of individual 
freedom that neoliberalism imagines—freedom, that is, to enter the market and 
participate competitively. Flynn depicts a purer sort of freedom as finding oneself 
tethered to nothing, including the market. 
It is telling, then, that Amy’s ability to reenter life is made possible by her two 
narratives becoming marketable. Since disappearing, sales of the Amazing Amy series 
“have skyrocketed,” which means her “irresponsible parents can finally pay back [her] 
trust fund” they borrowed against—“[w]ith interest” (Flynn 352). Amy’s return to the 
neoliberal world after exiting it, however briefly, is on par with reclaiming the position 
of homo oeconomicus by entrepreneurializing the self and finding ways to market one’s 
existence. She does precisely that. Beyond Amazing Amy’s resurgence, Amy’s fabricated 




eventually lands her a book deal. Events like these show how Amy’s actions are not 
merely a riff on postmodernism, construction, and unreliable narrators by Flynn; instead, 
Gone Girl “imagines a world where one scrapes off anything disconnected from one’s 
state as homo economicus” (Johansen, “Neoliberal” 45). Tellingly, writing this future 
memoir signifies to Amy that she is “officially in control of our story” (Flynn 406, my 
emphasis)—not just hers, but continually in control of writing Nick’s, too. 
It is worth stressing that such a virtuoso performance exists within a space of 
privilege. Amy is White, blonde, attractive, and it certainly helps that she comes from 
money with a successful children’s book series attached to her. Amy knows this; it is 
why she can count on her story being quickly picked up by major news networks, which 
enable her to monitor the success of the diary’s performative impact on Nick from afar. 
This element of privilege is important. While Nick and Amy do lose their jobs and much 
of their savings in the financial collapse, Amy is still able to stay at home when they 
move to Missouri while Nick manages a bar. She uses these long days alone to 
meticulously plot against Nick by conducting extensive research and creating the fake 
diary. Gone Girl, then, examines a certain kind of neoliberal privilege where mobility 
and time are not in low supply, meaning Amy possesses a level of agency within her 
performance that someone from a lower class or the working poor simply would not 
have. This is why it is crucial to keep in mind Austin’s arguments about the cultural and 
temporal relevance of performative utterances. The text and form of neoliberal 
performativity will change from place to place and time to time. The kind of neoliberal 
performativity Amy embodies in Gone Girl is just one mode, a form aimed at personal 




Though the textual work of Amy’s neoliberal performativity continues till the 
close of the novel, Nick does manage to complicate the degree to which we regard her 
assertion of agency as successful. He tells Amy he pities her because “every morning 
you have to wake up and be you” (Flynn 415). The comment deeply troubles Amy, and 
it is significant in light of neoliberal conceptualizations of freedom. Amy’s perpetual 
performances and efforts to cash in, though enabling her freedom to enter the market, 
only imprison her. She remains tethered to Amazing Amy, Cool Girl, Diary Amy, or any 
other number of roles she has put on or had put upon her. Nick’s comment recalls 
Percy’s claim that unwittingly acquiescing to performative pressures results in a loss of 
agency; however, that is not Amy’s situation. Amy is keenly aware of her utilization of 
performances and eager embrace of them. But Nick suggests that Amy loses something 
in the process. In her efforts to write her fake diary and create an alternate life, Amy falls 
victim to Butler’s warning about the risks of performance—that rewriting signifiers “can 
never be understood as a controlling or original authorship over that signifying chain” 
(Bodies 219). Amy’s diary and masterful alibis certainly have “expand[ed] the 
boundaries of what is, in fact, culturally intelligible” (Butler, Gender 29), but Nick 
understands that the endless performances have only subsumed Amy instead of taking 
her to a place of freedom. As a case in point, the charade does not stop when she returns 
to Nick. She must continue the false narrative of her abduction and assault for the book 
deal she signed. Self-made product that she is, the market has her. While Nick cannot 
prove Amy’s lies, he can exact some form of retribution by identifying how her 




her. Her attempts at utilizing neoliberal performativity to her advantage are ultimately 
ineffectual if the end goal is some form of escape to freedom. 
 
The God of Small Things and Performative Resignation 
Unlike Gone Girl, Arundhati Roy’s The God of Small Things casts a bleaker vision of 
performativity within neoliberalism. Performativity, language, narrative, and how they 
intertwine are at the heart of the novel, which explores how performances are often 
initiated in deference to the West and its capitalist investment in India’s post-
independence modernization. Roy casts the influence of the West in India as private 
American corporations and American cinema, and she sets one Indian family’s intimate 
conflicts (what she terms “the Small Things”) within the larger political impetuses for 
putting on a performance (what she labels “the Big Things”). These “Big Things” are 
constituted by India’s mid-twentieth-century dependence on developmental loans from 
such entities as the World Bank, and Roy positions economic incentives as one—if not 
the—motivation behind performative utterances and actions. The influence of neoliberal 
ideology in post-independence India has notable local effects in the novel. First, the 
Kathakali dancers exemplify how Indian cultural practices and art have been irrevocably 
altered by continued economic degradation. The Kathakali are specifically performance 
artists whose livelihood and cultural standing have been exoticized and essentially put 
up for sale in order to attract Western tourists. Second, Roy creates an overt 
metaphorical rendering of how the neoliberalization of India’s economy trickles down to 
affect everyday life. When a concessions vendor at a movie theater sexually abuses 




the World Bank and companies such as Coca-Cola have done to India’s economic 
infrastructure and environment. Roy’s political essays further clarify this overt 
metaphor, which points to the ubiquity of Western economic involvement that saturates 
local infrastructure and produces small-scale forms of trauma. These local forms of 
violence further foreclose the ability for someone such as Estha to locate meaningful 
existence beyond the violence of neoliberalism. 
Roy highlights the entrance of neoliberal investment in India with the novel’s 
setting by foregrounding how India has opened itself up to foreign investment and what 
effect that has had. The God of Small Things conveys an image of India similar to the 
one she excoriates in her essays, a nation where protections for the environment and 
human life are secondary to profits that can be made by welcoming Western 
corporations and accepting loans from the World Bank. In India, Roy reads the current 
“age of Empire” as a time when democracy has been replaced by neoliberal capitalism 
(Public Power 5), and she does not mince words on what the effect is politically. The 
World Bank’s leaders, none of whom is democratically appointed, “make decisions on 
[India’s] behalf” (“Come September” 75), and Roy has made a careful study of the 
violent consequences of such financial dependence.30 Developing nations like India open 
 
30 Roy notes it is common for the World Bank to buy its way into nations’ political processes with funding 
for development projects. For instance, with the Narmada Valley Project in India, the World Bank “was 
ready with its checkbook before any costs were computed, before any studies had been done, before 
anybody had any idea of what the human cost or the environmental impact of the dam would be” 
(“Greater” 28, emphases in original). Further, the World Bank also funds aid and development agencies 
that, in turn, fund NGOs to go into India and help fill gaps left by the closure of public services that 
frequently occurs in the wake of its reliance on World Bank funding. Roy identifies this as standard 
procedure for the World Bank: It creates a problem and then it provides loans to help finance the cleanup. 
As a case in point, Roy references how 
David Hopper, the World Bank’s vice-president for South Asia [from 1978 to 1987], has 
admitted that the Bank does not usually include the cost of drainage in its irrigation 




themselves to international investment, and “the unrestricted entry and exit of massive 
amounts of speculative capital … effectively dictates their economic policy,” which 
enables institutions such as the World Bank to “virtually write” the rules for developing 
nations by buying their way in and forcing the direction of public policy (Public Power 
21-22). In The God of Small Things, Roy underscores the environmental consequences 
as just one aspect of India’s dependence on the World Bank. Estha and his sister Rahel’s 
childhood home in Ayemenem is along a river “that smelled of shit and pesticides 
bought with World Bank loans” (God 14), and the river eventually becomes “just a slow, 
sludging green ribbon lawn that ferried fetid garbage to sea” and contains “unadulterated 
factory effluents” (God 119). The nearly nonexistent river vanishes due to a saltwater 
barrage constructed downriver “in exchange for votes from the influential paddy-farmer 
lobby” that would control incoming salt water to produce “two harvests a year instead of 
one. More rice, for the price of a river” (God 118).  
I will return to the role of the World Bank in The God of Small Things in a 
moment, but it is noteworthy how Roy uses her novel to underscore how India’s land 
and resources are not the only things for sale. Other aspects of Indian life, like arts and 
culture, are also marketed for Western consumption, which Roy most compellingly 
conveys with her portrayal of the Kathakali dancers, performance artists who depict 
                                                                                                                                           
expensive. It costs five times as much to provide adequate drainage as it does to irrigate 
the same amount of land. It makes the cost of a complete project appear unviable. 
(“Greater” 70, emphasis in original) 
Yet the World Bank finances unviable projects anyway, destroying land and the livelihood of farmers, and 
then offers to loan money to the affected areas to finance the recovery, which places developing nations 
deeper into debt. This scenario happened in Pakistan with the Mangla dam in 1967 and the Tarbela dam in 
1977 (“Greater” 71). Investment of capital from the World Bank into India, though, is “a miniscule 
fraction of the actual cut in public spending” (Public Power 42). As a result, India today “pays back more 
money to the Bank in interest and repayment installments than it receives from it,” which Roy contends is 




lengthy epic narratives from Hindu religious tradition. The Kathakali and their 
performance art have been swallowed up by economic concerns in deference to the 
buying power of the West, which diminishes their cultural relevance from within India. 
In Roy’s novel, the Kathakali become little more than commodities and marketing tools 
used to facilitate the sale of other local products. For instance, Estha and Rahel’s uncle, 
Chacko, budding capitalist that he is, uses the image of the Kathakali in an 
advertisement for the family’s pickling business, Paradise Pickles & Preserves. He 
purposefully enlists this emblem of culture as an economic form of cultural 
appropriation, arguing it lends their pickled products a “Regional Flavor and would 
stand them in good stead when they entered the Overseas Market” (God 46). The 
Kathakali also appear at a Cochin Airport souvenir shop in the form of “papier-mâché 
masks” and on a “Kerala Tourism Development Corporation” sign (God 132-33). That 
Roy places the Kathakali in service to the tourism industry further points to the 
neoliberalization of Indian arts and culture. Indeed, there is a clear connection in the past 
half-century between the privatization and commodification of nature and the creation of 
new markets for medical tourism and ecotourism (Mosedale 13-15). Specifically with 
India, the state has been instrumental in branding the nation not as a developing country 
plagued by poverty but as a modern hub of ecotourism (Hannam and Reddy 81-82). 
But these uses of the Kathakali image are only part of the picture. The neoliberal 
impulse to economize all things also alters the dancers’ performance art in significant 
ways. Roy depicts the Kathakali visiting a five-star hotel each evening where Western 
“tourists [are] treated to truncated … performances (‘Small attention spans,’ the Hotel 




hour classics were slashed to twenty-minute cameos” (Roy, God 121). Not that the hotel 
guests pay attention, though. The Kathakali are there to simply add a veneer of 
exoticized authenticity to the tourist’s experience of India. In his careful study of the 
kathakali tradition, Phillip B. Zarrilli notes that this entrance of Western capital via 
tourism has significantly altered the structure and style of the dance since at least 1969, 
which is, not coincidentally, the same year much of Roy’s novel is set in.31 New, shorter 
performances have either been created or adapted specifically for foreign audiences. 
Zarrilli acknowledges that some of these edited-down versions carry honest attempts to 
present tourists with performances that still capture something of traditional Indian 
culture. Most, however, are “highly romantic/orientalist repackagings” that reductively 
present India as some mystical jewel of the East; further, it is not uncommon to find 
“inept performances by third-rate, ill-trained performers which capitalize on the naivete 
of foreign tourists willing to pay for just about anything that seems ‘indigenous’ while 
 
31 Roy’s choice of 1969 allows her to place the events of the novel amid the historical backdrop of the 
rising Naxalite movement and show how Indian Marxism is little more than an empty performance in its 
own right. She explores why it is ineffective through the characters Chacko and Comrade Pillai, both of 
whom are more interested in their own financial or political gain than they are in combating economic 
inequality. Chacko turns Paradise Pickles into a capitalist factory and sleeps with its female workers, and 
his sister, Ammu, sees through him as nothing more than “the old zamindar mentality—a landlord forcing 
his attentions on women who depended on him for their livelihood” (God 63). Comrade Pillai’s Marxist 
sincerity is compromised by his desire for political advancement. With a position open in the Legislative 
Assembly, he considers how he can cause Chacko’s workers to form a labor union and give him a “future 
constituency” prior to the upcoming elections (God 114). Roy positions both men as “pharisaic” (God 
266) precisely because their ostensible Marxism fails those who are economically and socially 
disenfranchised the most, untouchables like Velutha. Marxism fails Velutha because, card-carrying 
member though he is, economic concerns cannot overcome the caste system, and Roy chiefly criticizes 
how communism in India “never overtly questioned the traditional values of a caste-ridden, extremely 
traditional community” (God 64). As a result, the “Marxists worked from within the communal divides, 
never challenging them, never appearing not to” (God 115). Therefore, when Velutha turns to Pillai for 
help after being caught having an affair with Ammu, who is outside his caste, Pillai uses Marxist rhetoric 
to distance himself. He reminds Velutha the “Party was not constituted to support workers’ indiscipline in 
their private life” and that the “[i]ndividual’s interest is subordinate to the organization’s interest” (God 
271). For historical accounts of the Naxalite movement in India, see Sumanta Banerjee, In the Wake of 
Naxalbari: A History of the Naxalite Movement in India; Biplab Dasgupta, The Naxalite Movement; and 





on a two-week sun, surf, and sand holiday” (Zarrilli 178). What Roy imagines here runs 
directly counter to the kind of politically-resistant potential within performativity that 
Butler envisions. Rather than “expand the boundaries of what is … culturally 
intelligible” (Gender 29), the Kathakali dancers change their art to conform to what a 
Western tourist might think is culturally intelligible. Nothing about their performance for 
the tourists is undertaken to establish an alternative mode of discourse; even if they were 
to try, Roy implies that the tourists would not even notice it anyway. The culturally 
intelligible space created for the Kathakali is to be background noise, a prop for a certain 
Western experience or reading of the stereotyped East. Roy indicates there is no way for 
their performance to speak into or speak against that new zone whose boundaries have 
been redefined by the work of incoming capital. 
Accordingly, there is a utilitarian imperative behind the dancers’ decision to 
exoticize themselves for tourists—namely, “to stave off starvation” (God 218). But Roy 
goes further by considering what happens with the Kathakali after a day of subjecting 
themselves to such embarrassment. Every night they “jettison their humiliation” over the 
“truncated swimming-pool performances” by returning to the Ayemenem temple “to ask 
pardon of their gods. To apologize for corrupting their stories. For encashing their 
identities. Misappropriating their lives” (God 218). They effect this atonement by 
performing their traditional dances uncut, and not for any audience—just themselves. 
Roy emphasizes how the Kathakali dancer was formerly held in high cultural esteem, 
but as India achieved independence and pursued industrial modernization, he became 
“unviable. Unfeasible. Condemned goods,” and his children instead aim to enter a world 




is his whole life, cannot simply enter the modern world and participate in it. So he 
becomes subservient to it, and in his despair, “he turns to tourism. He enters the market. 
He hawks the only thing he owns. The stories that his body can tell” (God 219). The 
Kathakali dancer’s only option is to accept the commodifying imperatives of the market 
and further commodify himself. 
As a result, he “becomes a Regional Flavor” (God 219), which is a key line 
where Roy connects the two separate instances of that term in her novel that are divided 
by more than two decades. If Chacko’s use of the Kathakali dancers in his advertisement 
for Paradise Pickles was done to lend his products regional flavor, that act 
reappropriated the kathakali image, but not in a way that somehow subsumed the 
dancers themselves or their art. But in the shift from adding regional flavor to becoming 
regional flavor, Chacko’s advertisement stands as an authoritative performative 
enunciation. It changes the cultural stance toward the Kathakali by refashioning them as 
a mere sidepiece of everyday life in Kerala, instead of a central aspect of its cultural and 
religious identity. By performatively establishing the Kathakali as simple commodities 
in service to his business’ sales, Chacko, in a neoliberal turn, takes a formerly non-
economic space of life in Kerala and economizes it as a tool in service to the market and 
his desire to one day enter an overseas market. Though that overseas plan never 
materializes for Paradise Pickles, Chacko’s purpose in using the Kathakali as a regional 
flavor nevertheless ends up coming true later on when the far more powerful economic 
force of Western tourism restructures the meaning of the kathakali tradition. 
However, by the later portion of the novel, the Kathakali no longer lend regional 




passive voice there is slightly disingenuous, though, for Roy suggests that the Kathakali 
exercise a form of limited agency in that change or what Jane Elliott calls a neoliberal 
form of “suffering agency” (“Suffering” 84), where neoliberal ideology may tout the all-
important preservation of the individual’s freedom to choose, but as neoliberal policies 
and practices generate greater inequalities across the globe, the choices left to people and 
communities are often few and not too promising. So while the Kathakali make the 
decision to enter the market and peddle their performance art, the freedom within that 
choice should hardly be overstated. The hotel chain presents the dancers’ art as a 
regional flavor, but such an orientalized and exoticized artistic display only lends further 
ostensible authenticity to the prepackaged symbolic complex of what it is like to 
encounter the “real” India as a world traveler. The difficult task at hand now for the 
Kathakali dancer is “the reverse of an actor’s struggle—not to enter a part but to escape 
it” (God 220, emphasis in original). Performance here is not a space of agential effort; it 
is to be subsumed by the neoliberal apparatus of Western tourism.32 
This instance of economy-based cultural appropriation is also directly linked to 
the legacy of colonialism in India. This is evidenced by the location of the hotel that the 
 
32 Petri Pietiläinen argues that Roy’s novel runs the risk of depending heavily on “a new kind of western 
imperialism … in the cultural sphere … promoting the idea of useful Otherness” (107). He suggests that 
The God of Small Things “shows how important the Western literary markets are for non-western writers” 
and how “third world literature, especially prose, might be in fact written primarily for the consumption of 
the Western market” (108). These arguments echo some of the concerns raised by Graham Huggan in The 
Postcolonial Exotic: Marketing the Margins, and Roy has more recently responded to these types of 
arguments in Capitalism: A Ghost Story, clarifying that she is well aware all texts—not just hers—
circulate in problematic political ways due to the direct connection many private corporations have with 
the publishing world. Parama Sarkar notes that Roy knows her novel could be commodified in a way that 
plays to preexisting Western assumptions about India, and Sarkar argues that this Kathakali scene allows 
her to “construct her critique against globalization and hence repudiate potential accusations of 
deliberately inviting the western gaze” (228). Likewise, Alex Tickell suggests that Roy makes clear her 
“awareness of the involuntary, assimilative demand which global capital makes in its encounter with local 




Kathakali visit, which sits on a former rubber estate, what Roy terms the History House 
throughout the novel. Part of that house’s history is on display on the grounds of the 
hotel, though it is hiding in plain sight. The estate’s “old colonial bungalow” is still 
there, now “surrounded by smaller, older, wooden houses … that the hotel chain had 
bought from old families and transplanted” in order to display “[t]oy histories for rich 
tourists to play in” (God 120). Other older cultural artifacts are scattered about and 
labeled as if in a museum to form a symbolic complex that continues to give guests a 
feeling of authenticity while on the grounds of the hotel, despite the fact that developers 
“built a tall wall to screen off the slum and prevent it from encroaching” on the visitors’ 
experience (God 119). Additionally, Roy presents this entire production as the final nail 
in the coffin of any effective Marxism within Kerala, for “old Communists … now 
worked as fawning bearers in colorful ethnic clothes” while serving drinks to the hotel 
guests (God 121). 
The hotel also literally covers up and overwrites what the History House 
embodied in the late 1960s—failed Marxism and caste violence, for it is to the History 
House that Velutha, an untouchable, flees after being rejected by officials in the 
Communist Party. There he is beaten to death by Kerala police—possibly for his extra-
caste affair with Estha and Rahel’s mother, possibly for his Naxalite sympathies (it could 
be either; Roy leaves it ambiguous). While Velutha is being tortured, Roy calls it 
“History in live performance” as the policemen “[act] with economy” (God 293). The 
play on words with economy here signals the threat that Velutha and anyone like him 
represent in post-independence India. As a member of the Naxalite movement, Velutha, 




plans for modernization. Indeed, Roy notes elsewhere that, for “the wealthy, estate-
owning (pickle-factory-running), feudal lords” in Kerala, “communism represented a 
fate worse than death” (God 64), because plenty of profits were to be made in a 
postcolonial India intent on modernizing and expanding its industrial and capitalist 
modes of production. 
History is further in live performance when Estha and his family go to see The 
Sound of Music. At the theater, he is sexually abused by a concessions vendor, a man 
Roy simply names the Orangedrink Lemondrink Man, which equates his existence to the 
products he sells, much like the commodified change the Kathakali dancer has 
undergone in the twentieth century. Roy structures this character as an overt metaphor 
for the World Bank, personifying the international lending group and its work in India in 
the guise of this one vendor. In this way, Roy creates a local and intimate treatment of 
the World Bank that corresponds to Bret Benjamin’s arguments. Benjamin reminds us 
that, beyond public policy, the World Bank’s effect on different aspects of culture within 
developing nations should not be understated, for it “affects … social forces” and shapes 
“the very idea of culture” by influencing “the practices and routines of everyday life” 
(xii). So while the World Bank and other similar financial institutions alter 
macroeconomic concerns, they also produce normative pressures that contribute to 
neoliberalism’s cultural hegemony where individuals are forced to accept its decisions. 
Because of neoliberalism’s cultural influence, the World Bank is not some “reified 
abstraction of global capitalism” but “a powerful political actor” that has a material 
effect in former colonies (Benjamin xxii). That materiality is captured by the 




The Orangedrink Lemondrink Man embodies how the local (i.e., the Indian 
nation) can perform the oppressive work of the West (i.e., the World Bank’s 
investments). This is represented by the presence of Coca-Cola behind the concessions 
counter. Coca-Cola in India is an example par excellence of a multinational 
corporation’s complicated relationship with and influence in a nation’s developing 
communities. The company has faced accusations of “creating water shortages, polluting 
groundwater and soil, and exposing its customers to toxic waste and pesticides” (Yaziji 
and Doh 115). The groundwater and pesticide accusations specifically connect to Coca-
Cola’s effect on agricultural communities. While the company has cut back on the 
amount of water it uses and partnered with water conservation companies, it continues to 
fight opposition within India.33 Roy’s placement of Coca-Cola in this scene at the theater 
alludes to how “commodities simultaneously bear witness to the exploitation and 
violence that bring them into existence” (Lutz 63). Notably, the Orangedrink 
Lemondrink Man offers Ammu a Coke when she takes Estha out of the theater a second 
time because he feels nauseous. She declines the drink, and when Estha tries to refuse 
the Orangedrink Lemondrink Man’s offer of free candies, Ammu says, “Take them, 
Estha … [d]on’t be rude,” before demanding, “Say thank you” (God 104). Not only is 
Estha forced to take what he does not want from the Orangedrink Lemondrink Man, but 
the expectation is that Estha will be grateful for what the man behind the counter has to 
 
33 For further accounts of Coca-Cola’s use of pesticides, see Margaret Burnett and Richard Welford, “Case 
Study: Coca-Cola and Water in India: Episode 2”; R. Harish and Bharathi S. Gopal, “Coca-Cola in India: 
A Responsible Corporate Citizen?”; and Neeraj Vedwan, “Pesticides in Coca-Cola and Pepsi: 
Consumerism, Brand Image, and Public Interest in a Globalizing India.” On resistance to Coca-Cola’s 
expansion, see Henrick Berglund, “The Popular Struggle against Coca-Cola in Plachimada, Kerala” and 
the FRPT-FMCG Snapshot articles. On allegations of groundwater depletion, see Jonathan Hills, “Coca-
Cola and Water in India.” And on Coca-Cola’s attempts to address said groundwater depletion, see Alyssa 
Carroll, “‘Have a Coke and a Smile’: Is the Aqueduct Alliance Coca-Cola’s Solution to Escape Future 




give. This depiction corresponds to Roy’s aforementioned descriptions of the World 
Bank, which initiates projects and policies in India that the general public did not ask for 
but becomes burdened with all the same. 
The imagery throughout this brief scene and its irony are significant. When the 
Orangedrink Lemondrink Man forces his penis into Estha’s hand, Roy positions the 
World Bank and its influence within developing nations as one tantamount to sexual 
assault, to the irreversible trauma of people forcing themselves onto their victims and 
taking away their will and control.34 The lyrics from the song “Maria” in The Sound of 
Music play in Estha’s head, including the line “How do you hold a moonbeam in your 
hand?” right before he is abused. The answer is that Estha does so by force. There is no 
agency here. Estha “held [the man’s penis] because he had to” (God 98). The man’s 
ejaculation into Estha’s hand is self-serving, neither procreative nor productive, other 
than producing within Estha the perpetual fear that the man could come out to his 
family’s house and assault him again. Yet the World Bank’s self-narrative is one of 
productive development. Roy plays with this word “development” in this scene, even if 
she does not actually use the word. Development is the ostensible goal of the World 
Bank’s funds, yet Roy emphasizes throughout her novel that the material results of the 
group’s involvement in India is environmental havoc. And as far as Estha goes, he exists 
in a state of arrested development for the rest of his life because of the abuse. All that 
develops from the Orangedrink Lemondrink Man’s shared resources is a brutalized 
investment that lacks any sort of return, and it places Estha forever in its debt. 
 
34 For an excellent reading of how Roy situates trauma as the fallout from globalization, see Joanne Lipson 
Freed, “The Ethics of Identification: The Global Circulation of Traumatic Narrative in Silko’s Ceremony 




Estha becomes numbed to the world almost immediately, and it is because of that 
trauma that he and Rahel learn they can never navigate the Western world with the kind 
of ease that someone such as Amy Dunne does in Gone Girl. Upon returning to the 
theater after being abused, Estha understands that Baron Von Trapp in The Sound of 
Music could never love him or Rahel because they are not “[c]lean children, like a 
packet of peppermints” the way his seven children are (God 100). The wealthy, picture-
perfect, and White setting onscreen does not become a form of media that creates a 
powerful symbolic complex and constitutes reality, like the allure of film and television 
does for Nick in Gone Girl. Here, instead, the kind of logic displayed on the screen is 
“the process by which the children internalize the racist, neo-colonial ideals that view 
them as inferior to white Europeans” (Lutz 70). Estha and Rahel do not engage with a 
form of media and determine a way to use it as an outlet for agency. Roy does not allow 
for the productive and performative possibilities visible earlier within Jane’s 
documentary, You’s self-help books, or Amy’s fake diary. In the same way that the 
World Bank suggests that India is making progress toward greater development, its 
involvement largely holds the former colony back from recovering after its long history 
of colonization. Likewise, Estha looks to The Sound of Music and realizes he could 
never be part of such a polished world after what the Orangedrink Lemondrink Man has 
done to him, and this is devastating for Estha to realize since he “pretended not to love 
[the Von Trapp children], but he did. He loved them” and the beautiful, clean lives they 
lived (God 100). Roy additionally suggests this sort of violence is unavoidable. In the 
theater lobby, “the orangedrinks were waiting. The lemondrinks were waiting”—




products created by Western multinational corporations, produced locally, disseminated 
throughout developing countries, and sold to their citizens as part of the neoliberal 
common sense rationale that it is best for a developing nation to open itself to privatized 
industry. The Orangedrink Lemondrink Man obfuscates the higher powers that 
orchestrate and execute such transnational financial exchanges, since he is one of the 
locals, but regardless of his role as a conduit and the invisibility of financial power, the 
result is still as real and tangible as Estha’s abuse. 
It is worth noting two things here—how Roy’s explicit politics in her novel are 
similar to the didacticism in Ozeki’s My Year of Meats and how Roy’s polemical writing 
stands in stark contrast to Flynn’s more muted strategies in Gone Girl. Both Roy and 
Ozeki place a political urgency in their texts by pursuing narrative styles that directly 
confront the reader in order to underscore as clearly as possible the dire economic and 
cultural consequences at play in the India and Japan of their respective novels. In this 
way, Roy plainly conveys an unequivocal message: Nothing good has come from 
neoliberalism in India. Roy ends up fashioning her novel in a way that sharply 
distinguishes it from a text such as Flynn’s, for in The God of Small Things characters do 
not have the luxury of the kinds of obscure political or financial dependence that Amy 
displays in Gone Girl. Amy’s utilization of aspects of the housing market and 
plasmapheresis seems almost incidental at times, as if she does not truly understand the 
economic or political implications of those enterprises. In some ways, she is quite aloof, 
which Flynn emphasizes when Amy at one point does not know how much a gallon of 
milk costs. That same blasé attitude is wholly absent from The God of Small Things in 




everyday life in India, and if we, as readers, were to come close to thinking otherwise, 
Roy is quick to place the neoliberalization of India on the surface of her text. It is 
inescapable, is never in the background, and hardly provides agential space to those 
caught within its influence.  
Indeed, Estha, Rahel, and their family are incapable of avoiding conscription into 
certain predetermined scripts. They prepare a lengthy performance for Chacko’s British 
ex-wife Margaret and daughter Sophie when they come to visit. The effort to receive 
them is titled the “Day of the Play” (God 130), with the front verandah of their house 
possessing “the dignity of a stage” (God 158). Their performance carries both political 
and economic pressures. For Ammu, it is imperative that Estha and Rahel make a good 
impression. She wants “a smooth performance,” the kind that would be worthy of a prize 
if there were an “Indo-British Behavior Competition” (God 139). Ammu is painfully 
conscious of the colonial history between their two nations and does not want anything 
to happen that would make her or her family appear backwards in Margaret or Sophie’s 
eyes. Because of the orientalist and exoticized stereotypes of India, Ammu loathes the 
possibility that they would be expected to behave like “some godforsaken tribe that’s 
just been discovered” (God 171). But the suggestion that Estha and Rahel are 
theoretically taking part in an Indo-British Behavior Competition recenters the capitalist 
pressures of this moment. Being visited by family from England can never be only a 
visit. The history between these two countries is too fraught and violent for it to be 
anything but a competition. 
Accordingly, Roy casts the family’s performance for Margaret and Sophie in 




close to her nearly-blind eyes “[t]o read her like a check. To check her like a banknote” 
(God 166). Later, the family’s cook mistakenly tells Rahel, “When [Sophie] grows up … 
she’ll raise our salaries” (God 175). Though there is certainly no likelihood of this 
happening, these two moments still reveal the economic imperative behind the family’s 
performance. Even though Margaret and Sophie are part of their extended family, they 
still represent the imperialist power and authority represented by England that elicits 
deference. Their shared colonial history can never be divorced from its capitalist 
prowess, now channeled through the ability of former colonial powers to affect 
developing nations through their lending backed by accumulated liquidity. The only way 
to approach, read, and understand Margaret and Sophie is to regard them like checks or 
banknotes. Additionally, the family members conscripted into this Play do not control 
when, where, and how their performances take place because “the Play went with” 
Sophie wherever she walks about (God 177). She and Margaret bring with them 
everything England represents to India’s history, and Estha, Rahel, and their family 
cannot refuse to follow the script.35 
The Play, however, falls apart, and Roy envisions a larger ripple effect connected 
to this disappointment. The family does not play their polished roles as they had hoped, 
 
35 Incidentally, Velutha is the only one who can successfully exit the Play and the pressure of performance. 
He is even able to extend that freedom to Rahel when she “slip[s] out of the Play and [goes] to him” (God 
166). Rahel looks to him for reassurance outside of the Play, asking, “We’re not here, are we? We’re not 
even Playing,” and Velutha responds, “That is Exactly Right … [w]e’re not even Playing” (God 173, 
emphasis in original). Devon Campbell-Hall suggests that “Roy’s representation of Velutha as . . . pushing 
against the restrictive boundaries challenges not only the traditional caste distinctions but also postmodern 
distinctions of globalized class systems and systems of production” (53). In other words, minimal though 
his appearance in the story is, Velutha could be an agent of productive change due to his disregard for 
economic and cultural norms. However, Velutha’s brutal murder suggests that, while he may be able to 
“exceed the bounds of cultural intelligibility,” as Butler puts it, he cannot “effectively expand the 





oftentimes becoming frustrated with one another and bickering in front of their guests. 
Roy observes, “The Play had gone bad. Like pickle in the monsoon” (God 139), 
explicitly describing the success of Paradise Pickles as somehow contingent on the 
success of their performances, thus raising the performance to the level of a business 
venture. This culinary simile for the Play connects to the way Mammachi’s first batch of 
pickled goods “had absorbed oil and expanded, making the bottles leak,” a problem she 
never is able to fix. Even “after all those years, Paradise Pickles’ bottles still leaked a 
little. It was imperceptible, but they did still leak,” and “Mammachi wondered whether 
she would ever master the art of perfect preservation” (God 159). Here Roy makes an 
overt allusion to Salman Rushdie’s classic novel of post-independence India Midnight’s 
Children, where each chapter is represented in the narrative as a jarred and sealed 
pickled food, into which Rushdie’s narrator, Saleem Sinai, preserves the memories of his 
life. But Roy alters Rushdie’s metaphor significantly. Saleem’s intent with pickling is to 
lock in memories, a way to preserve his—and thereby India’s—history. Mammachi’s 
(and later Chacko’s) pickles, however, are housed in bottles that do not seal properly, 
meaning that anything they symbolize will spoil before too long and have to be thrown 
out. Saleem’s pickle bottles stand for an attempt to represent the moment of Indian 
history at independence. They are authoritative, agential inscriptions, while Roy 
connects Mammachi’s bottles to a different site of enunciation—the family’s 
performativity driven by economic concerns, their continual efforts to ingratiate 
themselves to the modernizing work of neoliberal capitalism in India. It is a performance 
Roy suggests they cannot avoid, and if “the art of perfect preservation” requires a 




that these efforts will be impossible. Indeed, by the end of the novel, the Communist 
Party shuts down Paradise Pickles, and even more “rice fields [are] sold (along with [the 
family’s] mortgages) to pay off the bank loans” that Chacko initially applied for to 
modernize the business (God 266). They lose nearly everything. 
Performances in The God of Small Things are ineffectual, and Roy extends the 
absence of agency within performativity across her novel to broader areas of commerce. 
A brief scene at a train station narrates different images of economic inequality—
underpaid porters, homeless people, starving people, beggars missing limbs. Roy labels 
the station “Society’s circus. Where, with the rush of commerce, despair came home to 
roost and hardened slowly into resignation” (God 285). In a place overrun with attempts 
at neoliberal modernization, all of society becomes performative in that it resembles a 
circus or carnival of chaos, and Roy, like Percy, argues that these performative effects of 
the economy propagate the absence of hope. Percy, for his part, claims that attempts to 
extricate oneself from the prepackaged world of the symbolic complex will only meet 
frustration. While “seeking an immediate encounter with being,” one will likely find 
instead “desperate impersonation,” and Percy underscores that the façade of the 
performed complex signifies the loss of hope (52). With her description of the train 
station, Roy does not envision what Butler describes as a productive possibility of 
performativity—the “difficult labor of forging a future from resources inevitably 
impure” (Bodies 241). One reason for this impossibility is that a debilitating economic 
repetition is at play, where the deference of everything to the market “generates a 
contrasting cycle of repetition that, unlike the cycle of the natural world, creates social 




over, but a new force of domination has filled that void, one that continues to be 
irrevocably detrimental. 
If J. L. Austin was reluctant to discuss the role of ambiguity or equivocation 
within performative utterances, both Flynn and Roy foreground different forms of 
ambivalence over the success of performativity within neoliberalism. Gone Girl 
envisions performance as an open-ended pursuit, one that provides ample space for 
agential choices; hence, Amy is largely successful in achieving her goals. But the only 
way she can construct her performative narrative is to subvert cultural common sense by 
taking well-established forms of meaning and knowledge and twisting them, so much so 
that her dogged efforts to stage her own murder would be difficult for anyone to fully 
grasp. Amy’s actions are hardly, to reference Butler again, “culturally intelligible” 
(Gender 29). In this way, Flynn suggests that a space outside of any hegemonic cultural 
common sense can be reached performatively, but the stability of that space will have a 
very short shelf life. The fact that Amy returns to Nick and their life together and secures 
a lucrative book deal to help further market herself starkly emphasizes just how difficult 
it is to extricate oneself from the performative pressures of neoliberalism. If anything, 
Amy’s actions only further entrench her within neoliberal logics and structures. Not that 
such an exit is really ever Amy’s goal to begin with. She wants money, wants more of it, 
and wants back what she and Nick lost in the financial crash. Her performative work, 
geared as it is toward naming a new reality into existence, is always supported and 
guided by the apparatuses of neoliberalism. Indeed, it is merely a happy accident that she 




sense of freedom, if even for just a moment. But the market inevitably calls her back; 
she never really meant to leave. 
But even Amy’s performativity, with its seemingly successful execution, is never 
an option in The God of Small Things. Roy’s novel presents an environment where both 
neoliberal values and the rigid caste system—the text’s different indomitable forms of 
cultural common sense—combine into a deterministic landscape. Any performance in 
Roy’s narrative is initiated with the hegemonic reach of Western capital in mind. The 
performances are deeply ingrained, to the point that Roy situates local individuals like 
the Orangedrink Lemondrink Man as the ones metaphorically carrying out the more 
intimate and traumatic work of transnational lending groups like the World Bank. 
Additionally, through Chacko and his efforts with Paradise Pickles & Preserves, Roy 
tracks how the continued spread of capitalist practices affect indigenous cultural forms 
such as performances of the kathakali tradition. Thus, The God of Small Things 
envisions and narrates Jameson’s familiar observation as a novel that “attempt[s] to 
imagine capitalism by way of imagining the end of the world” (“Future” 76). 
Though a fuller examination is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is worth 
noting that both Flynn and Roy consider how the different expressions of performativity 
in their novels are received by intended audiences. Amy watches the evening news like a 
hawk to gauge how her plan is unfolding and how the discovery of the fake diary affects 
Nick’s ability to maintain his innocence in her apparent murder. Similarly, we as readers 
are made to take note of the ways Western tourists do or do not pay attention to the 
Kathakali dancers, as well as what Estha and Rahel think as they watch the repentant, 




production and performance are fairly meaningless without their reception by audiences, 
and if art can be significantly determined and influenced by neoliberal ideology, we 
must also explore how it affects artistic reception if we are to construct a fuller 
understanding of artistic engagement within neoliberalism. This very subject, the focus 
of the next chapter, has been taken up recently by Latin American novelists who 
question how the acts of reading and interpretation are, in their own right, critical 



















RECEIVING THE NEOLIBERAL TEXT IN ALEJANDRO ZAMBRA’S MULTIPLE 
CHOICE AND SAMANTA SCHWEBLIN’S FEVER DREAM 
 
Recent work on literature and neoliberalism has taken up the issue of genre to 
query how representation functions or changes within the context of the increasingly 
immaterial movement of capital. At the core of these concerns is what it means to use art 
to represent how financialization has made the movement and work of capital more 
invisible. Different terms have been used to describe these changes in generic 
conventions. Some novels embody a “microeconomic mode” where “life-interest” drives 
the narrative and “constitutes the reterritorialization that accompanies the 
deterritorialization of the subject in contemporary capital” (Elliott, “Microeconomic” 
219); other novels resemble “bureaucratic narrative[s]” whose characters become 
“administrative subject[s],” which “emphasizes the depersonalized and routinized 
repetition of formulaic rhetoric” (Johansen, “Bureaucracy” 417). Within film, “Korea’s 
IMF cinema” and its utilization of CGI monsters to metaphorize social ills not only 
depicts “the anxieties surrounding today’s massive capital flows and seismic geopolitical 
shifts but also speaks to questions of [the] digital materiality” that has replaced the 
material costumed or animatronic monsters of past films (Jeon 88). Other filmmakers 
reshape the horror genre to portray “the increasing inextricability of horror and 
securitized credit” in relation to the 2008 mortgage crisis, and when these films refuse to 
reconcile the conflict, they explore how the “collapse of credibility and mutuality in the 




economic ideology” (McClanahan, “Dead”). These scholars describe how artists have 
responded to the social and cultural changes neoliberalism generates, and implicit within 
these arguments is the suggestion that readers and viewers are cognizant of these 
changes as well. That is to say, there is an underlying faith in an audience’s critical 
reception of a politically motivated novel or horror film. 
However, it is not uncommon for literary studies of neoliberalism to focus more 
on the text itself than its reception. As Terry Eagleton notes, literary theories of the 
reader and reader reception have long played second fiddle to textual analysis, despite 
the fact that literature is meaningless if not for the reader’s interaction with it (64). This 
chapter seeks to begin to fill that gap by turning to the subject of consumption or 
reception, the follow-up to artistic production in Theodor Adorno’s concerns over the 
commodification of aesthetics. Within the context of contemporary neoliberalism, I trace 
how reception and, more specifically, reading are often rendered as forms of 
consumerism, but I consider two novels that show how reception is also a politically 
significant act. Alejandro Zambra’s Multiple Choice (Facsímil) and Samanta 
Schweblin’s Fever Dream (Distancia de rescate) are two experimental novels chiefly 
invested in querying what readerly reception becomes within neoliberalism by telling 
stories about the reception of neoliberalism itself. Each narrative envisions in different 
ways how the reception of neoliberalism becomes a creative and even communal event 
where readers work together to establish new forms of knowledge that critique the 
damaging work of neoliberal ideology. By doing this, Zambra and Schweblin also create 
stories that invite the reader’s participation, a move that places them within a long 




American writers—Jorge Luis Borges, Julio Cortázar, Gabriel García Márquez, and 
Carlos Fuentes, among others. Similar to the aforementioned scholars, I read Zambra 
and Schweblin as using their texts to experiment with genre in ways that interrogate the 
work of neoliberalism within their specific cultural contexts, but with the added caveat 
that both Zambra and Schweblin’s novels produce a meta-reflection over what reception 
becomes within neoliberalism. 
I choose these recent Latin American novels because they come from specific 
transnational neoliberal contexts. Zambra is from Chile and Schweblin is from 
Argentina, two nations that have complicated, brutal histories with the transnational 
export and forced importation of neoliberalism via the installation of right-wing 
dictatorships, and these histories inform the content and form of each novel.1 For 
instance, Zambra writes Multiple Choice as a standardized test, copying the form of the 
exam he was required to take while living under Augusto Pinochet’s regime. The novel 
presents literature and reading as wholly saturated by the neoliberalization of education 
and knowledge, yet it also plays with the form of the standardized test to show how 
social and cultural meaning can be experimented with in the multiple choices open to the 
reader with each question. Zambra’s parodying form breaks the fourth wall frequently to 
address the reader with the questions or answers, and this encourages collaborative 
meaning-making by revising the form of the standardized test, recasting its monolithic 
authority, and turning it into a space that critiques how neoliberal policies have affected 
 
1 Though Argentina and Chile have similar starting points for the growth of neoliberalism in their nations, 
their paths have diverged in the past 40 years. Tomás Undurraga explains how capitalism has developed a 
stronger hegemonic hold in Chile than in Argentina in “Neoliberalism in Argentina and Chile: Common 




Chilean communities. Yet even as Zambra explores these possibilities, he 
simultaneously casts doubt over how politically significant a reader’s agency is. 
Schweblin constructs Fever Dream as a neoliberal horror story, where the effects 
of corporate agribusiness in Argentina play out in frightening ways. As the main 
characters, David and Amanda, try to pinpoint the moment Amanda was poisoned by 
agrichemicals on a soy farm, the novel interrogates the form of neoliberalism itself and 
how it affects the way stories are told. I contend Schweblin uses the characters’ 
interpretations to query what it means to represent neoliberalism in artistic form as well 
as how to read it. It is telling that Amanda and David disagree over what the most 
important moment is surrounding her poisoning and, therefore, how her story should be 
constructed through the act of interpretation. Through Amanda and David’s 
collaborative reconstruction of Amanda’s poisoning, they query what the most 
significant part of a neoliberal story is. Fever Dream, then, eschews the notion that 
reading is primarily a consumptive act; instead, it prefigures the ontological immediacy 
of the interpretive community that reading can offer—that is, reading with others is vital 
to making sense of our movement and being in a world dominated by neoliberalism. 
Before turning to the novels, I first consider how the ubiquity of neoliberal 
ideology has reshaped our understanding of consumerism broadly and reading practices 
specifically. On the one hand, these changes re-entrench preexisting assumptions about 
what the “right” forms of literature are (i.e., genres of high distinction, texts that 
translate into the most lucrative forms of cultural capital). Given neoliberalism’s often-
totalizing reach, an individual’s interpretive engagement with art is certainly not immune 




is facilitated by its status as a commodity, artistic reception unavoidably is consumptive 
to an extent. Neoliberal ideology positions consumption as one exercise of the freedom 
of choice to participate in the market; therefore, artistic reception can also be 
conceptualized as a form of self-investment, part of the entrepreneurial spirit that drives 
economic subjects to increase their social worth by engaging with the cultural capital 
that art offers.2 On the other hand, I consider how more traditional theories of reception 
from the likes of Wolfgang Iser, Roland Barthes, and Stanley Fish both confirm and 
complicate certain neoliberal values. Particularly salient for this study is Fish’s 
consideration that reception most successfully and productively takes place within a 
community of collaboration, a claim that challenges the neoliberal emphasis on 
individualistic self-investment.  
That is to say, while literature and reading can certainly lend themselves to the 
work of propping up homo oeconomicus, literary reception and interpretation are not 
totalized in such a way, either. It is the latter possibility I consider through my 
examination of Zambra and Schweblin, both of whom, I argue, depict how artistic 
 
2 While there is little consensus over the extent to which the economy has influence on culture (and vis-a-
versa), it has long been understood that artistic reception is caught within the work of the market’s 
influence. On the one hand, to view or read art is to consume, which is to say that the viewer or reader is 
on the receiving end of the processes of literary production by purchasing or exchanging art. In this sense, 
to be a reader is just one of many behaviors that contribute to the makeup of homo oeconomicus. On the 
other hand, as noted in chapter two with Mohsin Hamid’s How to Get Filthy Rich in Rising Asia, reading 
also carries the potential of enabling the reader to participate in the work of literary production. To 
consume is also to produce in a creative and collaborative manner, not merely to use up what one has 
purchased. The discourse surrounding the “cultural economy,” initially rooted in Adorno and Pierre 
Bourdieu’s theoretical arguments, has since spawned a diverse conversation across academic disciplines. 
For arguments over whether culture has a greater effect on the economy or vice versa, see Paul du Gay and 
Michael Pryke, Cultural Economy: Cultural Analysis and Commercial Life and Andy C. Pratt, “Beyond 
Resilience: Learning from the Cultural Economy.” Others have called for a return to Bourdieu’s work on 
the classist function of taste within artistic reception; see Sarah Hinde and Jane Dixon, “Reinstating Pierre 
Bourdieu’s Contribution to Cultural Economy Theorizing.” More recently, Carolyn Hardin has argued that 
disciplinary methods from cultural studies would be beneficial in helping the academy better understand 
the political work of financial activity; see “The Politics of Finance: Cultural Economy, Cultural Studies 




reception is itself a politically significant response to neoliberalism. In both Multiple 
Choice and Fever Dream, reception is distinct from actual reading in the sense that the 
characters in each novel are not reading books; however, they are engaging with and 
trying to make sense of the effects of neoliberalism, meaning that neoliberalism becomes 
the text itself that is received and interpreted in these narratives. For Zambra, reading is 
an act of collaborative meaning-making predicated on playful experimentation with 
artistic form that invites the reader to participate. For Schweblin, reading is a catalyst for 
political action where the reader is encouraged to dissect and critique the violence of 
neoliberalism. In both novels, the writers’ experimentation with genre is the vehicle for 
such political critique. 
 
Literary Reception and Consumerism within Neoliberalism 
Cultural concerns over artistic reception and genre have long been tied together within 
the world of literature, where the kind of literature one reads has often been viewed as a 
cultural source for economic and social self-betterment. Since the early eighteenth 
century, people in middle and upper classes have been encouraged to fill their ever-
increasing leisure time with more refined hobbies, ones taken up with the arts and “polite 
literature” (Woodmansee 88). By that, critics meant books that led the reader to a deeper 
“reflection and meditation,” not genres devoted to “entertainment and diversion” 
(Woodmansee 90). The concern was that such middle- or lowbrow reading would lead to 
numerous books being consumed, but few actually digested and absorbed.3 A person’s 
 
3 For more on the great “reading debate” (90) of the 1700s in Germany, see Woodmansee, The Author, 
Art, and the Market: Rereading the History of Aesthetics (specifically chapter four). Historically, there has 




reading selections, then, have the potential to become a weighty cultural signifier of 
social status, both in terms of how readers think of themselves and how others view 
those readers. It is plain to see, then, that reading (and its cultural and economic 
significance via its connection to consumerist concerns) is not some new development 
and, therefore, cannot be attributed to the rise of neoliberal ideology. However, the 
extent to which reading and reception are regarded as possessing cultural importance 
help to lend them as ready participants in the neoliberal drive to economize and 
commodify nearly all aspects of life. Indeed, sociologists and literary theorists note how 
both consumerism and reading practices have become neoliberalized in unique ways, 
which are important arguments to take into consideration.  
One way that contemporary forms of consumerism bolster different aspects of 
neoliberal ideology is visible in the rise of the “enterprising consumer,” a figure that is 
markedly entrepreneurial, competitive, and happy to demonstrate these characteristics in 
                                                                                                                                           
the process of using goods is entirely different from the processes that produced those goods. Janice A. 
Radway argues that this mistaken view stems from the original meaning and use of the word consumption: 
“to refer to fire or to other destructive natural forces which annihilated the elements upon which they 
acted” (“Reading” 8). The problem here, especially in relation to consuming literature, is that reading is 
rarely a one-time event that leaves the physical materials of the book exhausted. Given the sheer number 
of used bookstores in the US alone, reading is certainly not consumptive in the original sense of the word, 
since a physical copy of a book lives on long after it has been read once, twice, or even three times. Yet 
even so, “the metaphor [of reading-as-consuming] has been taken too literally,” and within this 
misunderstanding, Radway locates the war waged over which books count as “serious” literature and 
which ones are regarded as nothing more than mindless entertainment (“Reading” 9). The well-worn idea 
here is that mass-produced texts are less nourishing in light of how they lend themselves to being quickly 
consumed because of their subject matter—romance, mystery/thriller, horror, etc. 
The anxieties over the act of reading and, more importantly reading the “right” kinds of literature 
have been covered extensively, especially in regards to early US history. See Steven Fink and Susan S. 
Williams, Reciprocal Influences: Literary Production, Distribution, and Consumption in America; Carl F. 
Kaestle and Janice A Radway, Print in Motion: The Expansion of Publishing and Reading in the United 
States, 1880-1940; Barbara Ryan and Amy M. Thomas, Reading Acts: U.S. Readers’ Interactions with 
Literature, 1800-1950; and Ronald J. Zboray, A Fictive People: Antebellum Economic Development and 
the American Reading Public. This is a debate that continues today in a broader context among more 
“elite” literary figures as well as, notably, within the general public: see Arthur Krystal, “Easy Writers”; 
Lev Grossman, “Literary Revolution in the Supermarket Aisle: Genre Fiction Is Disruptive Technology”; 
Joshua Rothman, “A Better Way to Think about the Genre Debate”; and Neil Gaiman and Kazuo 




the public sphere (Brooks and Wee 218). This specific form of homo oeconomicus is 
predicated on an “achievement model” of consumption (Brooks and Wee 221), where 
the consumer’s success is something to be celebrated. Further, new forms of consumer 
citizenship, what are known as relationship management marketing (RMM) or “cause 
marketing,” are promoted in business schools, where the consumer’s purchasing power 
is presented as simultaneously capable of benefiting social causes (Cabrera and Williams 
350). What makes RMM neoliberal is its appeal to the responsibility of consumers while 
also promoting the idea that their participation in the free market will generate broader 
social change (Cabrera and Williams 351).4 These contemporary forms of consumerism 
fit within Michel Foucault’s conceptualization of neoliberal governmentality, where the 
emphasis on governing the self replaces the governance of the population, what Foucault 
terms “conducting the conduct” of others (186). Sam Binkley, however, argues that 
consumerism within neoliberalism is never so cleanly mapped, since the “economic 
 
4 There are significant possible consequences with this type of consumer citizenship, given its highly 
individualized structure compared to an older Keynesian model that took the larger social good as its 
focus: 
This neoliberal model of consumer citizenship has potentially disastrous implications for 
a democratic society. Because businesses privilege the social concerns of wealthy and 
elite consumers, society will never address issues such as stable employment, living 
wages, and universal health care. Under the regime of neoliberal consumer citizenship, 
these issues can enter the public agenda only if they become the concerns of profitable 
customers, which is unlikely granted their privileged position in a class stratified society. 
(Cabrera and Williams 363) 
Not all agree with Cabrera and Williams’ negative assessment, though. Kim Humphrey tracks the “deep 
political ambiguities of ethical consumption” that can form “an opposition to the neoliberal,” though 
admittedly in “largely incremental” ways (99). Roopali Mukherjee and Sarah Banet-Weiser contend that, 
though consumer activism may be a byproduct of neoliberalism, it does not mean that political efficacy 
and consumerism have to be diametrically opposed (13). Henry Jenkins also notes how culture jamming 
has evolved into forms of “fan activism” that have been successfully “deployed toward explicitly political 
ends” (147). Similarly, Rob Shields argues that consumers can challenge power systems through their 
buying habits, to the point that consumption becomes an active process where both the self and society are 
created via the consumer’s appropriation of different styles and codes that turns into something else 
entirely; see “Spaces for the Subject of Consumption.” See also Steven Miles, “The Neoliberal City and 
the Pro-Active Complicity of the Citizen Consumer”; Sally Robinson, Authenticity Guaranteed: 
Masculinity and the Rhetoric of Anti-Consumerism in American Culture; and Colin C. Williams, A 




objectives plotted by market researchers and finance ministers” cannot accurately 
explain how consumers are motivated or motivate themselves as rational, responsibilized 
subjects (351). Binkley suggests this is because the mentalities and habits that govern an 
individual’s purchasing ability are often less regimented than any concept of 
governmentality might hypothesize, what with the “expressive and ephemeral 
dispositions” involved in poor credit, impulse buys, and taking on unnecessary risk 
(352). Consumerism is less “instrumentally ordered” and more “playful,” a process 
encouraged by the seeming separation of consumption from production (Binkley 353). 
Risk, however, is not outside the purview of governmentalities, since taking on risk is a 
key component of the contemporary financial landscape. Even if, as Binkley argues, 
theories of governmentality fail to accurately account for the logics of consumption, the 
neoliberal logic of responsibilization still remains and explains away the consumer’s 
loose spending as a lack of self-control, the failure to successfully conduct his/her own 
conduct. 
Beyond the broad scope of consumerism, others have argued how literary 
reception itself has been neoliberalized. Rachel Greenwald Smith observes how certain 
assumptions we carry about what literature can “do” mirror neoliberal social 
expectations, such as the belief that literature is most meaningful because of the 
“affective hypothesis” surrounding it (i.e., that reading stories of others’ personal 
experiences can increase our compassion and empathy) (2). Smith contends this 
hypothesis is specifically neoliberal because it responsibilizes the reader as an 
entrepreneur of the self who is “strategically networking” their feelings in different 




neoliberalism, emotions and what one does with them become “resources to develop and 
manage,” and feelings then turn into “yet another material foundation for market-
oriented behavior” (Smith 6). Smith’s points echo the eighteenth-century mindset 
surrounding the worthwhile nature of reading that Woodmansee describes. However, 
Smith adds that reading is no longer just a hobby or discipline in the twenty-first century 
that, if the right titles and genres are consumed, helps signpost one’s belonging in a 
certain socioeconomic class; reception becomes a kind of discipline to manage, like 
stocks in a portfolio of the self. Reading becomes more than a marker of social class; it 
also has the potential to mark a social conscience. This is yet another example of 
neoliberal self-conduct that helps place and map the economic subject, and it is why 
Smith rejects Jameson’s argument that artistic reception helps people locate themselves 
within the massive map of global capitalism’s reach so as to better establish agency 
within it. For Jameson, art enables a person to understand at least some of the capitalist 
space they live within and to then critically interrogate it (“Cognitive” 349). He calls for 
formalist experimentation to aid the viewer or reader’s cognitive mapping, while others 
have called for a mapping of affective experience of the reader.5 Smith argues, though, 
that both forms of mapping still play into neoliberalism’s responsibilization of subjects. 
Individuals are now bombarded with all kinds of information, data, and content that 
encourage “the cultivation of subjects who can locate themselves” within a system and 
then “make smart entrepreneurial decisions” (Smith 78).6 
 
5 See Jonathan Flatley, Affective Mapping: Melancholia and the Politics of Modernism. 
6 For example, some writers’ attempts to metatextually reveal their role behind the curtain as the author are 
not as successful as we may think because they are simultaneously “emotionally absorptive”; texts like 
these “[mirror] the neoliberal dynamics of agency by appearing to offer freedom from the constraints of 




This idea that one’s connection with literature can help to cultivate a certain 
refined and cultured version of the self has long been part of general attitudes toward 
reading. Pierre Bourdieu famously argues that “consumers of cultural goods, and their 
taste for them, are produced” (1), the implication being that the reception of a material 
good, such as a work of art, plays a significant role in shaping how we understand the 
consumer. Therefore, two processes of production take place when art is consumed: the 
initial production of the artwork itself but, more than that, the reception or consumption 
of that artwork also produces an end-product—the recipient or consumer. Bourdieu 
identifies significant social stakes within the struggle Woodmansee describes. The 
dispute over highbrow versus lowbrow literature is tantamount to a clash over what 
constitutes “cultural nobility” (Bourdieu 2). Within this dispute is the clear potential for 
a classist divide, which Bourdieu strongly criticizes, and he specifically lambastes the 
postmodern turn toward “art which imitates art” (3). While others argue that such art can 
be read as a response to and even protest of the pervasive effect of late capitalism on 
culture, as discussed in chapter two, Bourdieu suggests this critique could be lost on the 
reader or viewer. This is because self-referential art has a deep sense of its own history, 
and an informed engagement with that art necessitates an understanding of that artistic 
history. The so-called “naïve spectator” potentially will not have the “cultural 
competence” to grasp what artists are doing with their art—for a variety of reasons: lack 
of education, cultural difference, or fewer economic opportunities (Bourdieu 4). 
                                                                                                                                           





Bourdieu seems to suggest that some people lack the intellectual capacity to 
comprehend what an artist is doing in a self-reflexive artwork, a claim we should regard 
with skepticism. Yet at the same time, his point that a culturally normative respect for 
high forms of art can increase social and classist divisions is worth remembering, for a 
key aspect of this classist divide is simply one of access, where many people do not have 
sustained “contact with works of art” (Bourdieu 4).7 Bourdieu’s data analysis confirmed 
that upper classes do have the educational and financial means to appreciate and 
understand art about art, while working classes prefer art that is more representational 
and about the “ordinary circumstances of life” (5). Behind this separation in artistic taste 
is a chiefly economic rationale. High art invites and encourages a “pure gaze” that 
“give[s] primacy to that of which the artist is master”—issues of form or style and how 
they have changed throughout the centuries (Bourdieu 3). Therefore, hyperreal art about 
art rarely deals with day-to-day experiences and conflicts that someone from the 
working class might know all too well. This pure gaze—of the artist and the privileged 
receiving audience—is supremely ironic in that it distances itself from the world because 
of the desire to avoid feeling the terror of economic necessity; this distancing effect is 
most apparent in the aestheticization of common objects and practices—clothes, 
cooking, etc.—which can divest them of their useful function (Bourdieu 5).8 The 
 
7 It is worth noting here that John Fiske argues that these classist debates quickly turn from the political to 
the personal by becoming more about the subjects in each social division or class to the point that “critical 
discrimination” carries “a dimension of social discrimination” (103). 
8 As a contemporary example, consider how the Western demand for the “super-food” quinoa has had a 
negative effect on indigenous Latin American communities that can no longer afford the rising prices of a 
crop that has long been a staple part of their diets. See Timothy Keen, “The Battle for Quinoa: The 




creation and pursuit of taste, then, creates a tension in artistic reception across classes 
between style and function, luxury and necessity. 
What Bourdieu’s research helps to clarify is how there is an attendant economic 
value to certain forms of literature, a value that is economic because of how it quickly 
translates into cultural forms of class distinction. Though Bourdieu does not reference or 
pretend to be studying neoliberal ideology, we can understand his arguments on cultural 
forms of distinction and the cultivation of taste via one’s reading choices as correlating 
to certain neoliberal values. Indeed, similar to what Smith describes, Bourdieu notes how 
literature itself becomes a form of self-investment, a way to distinguish oneself from 
those who are not well read. Within both Bourdieu’s arguments and a neoliberal 
approach to the socio-cultural significance of reading, there is the implicit understanding 
that literature “does” something for the reader. This conviction is also at the heart of 
reception theory, but the difference between its approach to reading and a neoliberal 
rendering of reading is how reception theory stresses the importance of the reader’s 
agency and social situation while interpreting texts. In other words, the political 
significance of reading is at the forefront of reception theory, not its economic import. 
Reception theorists, that is, do not understand the reception of literature as an investment 
in homo oeconomicus, but as an act that further places oneself within society. To 
reference Anna Kornbluh’s assessment of literature, mentioned earlier in chapter one, 
reception is an engagement with that which is immanently critical, since literature 
imagines alternative social possibilities. 
Which types of literature—highbrow, lowbrow, or experimental genres—are best 




often disagree over. For instance, Wolfgang Iser argues that, in order for readers to make 
sense of what they are reading, they have to be familiar with either the literary 
conventions or “prevailing codes” specific to the text that determine how its meaning is 
produced, codes that are rooted in forms of social knowledge (29). Iser claims that the 
most compelling literature is the kind that helps readers become critically perceptive to 
the way they are constituted and informed by these social codes. Literature can help 
readers identify and question certain cultural assumptions they hold onto when “gaps” or 
“blanks” in the text encourage them to see “familiar reality with new eyes” and thereby 
question the automaticity of different norms and mores (Iser 169, 181). The hypothesis 
here is that literature is capable of changing readers, of bringing their assumptions to 
light for productive scrutiny, but some of Iser’s points are not as socially progressive as 
they seem. As Terry Eagleton notes, Iser describes how “the act of reading produces a 
kind of human subject which it also presupposes”—one who does not hold tightly to 
ideological convictions, is already open to questioning traditional values, and is then 
“simply returned to himself or herself as a more thoroughly liberal subject” (69). Thus, 
Iser’s arguments put forth a “closed unity” that confirms Bourdieu’s reservations about 
artistic reception because Iser describes how the reader who would be most deeply 
moved by a work of literature is the reader who already possesses the critical and 
interpretive skills necessary to identify when a literary work properly conforms to 
standard conventions (Eagleton 69). Literature in this vein is little more than self-
congratulatory, helping the reader to feel good about his preexisting progressive values. 
That “closedness of the circuit” involving a reader and a text mirrors the cultural 




certain kinds of texts and readers need apply” (Eagleton 70). Thus, Iser’s theory of 
reception is one that largely preserves an elitist status quo.9 
In contrast to Iser, Roland Barthes claims the only socially consequential 
literature that moves the reader is the kind that cannot be accounted for by a 
“hermeneutics based on the exclusive search for the signified” (Pleasure 39). 
Hermeneutical analyses such as these run the risk of confirming the older social codes 
Iser describes. Rather than reading books that “continually repeat the same structure, the 
same meaning” over and over, literature that captures the “bliss” of “the erotics of the 
New” is what will truly encourage the reader to see the world in different ways (Barthes, 
Pleasure 40). These kinds of books would confound the cultured reader who is 
dependent on literary conventions, and Barthes suggests alternative forms of social and 
cultural meaning most forcefully come to the reader in letting go, in joyfully exulting in 
the playfulness and slipperiness of language. This theory of the untethered reader, 
however, also suffers from classist assumptions of a different shade than Iser’s. Eagleton 
notes that while Iser’s theories were more normative, Barthes conceptualizes “a private, 
asocial, essentially anarchic experience” (72). The problem here is that both Iser and 
Barthes “ignore the position of the reader in history” by too often hypothesizing 
 
9 Jean-Paul Sartre argues, however, in What Is Literature? that this form of address or understanding 
between the author and reader is difficult to avoid. A book’s reception is not somehow outside of the text 
but, rather, is part of its very construction, since writers produce their work with potential readers in mind 
or, at the very least, have their potential audience predetermined for them because of the language in 




reception as if readers “encounter texts in a void,” when in fact their readings will be 
impacted by their social and historical circumstances (Eagleton 72).10  
It is more likely that readers occupy portions of ground within both Iser and 
Barthes’ conceptualizations—that is, being a socially-constructed reader and an agential 
maker of meaning. Stanley Fish explores these possibilities, claiming there is no such 
thing as an “objective and self-contained text”; instead, he focuses on the act of reading 
itself and describes a text as “the basic data of the meaning experience” (22). By this, 
Fish means to underscore how there is “no direct relationship between the meaning of a 
sentence … and what its words mean” (32). In a literal sense, he is correct. The various 
lines, dots, and slashes that comprise words are little more than arbitrary shapes that 
carry zero objective meaning; the fact that they possess any meaning to a reader’s eyes at 
all owes to what we as a society have agreed upon over time. But it is precisely that 
social significance of arbitrary markings that causes Fish to also fall in line with Iser. 
Though Fish does not share Iser’s view that texts carry any objective social meaning, he 
does note, more so than Barthes, how the reader is socially situated. Therefore, Fish’s 
claim that a text does not possess any meaning until a reader interacts with it is not 
tantamount to an interpretive free-for-all. His assertion that “interpretive strategies” are 
not “arising” from a text but, rather, are “making” a text still leaves room for the 
influence of social norms on the reader (168). Indeed, this is why “interpretive 
communities” share similar approaches to interpretation, for “these strategies exist prior 
to the act of reading and therefore determine the shape of what is read rather than, as is 
 
10 Hans Robert Jauss more closely attends to the social and historical situatedness of texts by articulating 
how literature exists within a specific historical context, but that its reception—the “changing horizon of 




usually assumed, the other way around” (Fish 171). The wild playfulness of Barthes’ 
theory is not actually feasible, since the reader that meets a text and creates meaning in 
the act of reading is still a “social construct whose operations are delimited by the 
systems of intelligibility that inform it” (Fish 335).11 Therefore, while we could read T. 
S. Eliot’s The Waste Land in a supremely unorthodox manner, Fish suggests it is 
unlikely to happen because of the different social apparatuses that influence our 
interpretive strategies before we ever encounter the text. Interpretation remains, as 
Eagleton puts it, a “constrained affair,” since the self remains governed by a fairly stable 
set of social practices that are not so easily cast off (75).12 
These arguments complicate some of Bourdieu’s claims about artistically-rooted 
classism, for while a reader’s social situation does affect how he/she receives a text, 
Fish’s arguments suggest that the genre of a narrative and its high or low quality does 
not keep reception from being its own agential act of meaning-making. Similarly, 
Jameson argues that we should not read the downturn in representational art as a loss of 
objects, but as a “local failure” of language (Postmodernism 137). It is a breakdown that 
reveals how the connection between words and things is losing its particularity. Jameson 
is referring here to the work of poststructuralism that questions just how successful the 
work of representation in art can be. Specifically in relation to literature, language’s 
limited ability to represent reality provides two productive possibilities: Hegel’s, who 
suggests we can now turn our thoughts toward new concepts of “universal” meaning; or, 
the nouveau roman’s, where art embarks on a perpetual deconstruction of signification 
 
11 For similar arguments about the process of negotiation the reader enacts and enters, see Stuart Hall, 
“Encoding, Decoding.” 
12 Yağmur Demir traces the nuanced differences between these theorists’ various concepts of the reader. 




that turns “the sign itself into a mere image” (Jameson, Postmodernism 139). Granted, 
the latter does lead to a greater specialization of reading, viewing, or interpreting, which 
is precisely the subject of Bourdieu’s lament, but Jameson does not view this shift as 
necessarily classist. While high art’s eschewal of traditional uses of referentiality and 
chronology may not appeal to the masses, that is not the same as saying these art forms 
are removed from reality. If anything, they are inherently truer to life because the 
jumbled patchwork and collage of seemingly disparate images and noise “fulfills the 
present” by providing “new equipment for registering the raw material of everyday life”; 
this means the postmodern artist endeavors to teach viewers how to read the present by 
giving them “an index of [art’s] democratic accessibility” (Jameson, Postmodernism 
145). As a result, an artist “renders reception (or consumption) indistinguishable from 
production” (Jameson, Postmodernism 146). Jameson’s point here is significantly 
different from Bourdieu’s. While Bourdieu asserts that the act of consuming a product 
produces a consumer, Jameson claims that art about art invites the viewer into the 
production process. In other words, to consume is not to be produced; to consume is to 
produce, to participate in the artwork’s continued creation of meaning. This is why 
Jameson pictures artistic reception as possessing an inherently “democratic 
accessibility,” and it is a progressive faith shared by Fish—that our interpretations of 
texts happen best within a communal context. Though art about art does not give readers 
the easy option of “instant recognition” that more realistic or representational forms of 
art tend to offer (Postmodernism 146), the key takeaway for Jameson here is that art 
becomes less passive.13 
 




I argue, however, that the agential potential of reception is not so straightforward 
within neoliberalism today because of the ways, noted earlier, that literary reception and 
consumerism have changed as neoliberalism has spread. Jameson’s identification of the 
democratic possibilities of consumerist reception are overstated; after all, the 
postmodern shift in artistic form and content is also evidence of art’s further co-optation 
by late capitalism, an argument Jameson himself makes. This is evidenced by literary 
markets, where readers are often targeted in ways that further economize literature and 
its profitability. For instance, cultural and economic apparatuses such as best-seller lists 
are quite effective at manufacturing consumer taste, given the different creative and 
manipulative means an author or publisher can take to land their book on one of those 
lucrative lists.14 Then again, the commercialization of cultural enterprises does not 
always have negative social consequences. As a reading public grows, the cultural elite 
can potentially have its values challenged by long-excluded or marginalized social 
groups (Miller, Reluctant 7). Specifically, adjustments to methods of commercialization 
generate different types of consumers, one of them being the “citizen consumer” who 
makes a determined effort to turn “consumption into a political act” that resists some of 
capitalism’s more harmful work (Miller, Reluctant 17). These consumers view their 
purchasing power as existing within a larger set of “moral principles,” which makes their 
consumption less about what they can get out of it and more attentive instead to “public 
                                                                                                                                           
not “a useful vehicle for their imaginative experience.” Democratic though its potential may be, it can 
often be off-putting. Explaining postmodern art’s structure as “play” does not necessarily make it anymore 
appealing, what with the extent to which “leisure is as commodified as work” (Postmodernism 147). 
14 Laura J. Miller notes how the best-seller list has become a proven method to increase profits around 
specific titles; see “The Best-Seller List as Marketing Tool and Historical Fiction.” It is worth noting, 
however, Mark Fidelman’s findings that websites like Goodreads with their recommendation algorithms 




outcomes” (Miller, Reluctant 200).15 But I contend that even this citizen consumer is 
fashioned by—and formulated as a response to—the growth of a market-driven culture 
that becomes not a monolith to resist but, rather, the basis from which to build a social 
identity that works within the system instead of outside of it. In this sense, culture 
appears to be at the beck and call of the economy, less of an antagonistic relationship 
and more one of capitalist complicity. 
Yet, at the same time, we must be careful not to approach consumerism, reading, 
and reception in such a way that accords a homogenous, totalizing reach to neoliberal 
ideology, which is one of the mistakes that Smith makes. Her dour assessment of 
neoliberalism’s totalizing reach merits questioning, for there are certainly ways in which 
the novel form and readers’ reception of it forms a space of substantive political critique. 
For example, Leigh Claire La Berge and Quinn Slobodian assert that Smith’s account 
runs the risk of furthering the act of “reading as neoliberals” instead of “reading for 
neoliberalism” (611). Since the market is “only one of a range” of systems, we should 
embrace a critical approach that seeks to identify how people do not fully fit the concept 
of homo oeconomicus (La Berge and Slobodian 609).16 There is space within literary 
 
15 See also Ted Striphas, The Late Age of Print: Everyday Book Culture from Consumerism to Control. 
Similar to Miller, Kim Becnel argues in The Rise of Corporate Publishing and Its Effects on Authorship in 
Early Twentieth-Century America that corporate publishing, at least in the US, should not be read as only 
“corrupt[ing] or dilut[ing] art and literature,” but also as “facilitat[ing] communication” by helping to 
introduce new writers to readers (2). Ann Haugland disagrees, describing the 1980s as moment in book 
publishing when the emphasis of importance shifted from the literary merit of a book’s content to whether 
or not a book could sell. Using The New York Times Book Review as her sample size, Haugland finds that 
the editors attempt to “uphold the standards of literary culture” while simultaneously having to fulfill 
“commercial obligations” and review less “serious” texts that sell well, like mystery thrillers (796). 
16 La Berge and Slobodian identify the method of “surface reading” put forth by Stephen Best and Sharon 
Marcus as an effective strategy for reading for neoliberalism. While such a critical approach could 
certainly miss some of the fetishized aspects of neoliberal capitalism’s work, its contention that even on 
the surface texts bear witness to certain truths about contemporary life is worth remembering when 
psychoanalytic and Marxist literary approaches have long maintained that a text’s meaning is necessarily 




texts, as well as our reception of them, to understand the limits of neoliberalism’s 
hegemony and call attention to it. While literary reception can certainly be understood 
within the economic bounds of consumerism, there is something more at work than the 
mere exchange of material commodities. People and their various actions—including the 
act of reading—do not perfectly fit into neoliberal conceptualizations of the economic 
subject. To regard them in such a way is dangerously reductive. 
Indeed, there are ways that literary reception does not fit within neoliberal values 
and ideals, and literary scholars have found this to be true of more middlebrow or 
lowbrow texts. Genres that seem to be targeted primarily toward readers’ self-interests or 
entertainment—self-help books and romance novels, respectively—actually help readers 
locate themselves within a community in profound ways.17 These findings question the 
assumption that only more cultured, “serious,” or highbrow forms of literature lead 
readers to undertake thoughtful critical inquiry. Though one could certainly read a self-
help book or romance novel in a self-indulgent manner, these texts are not automatically 
 
17 For example, Debra Grodin’s research about self-help books and female readers identifies a paradox: 
While reading self-help books is inherently a “private act,” it also “offers contact with a community of 
others who are not easily accessed in everyday discourse” (405). In fact, many of Grodin’s interview 
subjects took issue with passages in self-help books that encouraged a form of individualism or striking it 
out on one’s own, since few believed that independence and happiness were directly correlated (413). 
What many of the women believed was that taking ownership of one’s life meant putting more work into 
relationships and their community (Grodin 414). While self-help books certainly contain language geared 
toward the reader working on improving the self, Grodin’s interviewees also carried “a sense of the self as 
socially constructed through contact with others who have similar problems” (416). Reading, in this 
instance, helps create a more intimate form of Benedict Anderson’s “imagined communities,” only here 
the belief is specifically that one belongs to a wider network of people who also understand what it means 
to be a divorcee, widow, recovering addict, etc. 
Similarly, Radway’s research has challenged sexist and gendered assumptions about romance 
novels and book clubs, showing how they successfully function as communal spaces where readers can 
critique and question patriarchal society and its values. See A Feeling for Books: The Book-of-the-Month 
Club, Literary Taste, and Middle-Class Desire and Reading the Romance: Women, Patriarchy, and 
Popular Literature. For additional arguments on specific examples of how Book-of-the-Month clubs carry 
significant political potential, see Elizabeth Long, “The Cultural Meaning of Concentration in Publishing” 
and Joan Shelley Rubin, The Making of Middlebrow Culture (specifically the third chapter). Caroline J. 
Smith also argues that the dismissal of “chick lit” in literary studies misses the significant critique of 




disclosed from initiating substantive cultural critique that happens within the context of 
an interpretive community. These findings challenge the belief, visible as far back as the 
late 1700s, that certain genres of literature are not culturally beneficial, and they also 
correspond with Fish’s arguments that reading is not passive but, rather, an inherently 
creative act that produces culturally significant forms of meaning. In other words, our 
understanding of reception needs to remain open to the possibility that genres often 
dismissed for their ostensible lack of critical capacity or genres that bend or play with 
certain formalist expectations can have political significance. This, as Lyn Hejinian 
notes, is the power of the “open text,” which “invites participation, rejects the authority 
of the writer over the reader and thus, by analogy, the authority implicit in other (social, 
economic, cultural) hierarchies” (43). Literary reception produces “subsequent 
compositions” that preserve the text’s content from becoming fixed or static; therefore, 
“it resists reduction and commodification” (Hejinian 43). 
Zambra and Schweblin’s novels that experiment with genre contribute to these 
ideas by providing a meta-reflection on the work of reception itself. Multiple Choice and 
Fever Dream consider various aspects of neoliberalism’s effect in Chile and Argentina, 
respectively, and tackle the issue through wildly different generic conventions. Both 
remain open texts that cannot be easily reduced to a cohesive, homogenous meaning due 
to their complexity and difficulty. But they are not closed off from readers; instead, their 
narratives invite readers into the creative process. As a standardized test, Multiple 
Choice turns the reader into the test-taker, and Fever Dream, playing as it does with the 
conventions of the horror genre, asks the reader to be watchful for the imperceptible 




Schweblin each pose formalist questions over what exactly the nature, shape, and 
function of literature should be within cultural contexts whose history involves 
neoliberal dictatorships and toxic agribusiness, which makes their writing quite different 
in comparison to the rich legacy of Latin American authors that precede them.18 Indeed, 
an emphasis on locating or recuperating a Latin American identity or cultural heritage is 
not to be found here, which Brett Levinson notes has long been part of the Latin 
American literary tradition. The “uncanny presence of origins,” not their loss, but their 
stubborn persistence despite instances of violence or dislocation are a subject of 
significant focus for mid- and late-20th-century writers (Levinson, Ends 17, emphasis in 
original). It is an identity of “convergence,” the perpetual cultural “changeover” from 
indigeneity to colonialism to dictatorship to democracy (Levinson, Ends 18).19 But 
Zambra and Schweblin are more interested in the after-effects of neoliberalism’s 
dominance in their respective cultures. Not that neoliberalism is somehow over or has 
exhausted itself, but Multiple Choice and Fever Dream examine in different ways how it 
imbues their generation and contemporary life with certain unavoidable experiences and 
 
18 Some Latin American literary scholars are beginning to return to the question of form, eschewing the 
tendency for political questions to overshadow an attentiveness to the meaning of individual works 
themselves. This shift is recognizable in the recent creation of the journal Forma, as well as within the 
work of Héctor Hoyos (Beyond Bolaño: The Global Latin American Novel), Alessandro Fornazzari 
(Speculative Fictions: Chilean Culture, Economics, and the Neoliberal Transition), and Emilio Sauri 
(Crisis and Modernism: Culture, Economy, and Form in Twentieth-Century U.S. and Latin American 
Literature). 
19 Levinson suggests that the many Latin American treatments of identity are driven by the effort to 
“transpose the limit of the subject … into the being beyond translation” (Ends 25)—that is, into a figure 
that encapsulates the myriad historical shifts and transitions that Latin American cultures have 
experienced. Levinson asserts, then, that translation itself is a “proper name … an identity” (Ends 25). The 
effort, then, is to create “a language for the boundary or intersection between domains of sense” (Ends 25-
26). What this means is that “the contrary of poiesis, therefore, is … common sense” where all forms of 
social convention combine to build a shared cultural understanding (Ends 26). This disruption of common 
sense, Levinson suggests, is why Latin American literature has relied on Magical Realism as a narrative 
mode for so long, since it clarifies “Latin American history … itself as incapable of accounting for its own 




conflicts. For Zambra, that dissemination is chiefly educational; for Schweblin, it is 
laced within the fabric of everyday experience. The commonality between both novels is 
the effort to contemplate and interpret these different received events. Neoliberalism is 
the text itself in Multiple Choice and Fever Dream, received in specific forms for 
characters to consume and comprehend. 
 
This Is a Test: Reading and Controlled Choice in Multiple Choice 
Multiple Choice both narrates and enacts the complicated efforts that arise when 
navigating a text. Its structure mimics the form of the version of the Chilean Academic 
Aptitude Test Zambra took in 1993 as a high school student living under Pinochet. Split 
into five sections—Excluded Term, Sentence Order, Sentence Completion, Sentence 
Elimination, and Reading Comprehension—the test’s 90 questions are condensed 
narratives over a variety of subjects: the test itself, relationships, memory, everyday 
circumstances in Pinochet’s Chile. The multiple choices attached to each question are 
often playful in that they allow readers to change the content and meaning of some 
question’s narratives based on their selections. Thus, Multiple Choice explores the 
positionality of the reader within a neoliberal space that is marked by controlled 
choice—the illusion of freedom via the ability to choose from a limited set of options. 
Zambra depicts this positionality in two ways. He traces the political contours of 
controlled choice by connecting it to the influence of the Pinochet regime. But he also 
interrogates literary forms of controlled choice by writing a book as a standardized test, 
and in doing this, Zambra questions what a reader’s agency is within neoliberalism. 




interpretation by calling attention to the test’s limits that are influenced by social, 
political, economic, and cultural horizons. Because of its innovative structure, Multiple 
Choice may be more accessible to a wider reading audience, but it can still only be 
engaged and understood within a specific context—that of neoliberalism’s effect on 
specific social and normative structures. 
Chile has a long, violent history with neoliberalism. The US-backed coup d’état 
in 1973 helped install Augusto Pinochet’s right-wing dictatorship that facilitated the 
entrance of neoliberal reform from the University of Chicago’s Department of 
Economics. Economic inequality grew rapidly in Chile, but Pinochet’s place in power 
was further strengthened in 1975 through the US-supported campaign Operation Condor 
that aimed to quash any leftist resistance against the dictatorship and its economic 
reforms. Concentration camps and detention centers were set up, where men, women, 
and children were illegally detained, subjected to horrific sexual abuse, tortured, and/or 
executed. Today, Chile officially recognizes that around 40,000 individuals were victims 
of imprisonment and torture under the Pinochet regime, and the official number of those 
killed or whose bodies were never found—people referred to as the “disappeared”—
numbers more than 3,000 (“Chile”).20 
The content of Zambra’s text is decidedly less violent, yet he uses the 
standardized test form to refer to parts of Chile’s history to comment on such issues as 
dissent, subjectivity, and freedom or the lack thereof. His focus on these topics is 
facilitated by his formal experimentation, for to discuss the standardized test is to take up 
 
20 For more on the violence required to install neoliberalism in Chile, as well as the role the US played in 
it, see Ruth Blakeley, State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North and the South; John Dinges, The 
Condor Years: How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents; and Peter Kornbluh, 




the issue of the neoliberalization and privatization of education, where “high-stakes 
testing” has come to place students within a “particular regime of efficiency [and] labor 
productivity” (Backer and Lewis 194-95). Indeed, the standardized test is geared toward 
subject formation, for educational systems are being altered so as to incorporate 
neoliberal managerial styles that place the responsibility of outcomes from standardized 
tests on students and teachers (Gunter 204). The rise of high-stakes testing and the forms 
of accountability they engender also signifies how market values have been extended to 
education (Ambrosio 317).21 Multiple Choice concedes this reality while also 
experimenting with the test’s form to imagine how the reader (and test-taker) can play 
with and subvert its purposes. While there is an element of wishful thinking here—the 
standardized test, after all, does not allow the test-taker to rewrite its rules—Zambra 
focuses on the specific moment the text is taken, locating it as the site of multiple forms 
of knowledge that the reader/test-taker encounters. It is during a test that the subject 
engages with different options and choices to select as answers to the questions, and 
Zambra understands this as a productive narratological juncture. Though there may be 
one official “right” answer to an exam’s question, Zambra uses the multiple choices 
attached to each question to explore the contingencies of meaning and, thereby, the 
problematic extent to which neoliberalism can be an overarching and unifying principle 
for everyday life. 
This experimentation with form fits within Zambra’s vision of what the novel is 
and should do as a genre. For Zambra, books should “set their own rules,” and the novel 
 
21 See also Harry Torrance, “Blaming the Victim: Assessment, Examinations, and the Responsibilisation 
of Students and Teachers in Neo-liberal Governance.” And as Henry A. Giroux has shown, higher 




form does this successfully because it “remains pretty much undefined” in terms of what 
it should or should not do (“Alejandro”).22 He describes Multiple Choice as a search into 
“how much [he] had internalized the test” when he took it in 1993, and writing it became 
a “game” where he could “make it [his own]” (“Rumpus”). Because of this playfulness, 
there are two forms of reception to consider with Multiple Choice. First, there is the 
subject taking this hypothetical test and what level of subject formation or subjective 
reformation and agency exist within Zambra’s rearticulation of what the form allows or 
discloses. Second, there is the reader of Multiple Choice, who is presented with an 
opportunity, as La Berge and Slobodian put it, to read for neoliberalism. With such a 
focus in mind, Multiple Choice is an example of a neoliberal aesthetic that not only 
queries its own limits and possibilities, but also invites the reader to ask these same 
questions about their role as consumers of and participants in different neoliberal forms 
like standardized tests. 
Multiple Choice is concerned with the neoliberalization of form, both in terms of 
narrative form but also in regard to the kinds of official forms one would fill out, such as 
a test.23 Because of its unique form, Zambra suggests in an interview this text is chiefly 
concerned with what it means to read: 
 
22 At other times, however, Zambra refuses to clarify what genre Multiple Choice fits within: “I just didn’t 
want to define this book, I didn’t want to put it under any label. There is this tradition here in the States of 
identifying the genre on the cover, ‘a novel,’ ‘short stories,’ and the idea of making it clear in that way 
terrified me, mostly because it’s not even clear to me. So I wanted to play with this practice” (“Rumpus”). 
Indeed, the Penguin English edition of Multiple Choice turns the book’s title itself into a test question on 
the front cover. Underneath the title are five options: A – Fiction, B – Nonfiction, C – Poetry, D – All of 
the above, E – None of the above. The bubble next to each appears to be slightly shaded, as if a test-taker 
labored over which answer to choose and selected each one at different points, before eventually erasing 
all of those choices. In other words, Multiple Choice may be all of these genres or it may be none of them. 
23 Little scholarship focuses on Zambra’s formal experimentation. The majority attends to subjects of 
nostalgia, memory, and irony in his work and how they comment on life during and after the Pinochet 




You can read [Multiple Choice] in sophisticated ways, but I like the idea 
that this book deals with unsophisticated approaches. I mean, some 
people don’t even read books—most people. They don’t read novels, 
short stories, or poems; they read forms and fill the blank spaces. So it is 
exciting for me to imagine that readers who are not used to literary 
structures might understand this book under a different light. When you 
read a novel, you know what to expect because you’ve been reading 
novels for a long time. But if you don’t and you happen to be—who 
knows why—reading this book, maybe you just try to answer these 
questions. And maybe you know the structure of the standardized test 
better than you know literary structures. (“Rumpus”) 
Multiple Choice, then, offers a kind of egalitarian possibility. Zambra’s intent to produce 
an “unsophisticated” novel confronts some of the classist assumptions inherent within 
literary taste that Bourdieu identifies. More specifically, any social capital that reading 
literature carries becomes something of a moot point with Zambra’s experimental text 
because a certain level of access is opened up to the reader in two ways. First, the 
conventions of what a novel should do are unimportant for no other reason than they are 
                                                                                                                                           
after Alejandro Zambra” and Bieke Willem, “Metáfora, Alegoría y Nostalgia: La Casa en las Novelas de 
Alejandro Zambra” and “Desarraigo y Nostalgia. El Motivo de la Vuelta a Casa en Tres Novelas Chilenas 
Recientes”. On memory, see Luisa Fernanda Barraza Caballero and María Rita Plancarte Martínez, 
“Memoria y Naufragio en Fromas de Volver a Casa de Alejandro Zambra”; Mary Lusky Friedman, “Tales 
from the Crypt: The Reemergence of Chile’s Political Memory”; Edgar Tello García, “Justicia Cósmica: 
En Torno a la Recuperación y la Memoria en Algunos Mundos Descolonizados”; Elizabeth Osborne, 
Remembering the Remote: Family, Memory, and Television in Post-Pinochet Chilean Culture; María 
Angélica Franken Osorio, “Memorias e Imaginarios de Formación de los Hijos en la Narrativa Chilena 
Reciente”; and Valeria de los Ríos, “Mapa Cognitivo, Memoria (Im)política y Medialidad: 
Contemporaneidad en Alejandro Zambra y Pola Oloixarac.” For irony, see Bieke Willem, “Narrar la 





altogether absent in Multiple Choice; in no way does it resemble a traditional novel and, 
therefore, the uninitiated reader, who likely does not share the pure gaze of the high 
artist that Bourdieu describes, is not at a disadvantage when reading it. If anything, the 
uninitiated reader may have an advantage over more cultured readers who carefully 
curate their tastes. The standardized test, because of its ubiquity, amounts to a kind of 
common or universal language that the uninitiated reader can readily identify. Second, 
there is no reason why the reader, whether uninitiated or cultured, cannot participate in 
the work of Zambra’s text itself. Choosing to answer the questions is an actual option for 
every reader, since each edition of Multiple Choice has an answer sheet as one of its 
final pages, like a blank Scantron waiting to be filled in. As a material object, Zambra’s 
text encourages the reader’s participation, which lends a greater significance to the ways 
the narrative voice addresses the reader at different moments throughout the test. 
For the reader/test-taker, Multiple Choice is an opportunity to interrogate, play 
with, and alter the meaning conveyed through the questions; however, at the same time, 
the test’s questions and answers repeatedly remind the reader how that same play and 
construction of meaning is ultimately ineffective in terms of its ability to do something 
all that transformative. Zambra foregrounds this limitation with the book’s Spanish title. 
Though I mainly refer to Megan McDowell’s English translation of Multiple Choice in 
this chapter, there are noteworthy differences between the English version and the 
original Spanish. For one, Zambra titles his narrative Facsímil, an imitation or 
reproduction.24 In terms of the subject formation standardized tests encourage, the 
 
24 Another significant difference between the two translations occurs in the first section of the test, 
Excluded Term. The singular terms that comprise each of the 24 questions have only occasional 




Spanish title, more so than the English translation, suggests that the test creates a kind of 
simulacrum of the individual. In this way, Zambra’s text addresses the place or role of 
literary production within late capitalism and intersects with Jameson and Baudrillard’s 
arguments on the rise of recycled dead forms as examples of the hyperreal. In 
postmodern theory, one concern is that literature becomes just another commodity that is 
quickly mass-produced, and one response to that problem is play and experimentation. 
Zambra specifically calls attention to our underlying expectations of what literature or 
novels should do or should look like, and Multiple Choice fits within his aim to avoid 
writing stories that look like “conventional ones” (“Alejandro”). At the same time, 
though, his title suggests that play and experimentation may do nothing to alter the test’s 
hyperreal production. 
The experimental possibilities are visible throughout the text. The test’s five 
sections chart theoretical and actual opportunities for the reader to contribute to the 
construction and alteration of meaning. The test’s first section, “Excluded Term,” 
immediately foregrounds a specific irony about the test. The purpose of this section is 
that the reader “mark the answer that corresponds to the word whose meaning has no 
relation to either the heading or the other words listed” (Multiple 1). Therefore, this 
                                                                                                                                           
Body, Mask, Bear, Teach, Copy, Letter, Cut, Heartbreaking, Blacklist, Childhood, Protect, Promise, Pray, 
Blackout, Raze, Spare, Pause, Silence, and Silence (Zambra, Multiple 3-10). Here, the terms progress from 
available options (and, therefore, the semblance of agency) to the body under duress before another shift 
toward words that suggest education is tantamount to indoctrination. In the Spanish, the terms are: 
Facsímil, Réplica, Educar, Copiar, Borra, Letra, Junta, Salvavidas, Máscara, Apagón, Allanar, Resisténcia, 
Proteger, Prometo, Guardar, Secreto, Digo, Familia, Culpa, Nueva, Toser, Silencio, Silencio, Silencio 
(Zambra, Facsímil 15-19). This progression immediately starts with words that imply education is merely 
indoctrination before moving quickly to words that denote violence and destruction. 
McDowell says the significant differences between the translations exist due to the Spanish 
edition’s “dependen[ce] in part on wordplay and cultural references” that would not carry over into 
English (“Steeped”). Indeed, because of the text’s “technical gymnastics … it required a re-write in the 
original Spanish”; thus, “McDowell and Zambra collaborated on entirely new content to convey the effect 




portion of the test is an active exercise in establishing meaning and correlation—that is, 
a certain form of cohesion within a subset of words. Yet that cohesion is achieved 
precisely through exclusion or removal—the introduction of a gap. The selection of one 
of the five choices as the word to be removed would, in some cases, demonstrably alter 
how one should understand what the heading means. For example, Question 12 is the 
word “cut,” paired with five choices (see figure 2). To select “wound” as the word to 
remove significantly changes how we understand the word “cut” in this instance. A 
“wound” certainly fits as a synonym for “cut,” but it does not correspond with the four 





Figure 2. Question #12 in Multiple Choice. Reprinted from Alejandro 




As a result, the remaining four words establish a textual or legal context for the word 
“cut,” but the option “wound” simply does not go away after being selected. Here. 
Zambra highlights how the standardized test leaves behind a kind of textual and, 
therefore, cultural detritus for the reader/test-taker. If “wound” is selected for exclusion, 
its presence as a signifier still remains on the page for the reader/test-taker. The very 




That is to say, it is in the standardized test’s very process of simplifying knowledge that 
it calls attention to alternative and contingent forms of meaning. Question 12 raises the 
implicit question: Why not primarily think wound when you read cut? 
In a more overt manner, Question 23 calls attention to the political significance 
of further reducing the meaning of words (see figure 3). Whichever word is removed 
from the five choices paired with “silence” would speak volumes to the reader’s/test 





Figure 3. Question #23 in Multiple Choice. Reprinted from Alejandro 




What is more, Zambra does not provide a clean set of four coherent choices and one 
aberrant option here as he does in Question 12. With Question 23, choices A and C 
correspond while B, D, and E seem to have more in common together. No matter which 
word the reader/test-taker selects, an incomplete picture of the etymological possibilities 
of the word will be accounted for in the completed test. The reader/test-taker, however, 
will have still engaged with the possibilities, with what is left behind. Thus, the 




student productively, not so much because of what the test does say but because of what 
it could say. 
Similarly, the reader/test-taker has some creative agency with the Sentence 
Elimination section. The myriad sentences that constitute each question build to form 
short narratives that can change depending on which sentence(s) the reader chooses to 
eliminate. These edits, much like in the Excluded Term questions, dramatically change 
the content in some instances. Question 57 gives the reader/test-taker the option of 





Figure 4. Question #57 in Multiple Choice. Reprinted from Alejandro 







But without these sentences, the question’s story would become a short account of a 
father meeting the narrator’s mother. Or, depending on which sentences are cut from 
Question 62, it could be a personal story about how a woman does not talk to the 
narrator on the elevator, or it could become a story broadly about “Chilean identity,” the 
precarity of interpersonal relationships, and what it means to feel like one “inhabit[s] the 
worst country” in the world (Multiple 47). But as with the Excluded Term questions, the 
reader’s/test-taker’s selections (or eliminations) do not elide his/her interaction with a set 
of options that tell a much more complex story. The reader/test-taker, then, becomes 
acquainted with the reality of his/her agency to tell a story a certain way through how 
he/she decides to read (or answer) it, and the story could just as easily become 
something else entirely. 
These passages point to how the reader’s reception of a text provides a creative 
array of interpretive options. It is a type of encounter with the unconventional that 
Zambra has described elsewhere as the “melodrama, that perpetual domestic ordeal” of 
wrestling to figure out what a text means (“Empty” 91). The idea for Zambra is that “the 
best books are those that we didn’t know we wanted to read,” and these will be books 
that are not formulaic or full of “strategic excellence” (“Empty” 92). They will be 
“books that don’t know what they are saying” (“Novels” 223). It is crucial to stress here 
that Zambra is placing his and his contemporaries’ work within a political trajectory and 
artistic tradition that is not simply trying to achieve an “erotics of the New” (Barthes, 
Pleasure 40). What Zambra describes here are texts that are necessarily incomplete in 
their meaning. Though that can seem to recall the disorienting playground of meaning 




nature, its own condition as an “empty book” (Zambra, “Empty” 91). The generating 
force behind such an experimental project is not mere playfulness; instead, Zambra 
identifies it as a distinctly Chilean form of writing that owes to poet Pablo Neruda. 
Neruda was adept at creating an “abyss between what is said and what is written,” 
formulating “an elegant stutter, a literary phrasing that favours circumvention and 
endless digression” and draws the reader in (Zambra, “Novels” 226). 
This kind of incomplete writing that generates a collaborative form of reading is 
what Zambra suggests necessarily follows the previous generation of writers who were 
censored during Pinochet’s dictatorship. As Carlos M. Amador contends, the greatest 
casualty of the regime’s “censorship and terror” was “the very fabric of signification and 
communicability”; it attacks “the modalities of the sayable and reconfigures the 
possibility for sites of language to occur” (21). As a result, “self-censorship” became the 
standard practice for Chilean artists who sought to find creative ways to say what could 
not be said under the regime (Amador 24). That censorship affected Zambra as a reader, 
who grew up reading “dead Chileans … since the living ones were finishing up their 
exiles or perpetual house arrest of those years” (“Novels” 224). Only in the early 1990s 
did this change, what Zambra calls a “late meeting” with these writers’ books (“Novels” 
225). But now, because of that history and experience with reading, Zambra and his 
contemporaries “distrust fluidity, the ease of words” and “distrust writing, as well” when 
they set about telling their stories (“Novels” 226). There is a certain kind of distance that 
Zambra implies it is difficult or impossible to get circumvent. 
Zambra connects this exteriority to “growing up in this shitty silenced world with 




to the point that “we were not able to tell our own stories and they were not as important 
to tell as other’s stories” (Zambra and Taneja). Yet Multiple Choice seeks to work 
against that exteriority by using the form of the standardized test to show how immersed 
Zambra is (or any of his peers were) in that history, since the test form always 
presupposes a social construction of the test-taker. Hence, why Zambra notes he is not 
“outside of” but “within what [he] is observing or parodying or criticizing” (“Free” 278), 
so much so that he repeatedly remarks in interviews how “the subject of all books is 
belonging,” an attempt to regain the interiority with a community or sense of history 
(Zambra and Taneja). Multiple Choice embodies this simultaneous exteriority/interiority 
by alienating the reader with its odd form even as it draws the reader in with the very 
familiarity of is standardized-test structure. Thus, Zambra’s book may be formally 
experimental, but it is still deeply familiar since the standardized test has its own 
conventions and attendant social expectations. In this way, the reader is invited to bring 
his/her “interpretative strategies” to the text to produce something new or provocative 
(Fish 168), even as those strategies and the reader him/herself are always already 
socially constituted, too. 
Zambra carefully charts these limitations the reader/test-taker faces in other parts 
of Multiple Choice. For all the experimentation and play within its structure and 
questions, he showcases how difficult it is to work outside the confines of neoliberal 
structures of meaning-making. For example, some questions in the Sentence Order 
section do not allow the reader/test-taker to rearrange the narrative that the question sets 
forth, as is the case with Question 36 (see figure 5). The implication here is that there is 









Figure 5. Question #36 in Multiple Choice. Reprinted from Alejandro 




Zambra uses the limitations within Question 36 to specifically comment on the difficulty 
in narrative creation while living under Pinochet or how difficult it might be for a 




from numbers five through eight speak to this dilemma; likewise, the limitations within 
the answer choices suggest that the only option is to try to move from the general to the 
specific, the abstract to the concrete. Zambra equates the general with the abstract and 
attaches a level of abstraction to Pinochet, as if the violence of his regime is not wholly 
real. This question also informs readers about their role in this text. If what is real only 
feels abstract until it invades one’s own feelings and space, how might the writer or any 
other creator of meaning and content move from the abstract to the concrete? The 
reader/test-taker is now in a position along with the writer to render content in a 
powerful way. Indeed, earlier in the Excluded Term section, Zambra includes “novelist” 
as a synonymous option for Question 11’s word “blacklist” (Multiple 7). He positions 
the figure of the writer and specifically the novelist as presenting a substantive threat to 
educational and political structures that would encourage blind acceptance. 
If the novelist, for Zambra, wields a certain kind of power, it is because of the 
lasting power of words. Question 58 in Sentence Elimination is a brief story about how 
words cause memories of regret, but the reader/test-taker cannot cut any sentences (see 
figure 6). This underscores the message of the third, fifth, and ninth sentences—that 
words remain regardless of the interlocutor’s or reader’s role. The reader’s/test-taker’s 
ability in the Excluded Term section to create cohesion by removing a word is now 
wholly absent in Question 58. Here, Zambra notes how the reader occupies a space of 
powerlessness because of the permanence that words—read or written—have. But that 
same powerlessness speaks to the strength that words carry. Whether there is or isn’t the 
luxury of elimination or erasure, Zambra theorizes how readers have encountered a text 





Figure 6. Question #58 in Multiple Choice. Reprinted from Alejandro 




This is why we can understand Zambra’s rendering of the standardized test and 
its self-reflexive comments as a more open-ended genre of narrative than initially meets 
the eye. He invites readers to consider how they are being constituted by the test and to 
understand what its form accomplishes. This is more explicitly explored in the three 
stories that comprise the Reading Comprehension section at the end of Multiple Choice. 
These stories literally query what is comprehended in the act of reading and show how 
the limitations enforced by the standardized test encourage creative forms of resistance. 
The first story, about two brothers who decide to cheat on the test, acknowledges that a 
neoliberal education does not allow students to “form opinions or develop any ideas” of 




Zambra envisions how a byproduct of this limitation is that the decision to cheat 
removes a student from the very isolationism that the test encourages: “[T]hanks to our 
cheating, we were able to let go of some of our individualism and become a community. 
It’s sad to put it this way, but cheating gave us a sense of solidarity” (Multiple 66). Not 
that there is much waiting for them beyond the test; as one of the students’ former 
teachers tells them, the test only prepares them “for a world where everyone fucks 
everyone over” (Multiple 71). In a sense, the students learn to play the game of the test 
but do so in a way that provides them with precisely the kind of education the test itself 
is incapable of imparting—the ability to think outside the box. 
This resistance via a refusal to blindly follow rules is later equated to a form of 
existence in the section’s third story. The first-person narrator, a father, comments that 
he understood his young son “existed” when he realized he “couldn’t fool [him] 
anymore” (Multiple 93). If Multiple Choice is a genre or narrative form that 
circumscribes and limits the reader/test-taker, that same limiting structure also contains 
alternative modes of knowledge that challenge what would otherwise be inculcated in 
the reader/test-taker. To prove one’s existence, then, is to show that one knows what the 
standardized test is up to, to refuse to be fooled by it any longer. Similar to how Fish 
argues that a text does not objectively mean anything, Zambra also delegitimizes the 
standardized test’s ostensibly inherent objectivity. Yet at the same time, Multiple Choice 
defies the straightforwardness of Fish’s attempt to conceptualize texts as “the basic data 
of the meaning experience” (22). A more concrete apparatus of authority surrounds the 
standardized test than a novel or any other genre. Though Iser, Eagleton, and Fish are 




and guide how we read them, the standardized test is governed by a sharper 
authoritarianism: the reader/test-taker either does or does not select the right answers. 
Thus, the productive and creative potential of Fish’s interpretive communities are more 
limited in the hypothetical scenario of Multiple Choice. Likewise, Barthes’ hope for the 
playful or the erotically new are nowhere to be found, and if there is anything 
meaningful that an interpretive community like Fish’s can yield from Multiple Choice, it 
appears to be this: To find solidarity in a community that will cheat on the test, a test that 
prepares you to get fucked. Multiple Choice, unique structure aside, simply repackages 
for the reader what he/she already knows. 
With that in mind, it is telling that Zambra reflects on what the purpose of a story 
is near the end of Multiple Choice, literally asking it of the story about the brothers 
cheating. Question 73 queries, “The purpose of this story is” but only the last two answer 
choices seem remotely plausible: “D) To legitimate the experience of a generation that 
could be summed up as ‘a bunch of cheaters.’ And to entertain,” and “E) To erase the 
wounds of the past” (Multiple 76). The two options are diametrically opposed. The 
former honors the difficulties of living under the Pinochet regime; the latter tries to blot 
it out. But option E is an impossibility in a literary sense, which the beginning of the 
third Reading Comprehension story acknowledges when the narrator imagines his son 
one day being able to erase his painful childhood memories of him, before the narrator 
observes, “I know that is impossible” (Multiple 89). Memories, a form of reception in 
their own right as repeated readings of events in one’s own life, are not merely 
something to accept passively. This is where Zambra’s self-reflexive work with Multiple 




presentation of his contact with the standardized test in 1993. While that is in the past, 
Zambra understands how the test lives on for him, so he uses it to continue critiquing 
that past. 
The violence of the Pinochet regime may be abstract to many, but to others it is 
not, and Zambra understands that legacies and histories can continue to be remade and 
reshaped. They continue to be an open text. In Question 64, a series of sentences 
narrated by the son of Manuel Contreras, the head of Pinochet’s secret police, Zambra 
has Contreras fight against the author’s and reader’s ability to effect, if not revisionist 
history, the placement of incriminating words in the mouths of those in power who 
destroyed the lives of many. Contreras’ son notes, “This is not me talking. Someone is 
talking for me. Someone who is faking my voice,” and he concedes the possibility that 
“people will think that there is something true in what [his] fake voice says” (Multiple 
52). This is the author’s choice, an action tantamount to “searching for words to tattoo 
on [Contreras’ son’s] chest using the biggest drill he has” (Multiple 53). The author 
bypasses the subject—Contreras’ son—and directly reaches out to the reader to explain 
with a wink and a grin that both he and reader get to have their fun now. Nothing about 
the past is changed, but how the past is discussed does. Again, whether the uninitiated or 
cultured reader picks up Multiple Choice, Zambra extends the invitation to them to seize 
the narrative once again and remake it through an official form with which many are 
familiar. In this way, the solidarity that the boys cheating on the test discover is also 
shared between Zambra and the reader. Their frustration over inequitable political and 




In the end, the agential efficacy of such a test is suspect at best. Zambra himself 
demurs over the actuality of a reader’s agency at the end of Multiple Choice. The father 
narrating the third Reading Comprehension notes his son “can’t erase” his painful 
memories of his father, which will continue to drag “out ever longer the absurd film of 
life” (Multiple 95). The inability to erase or substantively change what has actually 
happened in one’s life remains, but if that is the case, it is all the more imperative to 
make greater sense of the severity and emotional heft of what occurred. In many ways, 
this is Zambra’s project: To reassess what it means to grow up under Pinochet and be 
subject to the educational standards of those days. How that time is spoken of is a 
continued exercise in reception, one that does not have a standardized form but is, 
instead, predicated on innumerable contingencies of meaning. If that is the case, this 
imperative to recount what has been received is deadly serious, and the high premium 
placed on interpretation is more fully explored in Schweblin’s novel—namely, if the 
violence of neoliberalism cannot be changed, let us at least make sure to get the story 
right. 
 
Absorbing and Interpreting Neoliberal Fallout in Fever Dream 
If Multiple Choice contains a lag time of two decades between its subject matter and 
publication, the focus of Samanta Schweblin’s Fever Dream is more immediate. The 
novel describes the ongoing conflict in Argentina over chemicals used in privatized 
agribusiness that are causing detrimental health effects. The cash crop at the center of 
Fever Dream is genetically-modified (GM) soy, and Schweblin uses its ubiquity in 




things. First, by using classic tropes from the horror genre—a disturbed child, ominous 
houses, a possible pandemic—Schweblin turns neoliberalism into its own literal horror 
story. Doing so casts the effects of neoliberalism in an alternative light, one that 
implicitly challenges the narrative of common sense surrounding it. Second, and more 
importantly for this study, the horror of neoliberalism becomes the text within the text of 
Fever Dream to the point that the characters in the novel literally absorb the fallout of 
neoliberalism and have to work together to make sense of what has happened. The main 
characters, David and Amanda, try to pinpoint the exact moment Amanda was poisoned 
by agrichemcials on a soy farm. They disagree over what the most important moment is 
surrounding her poisoning and, therefore, how her story should be recounted. 
Accordingly, Fever Dream is chiefly a work about reception and interpretation, one that 
also carries concerns over artistic form, for Schweblin’s novel explores how the different 
ways events are received and understood also affect any retelling of those events. Fever 
Dream suggests that neoliberalism’s effects are so indomitable as to determine the form 
and content of literature itself, but Schweblin articulates this by making the work of 
neoliberalism legible within the familiar horror genre.25 This formalist strategy makes 
neoliberalism both recognizable and uncanny all at once as a way to understand and 
critique its exploitative work. 
Schweblin offers a compelling account of the suffering connected to the 
detrimental effects of GM soy farming in Argentina, which have been carefully studied 
 
25 Literary scholarship has only recently turned to Schweblin’s work. Rodrigo Ignacio González 
Dinamarca examines how Schweblin utilizes the horror-genre trope of the monstrous child and argues that 
the character of David in Fever Dream functions as a canvas onto which adults’ fears are materialized. See 





in recent years. Argentina’s political economy is one predicated largely on “neoliberal 
extractivism,” where natural resources are controlled, manipulated, and exported by 
massive private corporations for financial gain; of all the different methods of resource 
extraction—mining, fracking, GM farming—the “golden egg” of Argentina’s 
socioeconomic growth is the soybean (Leguizamón, “Gendered” 2). Argentina is the 
third largest global grower and seller of soybeans, and by 2015, 52% of its cultivated 
land—what amounts to 20 million hectares—was devoted to the crop (Leguizamón, 
“Environmental” 685). The nation’s transition to a model of neoliberal agribusiness has 
developed steadily since 1991, backed by World Bank and IMF credit and policies of 
deregulation (Leguizamón, “Modifying” 150-52).26 The result has been immensely 
profitable for the “corporate-state elite” and middle-class landowners who lease their 
land for soy production, but it has dramatically increased deforestation and “the violent 
displacement of many peasant and indigenous families” (Leguizamón, “Environmental” 
685). Pollution has also become a key factor in Argentina with significant biological and 
ecological consequences. In 2013, cancer rates were found to be “two times to four times 
higher than the national average” in the Santa Fe province, which is a nexus of soy 
production; further, in the ten years since biotechnological methods enabled the rapid 
growth of agribusiness in Argentina, “children became four times more likely to be born 
with devastating birth defects” in Chaco, the nation’s poorest province (Warren). 
Further, streams near “intensive soy production regions” carried elevated levels of 
insecticides, high enough “to cause acute and chronic toxicity to aquatic invertebrates” 
 
26 Monsanto especially has been a key player in the efforts to help “embed” the soy industry into 




(Hunt et al, “Insecticide” 123).27 As soy production levels have increased, “rural 
populations started to report an increase in the incidence of certain pathologies which 
they associated to the use of glyphosate,” the herbicide more commonly known as 
Roundup (Arancibia 2). Indeed, pesticide and herbicide sprayers, such as crop-dusters, 
have been reported for failing to respect laws that establish 50-meter boundaries around 
schools, and the haphazard chemical spraying has not only caused students to faint, but it 
has also ruined those schools’ sources of clean drinking water (Warren). 
Despite its precarious aspects, the soy industry remains a central component of 
everyday life in Argentina.28 Schweblin captures the importance of soy in Fever Dream 
by building the novel around the crop’s effects. She does this subtly. References to soy 
are few and rarely lingered over, so much so that to say Fever Dream is a story about 
soy production in Argentina is not entirely accurate. Instead, one could easily read the 
novel and leave it knowing very little about the contemporary role of soy in Argentina. It 
is as if industrial soy production is not really there in Fever Dream, even as it drives the 
story in significant ways. That is to say, Schweblin’s novel is anything but polemical or 
didactic.29 It is a novel invested in critiquing and understanding that which hides in plain 
sight, and Schweblin’s careful construction of the catalyzing role soy plays in Fever 
 
27 This could considerably alter “ecosystem functioning,” since some of the most adversely affected 
invertebrates, such as shrimp, “play an important role in leaf litter decomposition” (Hunt et al, “Species” 
708). 
28 The nation’s economic stability hinges on the crop, as has been recently evidenced. A severe drought in 
2018 triggered Argentina’s latest financial crisis, devastating soy growth and leading the government to 
ask for a $50 billion loan from the IMF (“Argentina”). Analysts predict, however, that normal weather 
patterns in 2019 will help the soy crop—and, therefore, the economy—rebound (Landstreet). 
29 There are, however, more overt clues about how to read the book within the novel’s design depending 
on which translation you are reading. While Riverhead’s English translation book design gives little away, 
the cover illustration by Patrice Ganda for Literatura Random House’s Spanish edition is more forceful. It 
shows a bird standing on a soy plant, but instead of each plant growing pods of soy beans, they sprout 




Dream is one of overt subtlety, which further highlights what her text is truly invested 
in—making sense of Argentina’s contemporary landscape by interpreting the fallout 
caused by neoliberal enterprises, such as corporate agribusiness. Schweblin does so by 
playing with the notion of consumption, and since soy is produced for consumption, the 
irony in Fever Dream is that there are other forced forms of ingestion that people are 
unwittingly subjected to, and these lead to the artistic work that the novel undertakes: 
critical reception through David and Amanda’s book-length conversation. Neoliberalism 
itself becomes the text within Fever Dream that demands interpretation and explication; 
it is what the characters—and, therefore, Schweblin’s readers—receive. 
In this way, Schweblin presents neoliberalism and its work in Argentina in 
fatalistic ways. To be subjected to pesticides and herbicides is beyond the individual’s 
control.30 All that is left for Amanda to do is to try to come to terms with what has 
happened to her. But Schweblin uses Fever Dream to cast a vision of conflict over what 
is the most responsible reaction for characters like David and Amanda. David is adamant 
that the most important thing to determine is the precise moment when Amanda was 
poisoned. This, for David, is the organizing principle for how a neoliberal story should 
be told. Indeed, when Amanda becomes distracted or wanders onto narrative tangents 
when recalling past events, David is quick to interrupt and say, “This doesn’t matter,” to 
bring her back to the topic of her poisoning. But Amanda’s tangents reveal her 
convictions about what matters most in a neoliberal story—not the moment of violence 
itself but, rather, the consequences that come afterwards. For Amanda, this specifically 
 
30 Schweblin’s fatalism does not extend to the role of literature itself, however. She argues, “Literature 
can’t be informative, didactic, or indoctrinating, but it can leave a real mark on your fears, open new 
windows in your mind, make yourself question something you had never thought about before. And 




has to do with her daughter Nina and her concerns over who will care for Nina after she 
dies from being poisoned. David, then, interprets neoliberalism as a political story, while 
Amanda reads it as personal.31 As Fever Dream shows, those two considerations are 
messily entangled and never mutually exclusive, but Schweblin underscores how the 
individual “reader” of neoliberalism and its effects brings his or her own investments to 
the work of reception. The only way, then, to tell a more comprehensive contemporary 
story of neoliberalism is through collaboration. It would seem David and Amanda might 
disagree over what Fish calls “interpretive strategies,” but their understanding and 
formation of knowledge is best preserved through their interpretive community 
nonetheless. David and Amanda need each other to better make sense of the political 
economy they live within. 
Indeed, among the novel’s many tensions is the movement back and forth 
between the characters’ different investments. For Amanda, her individual responsibility 
as a mother is of paramount importance. David, however, wants to establish facts, and he 
consistently tries to make this Amanda’s focus as well. Ironically, this becomes 
Amanda’s new individual responsibility, replacing her maternal imperative. Throughout 
Fever Dream, Amanda describes her responsibility in terms of the “rescue distance” she 
feels tying her to her daughter Nina (Fever 19). Amanda defines rescue distance as “the 
variable distance separating” her from Nina (Fever 19), a kind of invisible thread or rope 
 
31 Schweblin herself describes being caught between these two motivations while writing Fever Dream: 
But in the middle of the writing process, I found myself in a big “politics” dilemma. I 
could say names, companies, cities, government [sic], I could be really concrete about 
the negligence underlying this story. But on the other side, it is a very intimate and 
personal story, and the more testimonial my narrator become [sic], the more away from 
the reader I felt. At the end, I made myself this question: what would be more effective 
as an alarm of danger for the reader? Being informative, or achieve a very authentic 
feeling that something really serious and real is happening, and that this is closer to the 




connecting them that feels relaxed when situations are not threatening and taut to the 
point of breaking when danger is around. The purpose of this rescue distance is “to get 
out in front of anything that could happen … because sooner or later something terrible 
will happen” (Fever 127).32 The limited capacity that rescue distance possesses for 
providing adequate safety and security is highlighted at the moment Amanda is 
poisoned. While she and Nina wait for their friend Carla, David’s mother, who works at 
a soy farm, they watch men unload barrels of what is assumedly pesticides and 
herbicides. Nothing dramatic takes place. Amanda and Nina watch the men work, a 
moment that “happens slowly and pleasantly” before Amanda notices that she and Nina 
are soaked from sitting on the ground that is saturated with chemicals, of which David 
says, “This is it. This is the moment” (Fever 86-87, emphasis in original). 
That this scene is unremarkable is precisely what makes it compelling, for it 
underscores how limited rescue distance (i.e., Amanda’s responsibility) is in its efficacy. 
Though Amanda and Nina are sitting next to each other, Amanda perceives no danger, 
no feeling of tautness in the invisible rope tying her to her daughter. About this moment, 
David asks, “What’s happening with the rescue distance,” and Amanda replies, 
“Everything is fine,” unaware that this is the instance when she is poisoned (Fever 88-
89, emphasis in original). Though we can—and many do—question and critique the 
extent to which neoliberalism constitutes an ethical or just form of common sense, 
Schweblin here shows that the effects of neoliberalism are at the very least 
 
32 That Schweblin titled her novel Distancia de rescate in the Spanish is noteworthy, for it suggests that 
Amanda’s notion of rescue distance is the nexus of the narrative itself. McDowell, the novel’s translator, 
agrees, identifying rescue distance as “the book’s driving concept” (Gregovich). However, the title Fever 
Dream was selected for the English translation due to that phrase’s higher level of cultural familiarity with 




commonplace, so much so that a usually hypersensitive mother like Amanda could be 
oblivious to the potential violence of something as seemingly innocuous as visiting a 
farm to see a friend. This scene is markedly different from earlier in the novel when 
Nina plays next to a pool by herself and Amanda watches from afar, ready to run and 
snatch her if she falls in. At the soy farm, however, Amanda does not know to be on 
alert. 
Neoliberalism’s saturation—literal and figurative in this novel—is not legible, at 
least not to Amanda, and this is exactly what David is invested in helping her 
understand. Amanda has trouble grasping David’s perspective, though, and she tellingly 
finds a way to make “the important thing” within her story an aspect of her fault, asking, 
“Is it because I did something wrong? Was I a bad mother? Is it something I caused?” 
(Fever 169). David does not answer, so she concludes on her own, “When Nina and I 
were on the lawn, among the barrels. It was the rescue distance: it didn’t work, I didn’t 
see the danger” (Fever 170). The problem, for Amanda, is not that big agribusiness has 
brought dangerous chemicals into contact with different water supplies, animals, and 
humans; the problem, as she interprets it, is that she did not know how to properly read 
for such threats. The reality of neoliberal agribusiness has become her burden to bear, 
has further responsibilized her role as a mother and added another layer to the different 
threats a person must account for when seeking to protect either herself or her child. 
Amanda reads her poisoning not as something for which a corporation such as Monsanto 
could be held liable, but as something for which she is ultimately responsible. Schweblin 




out, everyday life on national and personal levels is reshaped, and individuals are 
expected to respond and account for those changes accordingly.  
At no point, however, does David intimate that the fault lies with Amanda; his 
efforts to understand and interpret her story do just the opposite. David wants to 
establish what exactly happened to Amanda and how it occurred, but he cannot divine 
that information alone and requires Amanda’s help to collectively read and re-read her 
story. Ultimately, then, David’s emphasis on collaboration and communal interpretation 
is a direct counter to the hyper-individualistic ethos of neoliberalism broadly and to 
Amanda’s rescue distance that places the weight of neoliberal capitalism’s sublime work 
on her own shoulders. That Amanda is certain she is somehow at fault for what has 
happened emphasizes the necessity of interpretive community. David, who as a young 
boy was poisoned via a water source tainted with chemicals, is personally invested in 
Amanda’s story because he has experiential knowledge to contribute to her interpretive 
work. But the determination to make sense of a neoliberal environment marked by 
violent consequences is not merely a personal quest for him; instead, he views making 
sense of Amanda’s story and the precise moment of her poisoning as “very important for 
us all” (Fever 2, emphasis in original). He can help Amanda read neoliberalism 
differently than she otherwise might on her own, and to catch the “important details” 
they will have to work together, for Amanda notes, “I can see the story perfectly, but 
sometimes it’s hard to move forward” (Fever 6, 5). David relies on Amanda’s recall, 
while Amanda depends on David’s careful observation and attentive encouragement to 




But even as David and Amanda try to interpret the ways that neoliberalism has 
affected them, they each tend to take on rather neoliberal approaches to the text of 
Amanda’s poisoning. Though both of them are “reading for neoliberalism,” to borrow 
La Berge and Slobodian’s terms, they also frequently slip into the habit of “reading as 
neoliberals” (611). David, for instance, is intent on understanding the root causes of 
Amanda’s accident. In doing so, he frequently instrumentalizes Amanda’s story, 
disregards much of what she believes to be important, and responsibilizes her with a 
pressure to remember specific events. He essentially mines her story for its worth in an 
effort to locate something that is useful to him. He often seems less interested in her 
impending death than in gathering information. With Amanda, she is less interested in 
assigning culpability than David is. Instead of his narrower focus, she tries to determine 
what the larger social effects of her poisoning point to, thus eschewing an individualistic 
mindset by focusing instead on Nina and other ill children in the area. Yet even so, her 
adoption of a self-narrative of responsibilization is a thoroughly neoliberal approach to 
her own story. By blaming herself for not being responsible enough to account for or 
anticipate certain hazards, Amanda repeatedly casts herself as the neoliberal subject who 
is accountable for managing her own navigation of everyday forms of risk. 
Since David and Amanda have their differences and disagreements, their 
collaboration as an interpretive community yields conflicts not only over what the most 
important parts of Amanda’s story are, but also in terms of what can or cannot be done 
with a story. For example, Amanda wants to focus on how David was saved from his 
poisoning, a separate story that he claims “is not important” (Fever 55, emphasis in 




which David dismisses, arguing that “it has nothing to do with the exact moment” (Fever 
55, emphasis in original). But Amanda cannot eschew the responsibility she feels “to 
measure the danger … to calculate the rescue distance” and determine what will happen 
to Nina (Fever 55). David agrees that the rescue distance is “[v]ery important” (Fever 
44, emphasis in original), but with the caveat that it helps him understand what 
motivates the events that make up Amanda’s story, though not necessarily how one 
should respond to her story. 
In effect, David’s dismissal of some of Amanda’s concerns rewrites or reshapes 
her story and how it is constructed. Both have different investments in what is the story 
most worth telling. But beyond their disagreements, David also makes more explicit and 
frustrated efforts to alter Amanda’s story. When Amanda recalls why she later goes to 
the soy farm to visit Carla, David repeatedly interjects, “That’s a mistake. … Talking to 
Carla is a mistake. … This is the moment to leave town, now is the time” (Fever 78, 
emphasis in original). On the one hand, these exclamations humorously fall within the 
trope of the horror genre and the stereotyped image of the audience fruitlessly pleading 
with a character to avoid impending doom; on the other hand, David’s pleas suggest his 
own limited efficacy in helping Amanda interpret and put together her own story. While 
there are decisions to make, such as which details to focus on and which ones to dismiss, 
the actual events of the story do not change. Even so, David repeatedly wants Amanda to 
change course with her story, as if it can be rewritten, pleading with her, “Don’t leave 
Nina alone. It’s happening right now! … Don’t get distracted. … It’s happening” (Fever 
88, emphasis in original). What Schweblin depicts here is a more subdued image of 




could certainly tell her story in many different ways, the key, macro-level concerns of 
that story remain the same. The objective or inherent meaning of texts that Fish is 
largely dismissive of are found to be much more insurmountable in Fever Dream, given 
how the entire landscape of the Argentina in Schweblin’s novel is awash with chemicals 
directly harmful to life thriving. In that sense, the ability to tell a different story or 
construct a new kind of meaning is woefully limited. 
But if the story cannot be changed, David suggests that the least they can do is 
piece together Amanda’s experience accurately. Later in the novel, David reminds 
Amanda they have “been through all of this … four times” and that the frustration for 
him is how Amanda “know[s]” what happened but does not “understand” (Fever 110, 
emphasis in original). David asserts that the extent to which an individual is entangled 
within and affected by the violence of neoliberalism is difficult to grasp, which is 
precisely why it requires careful interpretation. Amanda’s knowledge that she has been 
poisoned is not enough; for David, the point of recall and retelling involved in 
interpretation is to address the how of Amanda’s situation, not only the what. Thus, 
through the difficulty of recall, Schweblin shows how neoliberalism and its effects 
continue to defy the very common sense it purportedly represents. That is not to say 
others do not understand how to connect the dots, for Carla ties David’s earlier illness to 
the “sown fields all around us” and how people “come down with things all the time,” 
and she assesses it with the fatalistic observation, “It happens” (Fever 95-96). Even 
Amanda later suspects the pervasiveness of the soy fields somehow relates to the 




remembers recognizing how that was “the moment to talk but [she was] immobile in the 
languid silence” caused by the poison beginning to numb her body (Fever 118).  
These passages point to the necessity of collaboration when attempting to make 
sense of the work of neoliberalism. If, as Schweblin portrays, neoliberalism results in 
growing amounts of destruction, then Amanda’s recollection that she was unable to take 
advantage of “the moment to talk” implies there may come a time when it is too late to 
discuss the consequences of neoliberalism. David, however, claims that the story will 
keep going because Amanda “still [hasn’t] realized” and “still need[s] to understand” 
the specifics of what happened (Fever 131, emphasis in original). Yet at the same time, 
“going forward with this story doesn’t make any sense” to David if Amanda is “not 
going to understand” (Fever 140, emphasis in original), for at that point it will be 
impossible to clearly establish the events and their causes. Amanda, however, presses on 
with the story, rejecting David’s claims that the details she wants to dwell on are 
unimportant, and she talks about them anyway so that he will have to “listen to it all” 
(Fever 142). Indeed, David disappears from the final ten pages of the novel, either silent 
or absent from Amanda’s side, frustrated as he is by her unwillingness to focus on the 
details he wants her to. 
But their collaboration has already had its necessary effect, for Amanda is able to 
establish a unified reading that connects the different threads in her story—the rescue 
distance and the soy fields. She concludes that the “important thing” to grasp is how “the 
rope is finally slack, like a lit fuse, somewhere; the motionless courage about to erupt” 
(Fever 183). The rope of rescue distance is now “slack” because Amanda’s impending 




protection and a person’s assumed responsibility for protecting her child in a dangerous 
world now becomes a fuse leading to a metaphorical powder keg; however, the potential 
for an explosion is left vague. Amanda locates it only “somewhere” because the 
impending explosion certainly cannot come from her, near death as she is. But she 
clearly understands—with David’s help—how her frustration and outrage at the horrors 
that have befallen her family are not hers alone. Indeed, David and Amanda’s entire 
conversation takes place at a hospital where many children have been brought, some of 
whom “were born already poisoned, from something their mothers breathed in the air, 
or ate or touched” (Fever 151, emphasis in original). As David tells Amanda, “there 
aren’t many children who are born right” in the unnamed rural setting of the novel 
(Fever 157, emphasis in original). 
Amanda’s sorrow is not hers alone but, rather, shared by many other mothers, 
fathers, and siblings in Argentina. It is against that backdrop of a poisoned collective that 
Schweblin casts Amanda’s interpretive conclusion. On the one hand, Amanda’s 
reference to a future explosion comes across as a fierce warning and rousing call to 
political action; on the other hand, Schweblin simultaneously renders it as an image of 
impotence. Though there is now a “lit fuse” that will enable “courage … to erupt,” the 
fuse is “slack,” not a taut straight line, which implies a long, meandering path for the 
flame to take before eventually reaching its explosive potential. Further, since the rope is 
only “somewhere,” in some indistinct location that is potentially impossible to locate, 
the impression is left that some significant action will not happen anytime soon. What’s 




“motionless.” For all the kinetic energy in the novel’s final image, Schweblin repeatedly 
waters it down with equal measures of stasis. 
We can understand this stasis in light of how effective the rope of rescue distance 
has been earlier in the novel. Amanda tells David, “My mother was sure that sooner or 
later something bad would happen, and now I can see it with total clarity, I can feel it 
coming toward us like a tangible fate, irreversible. Now there’s almost no rescue 
distance, the rope is so short that I can barely move” (Fever 76). That the rope 
constituting Amanda’s failed rescue distance is now the rope to light a powder keg of 
social indignation provides an ambivalent image of a way out of or against 
neoliberalism. If the rope of rescue distance failed, why would it suddenly be successful 
as a fuse? Instead, what Schweblin constructs through Amanda’s repeated use of the 
rope’s imagery recalls the narrator’s comment on the power of narrative in How to Get 
Filthy Rich in Rising Asia. There, the narrator claims that fate and narrative trajectory 
are the same (Hamid 181), and Schweblin expresses a similar observation through 
Amanda’s inherited conviction that “sooner or later something bad would happen” that 
would render rescue distance pointless. Throughout Fever Dream, David’s fruitless 
efforts to change the direction of Amanda’s story mirror her later responses to his desire 
to rewrite the ending: “It’s already done” (Fever 82). 
There is, however, more that can happen than just accurately pinning down the 
causes and totality of neoliberal destruction; Fever Dream neither presents nor advocates 
for merely cataloguing the degradation of our present landscape. In this way Schweblin 
shares Anna Kornbluh’s view on the dubious efficacy of realism as a politically 




these stories and working together to tell these stories is in and of itself a productive kind 
of fate: 
The tie with David is that when things become so bad that it’s all 
disasters in the world, when everything is so terrible, the small drama 
between two or three characters might be really important. It might be the 
beginning of something really deep, where a simple question helps you 
know where the evil starts—and if you know where the evil is, you can 
fight against it. When that happens, everything becomes dangerous. In 
some ways, that’s why the “rescue distance” gets broken: Everything in 
the world Amanda inhabits is dangerous. (Patrick) 
That is to say, there may be only one endpoint that Amanda’s story could reach despite 
David’s best efforts to reshape it. But even those attempts are a productive exercise for 
Schweblin, who regards stories as “a kind of spell capable of moving things inside us 
that we couldn’t move by ourselves” (Benson). This is precisely what happens with 
Amanda and David. As co-authors of her story, they are able to collaborate to determine 
which details should be included to constitute the most accurate and moving story, and 
though they have disagreements over what should be included and excised, their 
dependence on one another sharpens the focus of the story rather than clouds it. If 
narrative trajectory and fate are synonymous, Schweblin at least points to how different 
choices can be made to help the narrative trajectory more powerfully reach its fate. 
In this way, Schweblin extends David and Amanda’s story as an invitation to her 
readers. The characters’ efforts to make sense of what has happened to Amanda is an act 




received and consumed. Fever Dream occupies a similar space for readers, inviting us to 
discern how a text affects us in its account of neoliberalism’s contemporary 
consequences. Schweblin does not overstate literature’s potential here; the rope of the 
“lit fuse” is still “slack,” and who is to say what can productively erupt from a 
“motionless courage”? Fever Dream gives no hypothetical answer. But if the 
consumption of neoliberalism has devastating effects, Schweblin asserts that the effects 
of consuming literature should not be dismissed, either. Though she admits it makes her 
“sound more mystic than [she] would like,” she holds to the belief that “the reader gets 
some beauty from the book in exchange for some darkness that grows in his mind … 
[and] obliges him to looks for some beauty in his surroundings”; in this way, the “best 
stories take control of [the body]” as they are attentively consumed (Benson). 
Fever Dream depicts the reach of neoliberalism as terrifyingly indomitable, 
drawing up the sublime work of neoliberal capital as foreclosing the possibility that 
literature itself can do much to rewrite the social, cultural, and economic landscape. This 
does not stop Schweblin from calling for a productive eruption that is political in nature, 
but the timeline for any such productive explosion is “slack” at best. Part of this stems 
from the ways that David and Amanda, as noted earlier, each attempt to read their 
entanglement in the effects of neoliberalism in rather neoliberal ways. That is to say, 
each falls into the trap La Berge and Slobodian describe: “reading as neoliberals” when 
they could be “reading for neoliberalism” (611). Both David and Amanda miss the mark 
at times, and at other times they acutely understand the ramifications of what is 
happening to them and around them through the neoliberalized world of agribusiness in 




producing a coherent interpretation and articulation of what exactly neoliberal ideology 
effects in the present. 
The stutters and stops of David and Amanda’s collaborative storytelling point to 
the complications that arise when trying to describe what can often seem to defy 
explanation. Schweblin identifies one way of circumventing that difficulty as relying on 
and refashioning familiar tropes, such as the horror genre. What that amounts to is an 
uncanny production of an established form, which in its own way alludes to the 
mechanized production of soy in Argentina: Crops have been grown since the beginning 
of time, but not like this, not on this scale, and not with such violent repercussions. That 
is to say, neoliberalism can take familiar aspects of the world and alter them to an 
unrecognizable extent. This creates challenging work for literature in the neoliberal 
present, a challenge that other writers have recently taken up as well: How does one 
translate the present when seemingly familiar parts of everyday life are either no longer 













CONCLUSION: TRANSLATING THE NEOLIBERAL PRESENT 
 
In his recent work of nonfiction, The Great Derangement: Climate Change and 
the Unthinkable, Indian novelist Amitav Ghosh expresses disappointment over how 
fiction rarely deals with climate change in any serious manner, and in the event a text 
does venture into such territory, “the mere mention of the subject is often enough to 
relegate a novel or a short story to the genre of science fiction” (7). Ghosh wonders if the 
topic is simply “too wild” to be satisfactorily handled in fictive form, and, if that is the 
case, he argues that such an inability “will have to be counted as an aspect of the broader 
imaginative and cultural failure that lies at the heart of the climate crisis” (8). That is to 
say, “the climate crisis is also a crisis of culture, and thus of the imagination” (9). If 
climate change is difficult to imagine and, thus, hard to render into a believable narrative 
that is not automatically shuttled into the realm of fantasy or science fiction, Ghosh 
suggests that we could be staring down a problem with the novel itself.1 He argues that a 
penchant for realism continues to handicap the narrative possibilities of the novel, for he 
claims that “the modern novel, unlike geology, has never been forced to confront the 
centrality of the improbable: the concealment of its scaffolding of events continues to be 
 
1 Ghosh’s characterization of science fiction discounts its connections to realism, though. Flannery 
O’Connor’s observation about the inherent realism of fantastical stories is worth remembering: 
Fiction is an art that calls for the strictest attention to the real—whether the writer is 
writing a naturalistic story or a fantasy. I mean that we always begin with what is or with 
what has an eminent possibility of truth about it. Even when one writes a fantasy, reality 
is the proper basis of it. A thing is fantastic because it is so real, so real that is is 
fantastic. … I would even go so far as to say that the person writing a fantasy has to be 
even more strictly attentive to the concrete detail than someone writing in a naturalistic 
vein—because the greater the story’s strain on the credulity, the more convincing the 




essential to its functioning” (23). As a result, the irony of realism, the narrative strategy 
that still holds court for most novels, is that “the very gestures with which it conjures up 
reality are actually a concealment of the real” (Ghosh 23). Rather than debate the 
benefits and drawbacks of realism as a narrative mode, I bring up Ghosh’s comments to 
draw our attention to the way that current economic, social, political, and ecological 
crises generated by capitalism also spotlight the difficulty for literature to represent 
certain contemporary phenomena. Novelists have grappled with this challenge in their 
work over the last 40 years, as evidenced by Hergé’s final story Tintin and Alph-Art and 
more recent works, such as Vivek Shanbhag’s Ghachar Ghochar and Yoko Tawada’s 
The Emissary. All three, in different ways, explore a common question: What does it 
mean to produce art and/or represent contemporary life and its conflicts within a system 
of global capitalism? 
At the core of Ghosh’s concerns is how very real global ills remain ignored or 
altogether unseen in fiction, as if they are not central components of how a narrative 
should be told. His mandate for literature is that it should make the invisible visible; 
however, to do so requires working against centuries of narrative methods and influence. 
For one, Jacques Rancière notes it has long been true that literature is marked by “a 
partition of the sensible, of the visible and the sayable, which allows (or does not allow) 
some specific data to appear” (10). These efforts produce in narrative form a “common 
world” (Rancière 10), and if ecological crises are too fantastical for literature, as Ghosh 
suspects they are, such data may not fit into readers’ common vision of what the world is 
like. When Rancière argues that literature’s political work has long been “a specific link 




the dominance over literary form that writers such as Flaubert and Balzac continue to 
wield (12). While their realist modes eschewed the social hierarchies of older literary 
forms, their narrative approach did not necessarily open up a more democratic style of 
literature, for their methods were “displaying and deciphering the symptoms of a state of 
things” by cataloguing the mere matter of everyday life and experiences (Rancière 18); 
or, to put it another way, “the rhythm of the future had to be invented out of the 
commodities and fossils of the curiosity shop,” which is tantamount to “converting any 
scrap of everyday life into a sign of history and any sign of history into a poetical 
element” (Rancière 22-23). Flaubert and Balzac’s work may seem like an attempt to 
make the invisible visible by foregrounding the materiality of everyday life to decipher 
underlying social and political paradigms, but literary realism just as equally stands as a 
fetishized treatment of the commodified realm, a narrative decision to focus on the 
surface in such a way that further obscures political and economic realities instead of 
clarifying them. 
My point here, in conjunction with Ghosh and Rancière, is that the last 150 years 
of industrialized capitalism make it more and more difficult to render the invisible 
visible and make sense of it in narrative form. More recently, with the advent and 
ascension of neoliberalism, this has become even truer. As neoliberal economies became 
more predicated on immaterial and risky financial tools, “the culture of derivatives posits 
itself as a space lying beyond the power of representation, one that is discernible only 
through quantification” (LiPuma and Lee 65). Issues of finance are at their core issues of 
representation, and changes within methods of finance significantly influence cultural 




culture has long been in place. Franco Moretti notes how the rationalized aspects of 
modern life eventually affect forms like the novel in “a process that begins in the 
economy and in the administration, but eventually pervades the sphere of free time, 
private life, entertainment, feelings” (381). What this means, then, is that contemporary 
global literature faces a tall task of translation, and here I use translation in the broadest 
sense—rendering a topic recognizable or, at the very least, legible for an audience. 
Though Ghosh suggests that the period of the Anthropocene is where this challenge is 
rooted, other scholars argue we are beyond that timeframe. Instead, the global growth of 
capitalism—an intentional expansion that was necessary if capitalism were to survive—
has moved us to what Jason W. Moore calls the Capitalocene.2 
The Capitalocene argument regards capitalism as a “world-ecology” buoyed by 
three processes: primitive accumulation, territorialist power facilitated by the 
privatization of property, and new forms of knowledge that alienated people from land 
while science began to “read” nature for the sake of capitalist accumulation (Moore 85-
86). Moore notes that the Nature/Society split meant “the web of life could be reduced to 
a series of external objects” where Nature was placed in service to accumulation (87). 
Eventually the work/energy rhythms of nature become “incorporated” into capitalism as 
its metabolism “through the double internality: flows of power and capital into nature, 
flows of nature in capital and power” (90). Moore argues that the movement to new 
 
2 Moore prefers the Capitalocene argument over that of the Anthropocene because the former provides 
three unique arguments: it acknowledges that the history of capitalism is “a relation of capital, power, and 
nature as an organic whole”; it covers the history of “the relations of power and re/production premised on 
the cash nexus”; and it discredits the Eurocentric argument that capitalism grew out of eighteenth-century 
England (81). This last one specifically points to the Anthropocene’s “fundamentally bourgeois character” 





uncapitalized spheres for the sake of exploiting their resources has been the pattern since 
1450, not just the Industrial Revolution (92). Capitalism was “specifically organized to 
treat the appropriation of global nature in the pursuit of the endless accumulation of 
capital” from the very beginning (Moore 110, emphasis in original). A nation or 
empire’s movement from one place to the next to harvest its resources when a site has 
been depleted is nothing new. It typifies capitalism. This, for Moore, is the horrific 
“genius of capitalism”—that it regards nature as a “free” gift, free in the sense that there 
has been no thought as to the repercussions (112). Moore’s arguments speak to two of 
Ghosh’s concerns: First, the environmental destruction that is a result of capitalist 
expansion is an old tale, which makes its noticeable absence from literature all the more 
troubling, and second, it is a tale that is markedly global in scope, given how capitalism 
has had to traverse the planet in search of untapped resources once it exhausts other 
markets. That is to say, Ghosh’s arguments about the lack of imagination necessary to 
narrativize climate change is simultaneously an indictment of literature’s inability to 
depict at least one of the effects of global capitalism. 
However, while fiction on climate change may be scarcer than Ghosh would 
prefer, post-war writers do frequently attempt to depict other chaotic aspects of a global 
capitalist system.3 In the three decades spanning the end of World War II and his death, 
Hergé wrestled with what it meant for Tintin to satisfactorily portray reality in a world 
 
3 Ghosh’s claim that fiction on climate change is scarce is overstated to an extent. Recent scholarly work 
points to the not insignificant amount of fiction on this very subject: see Antonia Mehnert, Climate 
Change Fictions: Representations of Global Warming in American Literature, and Adam Trexler, 
Anthropocene Fictions: The Novel in a Time of Climate Change. Furthermore, Ghosh himself, though 
claiming to be “at a loss” when trying to come up with a list of writers who produce such narratives, 
names quite a few: J. G. Ballard, Margaret Atwood, Kurt Vonnegut Jr., Barbara Kingsolver, Doris 




increasingly defined by international conflict and the transnational movement of capital. 
Stories such as the aforementioned The Red Sea Sharks place Tintin and his companions 
in more global or transnational conflicts than ever before that take them to regions of the 
world they had not previously visited. What stands out from these later stories is Hergé’s 
awareness of the way that art generally—and Tintin specifically—circulates within 
global markets often dominated by the interests of private corporations. Hergé was less 
than encouraged by what that meant for Tintin’s legacy, and these concerns are most 
forcefully expressed in his final story, Tintin and Alph-Art, where he considers the 
broader ramifications of his own work’s global circulation as a commodity. In Alph-Art, 
Hergé returns to the issue of art’s lasting value first broached in The Broken Ear, only 
now the commodification of art is the central conflict. 
Alph-Art pointedly makes fun of the notion of art for art’s sake through Captain 
Haddock’s fledgling appreciation for abstract art. The artist Ramó Nash specializes in 
large canvases of capital letters, and when Haddock encounters the famous opera singer 
Castafiore at a gallery with Alph-Art on display, she remarks, “It’s fantastic! … so 
simple and at the same time so rich, so noble and so basic, can reach the whole world. … 
In it we return to the origins of civilisation, don’t we?” (Hergé, Alph-Art 8). Here, in a 
pointed self-criticism of what he had tried to do with previous stories, Hergé situates the 
canvases of block letters as an art that is universally accessible.4 Haddock does not 
 
4 After the accusations of racism surrounding The Red Sea Sharks, which I mentioned in chapter one, 
Hergé initiated a larger plan in the 1960s to remove Tintin from historical contexts altogether in an effort 
to maximize his appeal for reading markets. This included revising, yet again, stories that had already been 
published. The hope was that this would reshape the titular character’s image and universalize the series’ 
appeal (Peeters 306). By eliminating specific historical markers from past stories, Hergé aimed to take 
Tintin out of contexts that locked him in time. For example, Land of Black Gold underwent a complete 




understand what is so grand about the paintings, but is persuaded to start dabbling in fine 
art anyway. His purchase of a large capital H made of Perspex repeatedly elicits 
questions from Tintin and others about what the artwork is and what it means. Haddock 
responds, “Nothing! … Nothing at all! It’s a work of art! And a work of art isn’t for 
anything! Art is art!” (Hergé, Alph-Art 12, emphasis in original). Haddock frustratedly 
has this conversation three more times with people who want to know the same thing: 
Yes, we see it is an H, but what is it for? This scene acts as a poststructuralist jab at 
artistic meaning, for Haddock loves the H because he believes it clearly stands for his 
last name, referring to it not just as Alph-Art but also “Personalph-Art” (Hergé, Alph-Art 
12). Haddock’s definition of a stable signifier is meant to be laughable, for the H could 
just as easily stand for any appellation that begins with the letter H. The art that Haddock 
is attracted to is an open-ended signifier, freely floating and lacking any meaningful 
signification. We can read Hergé as Haddock in this scene and Tintin as the letter H. 
Hergé had specific attachments and invested meaning with Tintin, but no work of art is 
so long-standing that its significance and value remain stable. Hergé, via Haddock’s 
frustration, critiques the idea that art could simply exist for itself, even if Hergé had tried 
for a moment to do the same with Tintin by writing stories that were more timeless and 
removed from history. 
                                                                                                                                           
however, two decades later, Hergé changed it into a story about rival emirs fighting over oil, which he felt 
would make the plot more timeless (Peeters 209). Hergé stated that he wanted Tintin to “acknowledge its 
era without running the risk of being too dated; of bearing witness to the times while remaining timeless” 
(qtd. in Peeters 309). Realism was no longer the guarantor to Tintin’s success as it had been at the start; 
now, it was the perceived obstacle to the series’ legacy. Dehistoricizing efforts were, of course, ultimately 
futile, and by the time Hergé started to sketch Alph-Art, he had already abandoned efforts to make Tintin 
timeless and universal, as evidenced by the penultimate story, Tintin and the Picaros, which returns the 




The question “Yes, but what is it for?” is equally applicable to the entire Tintin 
corpus, just as the attendant concerns over art and meaning cannot be divorced from the 
neoliberal connection elsewhere in Alph-Art of artistic production to the world of 
commodities, foreign trade, and arts funding from the private sector. For example, it is 
telling that Emir Ben Kalish Ezab, first seen in The Red Sea Sharks, reappears in this 
story as an oil tycoon trying to enter the world of high art. In a televised interview, he 
explains that he has come to Europe to buy different landmarks, such as the Eiffel 
Tower, to take back to Khemed and turn into oil derricks. This recalls Sarah Brouillette’s 
arguments about the work of the creative economy, where art helps—in this case, quite 
literally—to buoy the political and economic work of nation-states. When denied the 
Eiffel Tower, the Emir then offers to buy the Beaubourg Centre, which he notes was 
built as a refinery before quickly being turned into a museum. He has decided to return 
home and build his own fine art museum but “like a refinery on the outside, just to keep 
up with the fashion” (Hergé, Alph-Art 10). The goal with the museum is “to make 
Khemed into a modern country resolutely moving into the future” (Hergé, Alph-Art 11). 
Tintin eventually discovers that the Emir is caught in a scheme run by an underground 
ring of forgers intent on selling perfect replicas of high-priced art. At one of the forgers’ 
meetings are Mr. Gibbons, a giant in imports and exports who first appeared in The Blue 
Lotus; Mr. Trickler, the American oil representative who tried to orchestrate the war in 
The Broken Ear; and the Emir with his sights set on a modern museum (Hergé, Alph-Art 
43). The meeting takes place at the villa of a religious guru, Endaddine Akass, who locks 
up Tintin once he discovers their work as art forgers. Hergé clearly draws the reader’s 




transnational politics and how funding for the kind of cultural capital that the Emir’s 
museum represents is not divorced from the money generated by the private corporate 
sector involved in oil production. 
Hergé, however, passed away before finishing Alph-Art, and his work stops with 
a sketch of Akass’ henchmen leading Tintin off at gunpoint to drown him in liquid 
polyester and turn him into a sculpture. Hergé left behind many sketches and notes of 
possible endings for the story.5 Most provocative is the possibility that Akass is actually 
Tintin’s chief nemesis from numerous earlier stories, Roberto Rastapopoulous, in 
disguise and finally successful in eliminating Tintin.6 Hergé also considered having 
Akass sell fake art pieces to the Emir, likely to fill his future museum. In that instance, 
the Emir’s oil money would be paying for the art and, thereby, financially supporting the 
forgery market. These sketches also show that Akass possibly has in mind for Tintin’s 
sculpture to find its ultimate resting place in Khemed at the Emir’s museum. Thus, Alph-
Art returns to the setting of the museum, that weighty metaphor from The Broken Ear, 
albeit with a key difference for the entire Tintin corpus. Instead of the admittedly 
worthless Arumbaya fetish, now Tintin himself would be the artwork placed in a 
 
5 For the notes and sketches of possible endings, see pages 54-62 of Tintin and Alph-Art. Hergé considered 
introducing various plot lines: drug trafficking; a conflict at an embassy that would bring in the fictional 
nations of San Theodoros, Borduria, and Syldavia from past stories; the possibility that Haddock takes up 
painting only to ultimately resume his alcoholic habits; and the more likely resolution that sees Tintin 
escape. 
6 It is worth noting that Rastapopoulous had become the consummate corporate cosmopolitan in The Red 
Sea Sharks. In that story, he owns Arabair, which traffics Sudanese and Senegalese as slaves after 
intercepting them on their way to Mecca, and he is also a “shipping magnate, newspaper proprietor, radio, 
television and cinema tycoon, air-line king, dealer in pearls, gun-runner, trafficker in slaves—the man who 
helped Bab El Ehr to seize power” from Emir Ben Kalish Ezab and throw the Middle East into political 
and economic chaos (Hergé, Red Sea 31). In this complicated plot, the simple resolutions of past Tintin 
stories disappear. It is telling that, immediately after discovering the kidnapped Sudanese and Senegalese 
onboard the ship, Haddock murmurs dazedly, “That cargo … I just can’t make it out” (Hergé, Red Sea 44). 
By the story’s conclusion, he and Tintin simply return home with no sense of triumph, a denouement that 





museum. The fetish in The Broken Ear exists metaphorically to question the value of 
Tintin as a reproducible commodity, but in Alph-Art metaphor disappears in place of a 
straightforward articulation of the question instead: What does it mean if Tintin is 
nothing more than a commodity in a time when the art world is overrun with influences 
from the competitiveness of foreign trade? The earlier sections of Alph-Art laugh at the 
notion that art exists for itself. The sheer repetition and mounting frustration of 
Haddock’s claims that art does not have to be for anything weaken with every iteration. 
Too many competing narratives and financial interests circulate around the production of 
art—as symbolized by the presence of Gibbons, Trickler, and the Emir in this final 
story—for art to simply exist as an end in itself. Alph-Art shows that nothing is so pure. 
Likewise, a Tintin story could never be outside current events, politics, history, and time 
in the way that Hergé briefly hoped was possible. 
Additionally, Alph-Art interrogates the meaning of Tintin the text and Tintin the 
character when placed within this highly financialized and commodified realm. It is 
ironic that Tintin will be literally changed into a sculpture. According to 
Akass/Rastapopoulous, the sculpture will be passed off as an original done by César 
Baldaccini, “authenticated by a well-known expert,” sent off to a museum, and then 
“could be entitled ‘Reporter’” (Hergé, Alph-Art 48). Here Hergé shows his 
understanding that Tintin is out of his hands as a material object. The authenticity of 
Tintin-as-sculpture (or Tintin-as-text) will have to be verified by someone else, and the 
credit of the work would be attributed to a sculptor who actually never touched the work. 
Any claims Hergé can lay on his work are irrelevant here, and that kind of authorial 




nod to the graphic series’ place as a site of enunciation that represents the world in all its 
varied periods across the Tintin corpus. But as a drowned individual entombed in liquid 
polyester, Tintin will speak no more. Instead, Tintin/Tintin can now be shipped about, 
enter new markets, and even be put to work in a nation’s creative economy. 
Two more recent literary examples further clarify the difficulty in narrativizing 
the global spread of capitalism’s influence. If Hergé was concerned about Tintin’s place 
as a commodity, Vivek Shanbhag’s Ghachar Ghochar considers the challenge posed to 
language itself. The novel tells the story of the changes that take place in an Indian 
family as they move from poverty to exorbitant wealth over the success of their spice 
business. The family’s newfound wealth negatively impacts their relationships with each 
other and their larger community. Shanbhag emphasizes that the problem is not just one 
of money, but it is also a syntactical conflict, for the narrator, the adult son in the family, 
has trouble articulating what specifically has made life so unbearable. On the one hand, 
he very clearly states what the problem is: their greed and pride. On the other hand, 
those are only effects, secondary responses to causes that are otherwise left vague in the 
text. Little is said or understood about the family’s business. The son knows they buy 
spices in bulk from Kerala and then repackage and sell them; there is also the possibility 
that the business has unsavory connections, for his uncle who runs it pays for a large 
security detail. Beyond that, nothing else is said. Thus, what specifically has led to the 
family’s greed and pride (i.e., what economic factors or structures contribute to their 
skyrocketing wealth) remains a mystery. All the reader can gather is that the family’s 
involvement in food production occurs on an industrialized scale in an India that 




The son is not even sure what goes on at work, for his title as director of the firm 
is solely nominal. The fact that money has changed their lives is undeniable; just how 
exactly it has done this is less certain. Shanbhag underscores this with the novel’s title, 
two words that aren’t actually words at all. Soon after marrying his wife Anita, the 
narrator hears her use the term ghachar ghochar to describe a bunch of string tangled in 
a knot. When asked what that means, she tells him it was a phrase her brother made up 
when they were children, a spur-of-the-moment neologism he shouted out to express his 
frustration over a tangled kite string he could not finesse. After that, it “entered the 
family’s vocabulary” and grew to simply mean anything messy or entangled, such as 
when Anita’s brother “fell in with the wrong people, and everything became ghachar 
ghochar” (78, emphasis in original). The next day, the narrator tries to use the phrase in 
a playful manner, but Anita does not laugh because for her the words are not 
meaningless. The narrator admits, “Of course, those words could never mean to me all 
that they meant to her; nor would I ever utter them as naturally as she did” (78). The 
linguistic implications here are significant. Though there is a specific material point of 
reference for the first time ghachar ghochar was used, the phrase eventually becomes an 
apt descriptor for other forms of entanglement, chaos, and brokenness. The suggestion 
here is that the confusing way different aspects of life become entangled defies 
language, so much so that these situations are waiting for a better descriptor to come 
along. It is as if Anita’s family lands upon the perfect syntax to capture their frustration 





Notably, the narrator identifies similar limits of language when trying to describe 
what it felt like to fall in love with Anita for the first time: “The rush of these feelings all 
at once is too much to describe. Language communicates in terms of what is already 
known; it chokes up when asked to deal with the entirely unprecedented” (75). Words 
fail the narrator because he does not have a preexisting reservoir of knowledge to pull 
from as he describes how he feels. The fact that language has trouble dealing with “the 
entirely unprecedented” echoes Ghosh’s frustration with literature’s seeming inability to 
narrativize what has heretofore been regarded as improbable. The suggestion here is that 
language is perpetually behind, always trying to catch up to the present yet never really 
able to. The only recourse, then, for Anita and her family is to create new words as an 
effort to jump in front of the unprecedented. That the phrase ghachar ghochar is created 
on an exasperated whim and not after careful deliberation is also telling. Shanbhag, like 
Ghosh, suggests that time is of the essence when it comes to describing reality 
accurately, and though the words are meaningless initially, they eventually come to 
signify exactly that which could not be described and signified earlier. The phrase 
creates new vernacular space or, rather, catches up to the space that has already been 
created. Over time, Anita feels these words deeply, which is why she does not appreciate 
the narrator’s use of it in jest. For her, ghachar ghochar now stands as a phrase full of 
appropriate significance and implication. 
Though the narrator initially uses it jokingly, by the end of the novel he too 
comes to take the word seriously and understands how it perfectly describes what is 
causing his family to fall apart after their wealth increases. In this way, Shanbhag 




recognition, and it is important to note that his novel goes beyond merely describing the 
work and effects of capitalism as sublime. To label something “sublime” is, in its own 
clever way, an effective method of describing the indescribable by describing just how 
indescribable it is. To acknowledge that a system or structure is too massive and intricate 
in its totality to grasp all at once is not the same as throwing up one’s hands and 
confessing to have no idea how anything within that system functions, the latter of which 
is precisely the predicament of Shanbhag’s narrator. As a case in point, quite a bit is 
known and understood about capitalism and how it works. But to say with certainty we 
understand all of it is simply impossible. The sheer global scale of capitalism’s 
movement defies such tall claims. However, that kind of sublimity is not the same claim 
that Shanbhag’s narrator makes. His frustration is instead tantamount to admitting he 
cannot comprehend what wealth has done to his family and how it did it, and the novel 
charts his journey toward recognizing that entirely new terms, such as ghachar ghochar, 
will have to be employed if some level of existential understanding is to happen. 
Shanbhag’s novel asserts that to translate such experiences into satisfactory terms 
is an issue of time, one where the signifier always arrives a little late, perpetually left in 
the dust of the signified. For language to get out in front of the work of capital and its 
effects—economic and social inequality, cultural conflict, ecological devastation—and 
create narratives that capture the present is an impossibility that Shanbhag describes and 
Ghosh laments. Shanbhag shows that language and its descriptive capabilities arrive late, 
limited as they are in their capacity only to describe what is already known or in the past; 
Ghosh, however, identifies how most cli-fi is automatically relegated to the ranks of 




is any success or encouragement from Shanbhag’s novel, it is that Ghachar Ghochar 
comes close to translating the present by narrating just how impossible that very task of 
translation is. But by articulating how difficult it is, Shanbhag also provides a tentative 
prescription: linguistic experimentation.7 
Yoko Tawada arrives at a similar conclusion in her novel The Emissary, where 
midway through she poses a question that falls within her larger concerns about the work 
of language, writing, and literature: How do you call attention to that which is invisible, 
nonrecurring, or an absence? In The Emissary, the earth is “irreversibly contaminated” 
(23), and nations install isolationist policies in response. South Africa and India were the 
first to decide to “withdraw from the global rat race in which huge corporations turned 
underground resources into anything they could sell at inhuman speeds while ruthlessly 
competing to keep the lowest production costs,” which meant “discontinuing all other 
imports and exports” (95-96). Japan, where the novel is set, followed suit due to the 
conviction that “each country should solve its own problems by itself” (42). In what 
many critics have read as a post-Fukushima commentary, The Emissary describes a 
ravaged world where successive generations in Japan become feebler, to the point that 
the elderly now care for increasingly frail children who lack energy and the ability to 
keep most food down. The novel follows Yoshiro, a novelist, who cares for his great-
grandson Mumei. Reflecting on the changes Japan has experienced in his more than 100 
 
7 Such a conclusion on Shanbhag’s part can sound like a contemporary recycling of Ezra Pound’s 
modernist mandate to “make it new,” which in some ways makes sense. Many scholars of literary 
transnationalism chart a resurgence of literary modernist thought and practice in literature across the 
globe, what has been labeled as “transnational modernism” or “new modernist studies.” See Jessica 
Berman, Modernist Commitments: Ethics, Politics, and Transnational Modernism; Peter Kalliney, 





years of life, Yoshiro recalls past efforts to revitalize Tokyo as more and more people 
fled the city for locales where food would grow. For a moment, others briefly admired 
Tokyo’s citizens, who were “the very first to give up their electrical appliances, as a 
model of the most advanced lifestyle” (51). The problem, however, is that “‘nonuse of 
existing machines’ was difficult to market as a new product. To make ‘revitalization’ a 
success, you really needed something people could see” (52). Accordingly, Tokyo 
became a ghost town. 
The complications with marketing Tokyo’s past also mirror difficulties 
throughout The Emissary that Yoshiro faces with the limitations of language. As part of 
Japan’s isolationism, the use of foreign words is discouraged if not illegal. Yoshiro 
knows that the “shelf life of words” keeps becoming briefer, and when they disappear, 
there are “no heirs to take their place” (4). In this diminished linguistic landscape, 
Tawada questions what it means to translate the present and near future into narrative 
form. On a social level in The Emissary, there is direct resistance in Japan to using 
language that references the inevitability of death. For example, a “physical 
examination” at one’s doctor becomes a “monthly look-over,” since physical sounds too 
much like phthisical, the latter conjuring up images of “asthma, tuberculosis, and death” 
(19). Similarly, “fallout” is a word one dare not utter, lest people be reminded of Japan’s 
brutal nuclear history (17). Further, the work of the novelist is rendered in a negative 
light. Yoshiro suspects that people resent writers who are “too busy penning their 
gloomy, perverse novels” and miss out on day-to-day events they could write about (68). 




traffic in “dead lines,” not deadlines (70), and Mumei’s nurse suggests that the paper 
novelists write on could just as helpfully be used as a diaper for infants (73). 
In terms of what writing produces, Yoshiro is not too optimistic about what 
books can accomplish. He believes they face an impossible task, especially when he 
thinks of sickly Mumei as the reader: 
A raw, honest treatment of the problems they faced every day would only 
end in frustration at the absence of solutions, making it impossible to 
arrive at places one could only reach in books. Creating an ideal fictional 
world for his great-grandson was another possibility, although reading 
about an ideal world wouldn’t help the boy change the world around him 
any time soon. (16) 
Yoshiro’s latter concern is that idealistic narratives fall into the realm of fantasy, and he 
does not believe such literary endeavors are helpful in any substantive way. For someone 
such as Mumei, whose physical limitations are severe, reading about an ideal world 
could register as a form of cruelty, an insulting reminder of what is impossible. Yet at 
the same time, Yoshiro seems to hold out hope that Mumei may be capable of 
“chang[ing] the world.” His added qualifier that it cannot happen “any time soon” 
presupposes that it could occur at some point. But the former option for narrative—
realism—does not seem any more productive than idealism. Realism, for Yoshiro, would 
only produce fatalism and highlight the lack of solutions for Japan’s contemporary 
social, political, and ecological situation. Yet, even so, Yoshiro again acknowledges a 




no other medium can. Whether or not those places can ever be actualized in real life, 
Yoshiro does not say, but they are present in books at the very least. 
This is the central tension within Tawada’s writing: Narrative affords writers and 
readers different options, but are any of them beneficial? Tawada chiefly answers that 
question via Mumei by tracing different ways that writing and narrative bring him hope 
and excitement. More than that, they shape and present the world to Mumei in 
compelling ways. For instance, the words Naumann Mammoth, written down on their 
calendar to denote an upcoming lecture, were “themselves … an animal that would start 
moving if only he stared at it long enough” (23). It is difficult for Mumei “to take his 
eyes off the name from which he believed a living creature might emerge” (23). Tawada 
playfully suggests here that, with enough imagination, representation in writing succeeds 
in establishing the referent. The novel explains this as the changeover between two- and 
three-dimensional representations, where the most impactful artistic rendering occurs. 
For example, pressed flowers fascinate Mumei, because they are “so different from 
ordinary pictures” with “their original forms squashed down from three dimensions into 
two” (61). The pressed flower occupies a middle space. It is not an outright artistic re-
creation of the referent through representation, but it is also not quite the referent itself, 
either. The pressed flower is neither a mere reproduction of the real nor does it capture 
the flower’s former real potential and glory of being fully in bloom. Instead, it captures 
the moment of decay and abstraction that Mumei finds so arresting. The change between 
dimensions is referenced again at Mumei’s elementary school when he and other 
students’ study a world map. It is outdated, made before an earthquake pushed Japan 




is round, the other students become angry over learning that the flat map is “a lie” and 
only a “flat drawing of a sphere” (123). However, Mumei is surprised to learn that the 
globe is cut in a different spot depending on where one lives and that, when spread out, it 
becomes “a different map of the world” (124). That there are “other, different maps” 
circulating in other locales causes Mumei to gasp (124). 
The students’ response of indignation to the flat map is a compelling corrective 
to the fascination over a pressed flower. If the flower’s movement from three dimensions 
to two is engrossing, the map’s presentation of two dimensions as actuality or accurate 
depiction of what is otherwise three-dimensional feels like a deception to the students. 
The representational work of writing has often been referred to as a kind of mapping, as 
noted earlier in chapter four, and it has more recently been referenced again by British 
novelist Tom McCarthy in his keynote address at the Society for Novel Studies 
conference in 2016, the title phrase or theme of which was “The Novel in or against 
World Literature.” In his address, McCarthy describes “the basic cartographic question 
and the basic question of literature, of the novel” as “How do you put the world on 
paper?” (167). McCarthy reminds us that all maps rendered on sheets of paper contain 
flaws since that same flat piece of paper cannot smoothly cover a sphere. It will contain 
imperfections to the point that all two-dimensional maps are “projections—and 
projections, being drafters’ conventions, are both arbitrary and flawed” (167). At some 
point, portions of the map “distend,” and the “poles themselves cannot be represented at 
all”; if someone attempts to correct that error, the equator will “undergo infinite 
distortion” (167-68). With these impossibilities assured, McCarthy eschews the pursuit 




“getting lost” as he or she tries to “pinpoint some location or event,” all while 
understanding that the search will likely yield only “the chance movements of debris 
round global flows” (166). That is to say, with The Emissary in mind, the novelist will at 
best come close to producing a pressed flower, something that is abstracted in its 
“projections … arbitrary and flawed,” yet also kinetic in its capture of “chance 
movements.” 
At one point, Mumei wonders if some material objects can “still be there … even 
after the words for them had disappeared” or if it is possible that “they change, or 
disappear, along with their names” (98). Like the outdated map in his classroom, some 
words become outmoded signifiers because the imposed political isolation negates the 
use of foreign terms. But Tawada suggests these efforts are slippery at best. A baker 
Yoshiro frequents, referring to some of his baked goods, says, “[W]e used to call this 
German bread. Officially it’s Sanuki bread now … people don’t seem to remember that 
bread is a foreign word” (14, emphasis in original). Certain outmoded or outlawed 
signifiers still slip in, relics of earlier times perhaps, but words that recall and refer to a 
different politics all the same—in this case, a time before Japan’s isolationism. Tawada 
answers Mumei’s musings here: The signified does not disappear with the signifier. 
Even if words, their representative abilities, and how they are put to different uses 
amount to little more than McCarthy’s “projections,” something is still captured and 
preserved like a pressed flower. It may be little more than a dead shell of something’s 
former, fuller actuality—Yoshiro’s grandson’s assessment of a novel as “dead lines” 
seems nicely apt by now—but even that is a form of mapping that provides some 




challenges Yoshiro believes books face, neither realism nor idealism, but some kind of 
middle ground instead, a capturing of the passage point between third and second 
dimensions. 
To synthesize the ideas briefly charted here, what Tawada does in The Emissary 
both attains and misses the gauntlet Ghosh lays down for fiction. While her novel comes 
close to cataloguing the active loss of life within the destruction of the environment, it 
also seems too future-oriented in its setting for Ghosh’s taste. The other option, though, 
as Shanbhag notes, is a sort of lag time that always plagues the narrativizing ability of 
language in its attempts to make sense of the world in the present. Language and its 
ability to describe, represent, and recreate always arrives a little too late. Indeed, to move 
beyond the political, social, and cultural evolution that global capitalism initiates is, as 
Hergé concludes, a futile effort to undertake with one’s art, and he certainly tried. But 
attempts to lend universal meaning to one’s art and give it a timeless sheen is hardly 
something that can be effected through a force of one’s will. Narrative distance is an 
illusion in its own right, one that Ghosh argues makes little sense to pursue, even if its 
seems the novel has done a fairly decent job of it when it comes to issues of climate 
change. Hergé also stopped pursuing narrative distance, concluding Tintin with the 
image of his work entombed and silenced by the different influences and interests of 
global capitalism. From a stance of literature-as-mapping, though, Hergé’s conclusion is 
hardly fair. Tintin still produces a specific map of the world, as does Shanbhag’s novel. 
They may be diagnostic and after-the-fact, outdated like the map in Mumei’s classroom, 




It is telling that after seeing both the Naumann Mammoth lecture scheduled on 
the calendar and the outdated map being brought out in class, Mumei thrusts his arms 
into the air and shouts “Paradise!” (23, 120). Both the lecture and the map symbolize 
forms of knowledge, vehicles through which information about the past will be 
disseminated. That the topics of discussion—the mammoth, the world—no longer exist 
or no longer resemble the form in which they are presented is insignificant to Mumei. A 
certain paradisiacal wonder remains regardless. But what elicits awe from Mumei—and 
notably moves him beyond the realm of language by causing him to gasp instead of 
shouting “Paradise!”—is learning that there are other maps, other ways of seeing the 
world. This, Tawada suggests, is what continues to be the truly breathtaking potential of 
literature, and it is the same goal Ghosh hopes contemporary literature would shoulder: 
to narrativize the world and all its changes in ways that map that which is still largely 
uncharted. As the global reach of capitalism continues to reshape our world and reorient 
our ways of seeing it, literature can do the same, albeit imperfectly. Since, as Tawada 
notes, there are places one can “only reach in books,” such a cartographic and linguistic 
search is an ongoing process. One often hears the phrase “an exchange of ideas,” as if 
ideas are chiefly intended for passing around to the extent they are reduced to their 
exchange value and nothing more. However, since ideas, theories, and ideologies have 
material consequences in their social aspects (Plehwe et al. 5), their use value should not 
be so easily dismissed. 
Ghosh, Hergé, Shanbhag, and Tawada all emphasize the difficulty and necessity 
of making the world legible through artistic narrative form; the methods for achieving 




world on paper” is a socially consequential act. Such narrative endeavors are entangled 
in the work and effects of global capitalism to the point it may all seem ghachar 
ghochar, but novelists continue to try to chart and map forms of understanding in the 
midst of it. It will likely require new narrative approaches, lexicons, and imaginative 
risks to create accurate global renderings, but that, Ghosh argues, precisely formulates 
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